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Preface 
In the mid-1960s when I was teaching modern British history at 
Marquette University in Milwaukee, I noticed that although the Irish 
Question was one of the most important, and certainly the most 
divisive and defining, issue in nineteenth-century British politics, 
few textbooks gave it sufficient attention. To assist my own and other 
students in American colleges and universities in their under-
standing of the Irish dimension of modern British history I wrote The 
Irish Question, 1800-1922. Since the University Press of Kentucky 
published it in 1968, the crisis in Northern Ireland has revived the 
Irish Question as a major factor in Anglo-Irish relations and as a 
disturbing element in British life and politics. The massive expan-
sion of Irish historiography since the original publication of The Irish 
Question is another good reason for taking a further look at the 
relationship between Ireland and Britain. Therefore, I was most 
happy to accept the invitation of the University Press of Kentucky 
to revise my original manuscript and to extend its narrative beyond 
the beginning of the Irish Free State. 
In this new version of The Irish Question I do not use footnotes, 
but pay tribute to the research of the many scholars who contributed 
to my knowledge of Irish history in the Recommended Reading 
section of the book. In addition, I would like to thank the graduate 
students I have worked with over the years: Eileen Brewer, Michael 
Funcheon, Brian Griffin, Terrence La Rocca, Eileen McMahon, 
Michael Murphy, Kevin O'Neill, Timothy Sarbaugh, Maryann 
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Gialanella Valiulis, and Andrew Wilson, Loyola University of Chi-
cago; Elizabeth S. Meloy, Northwestern University; Frank Biletz, 
University of Chicago; and Troy Davis, Marquette University. Their 
research and writing have affected my interpretation of Irish history 
in positive ways. 
I also learned a great deal from associations and conversations 
with such close friends as Thomas N. Brown, Patrick Casey, Vincent 
Comerford, Thomas Cunningham, Joseph M. Curran, Thomas Fla-
nagan, Thomas E. Hachey, Joseph M. Hernon Jr., T.W. Heyck, John 
Kelleher, Emmet Larkin, Sean Lucy, Ailfrid MacLochlainn, John A. 
Murphy, Maureen Murphy, Janet Nolan, Harold Orel, Ellen Skerrett, 
Mary Helen Thuente, and Alan Ward. 
I owe a special debt of gratitude to my wife, Joan; children, 
Kevin, Sheila, and Patricia; their spouses, Jean Luft, Fernando 
Trigosa, and Bob Jacques; my grandchildren, Sean, Emily, Brian, 
Kathleen, and Alex; and my West Highland White Terrier friends, 
Andy and the late Fergus, for frequent morale boosts. 
Much of this book is the result of my own research and writings 
on Irish nationalism, as indicated in the 1968 publication. In my 
discussion of the recent troubles in Northern Ireland, I borrowed 
from my Chicago Tribune essay of May 10, 1981, "Crisis in Northern 
Ireland." 
Introduction 
In many ways a study of the experience of the British in Ireland and 
Irish reactions to their unwanted presence provides insights into our 
world of disappearing empires, emerging nations, cultural conflicts 
between affluent and underdeveloped countries, and ethnic and 
religious feuds within and between nations. 
Traditional and popular versions of Irish history have traced 
the origins and attributed the success of Irish nationalism to the 
failure of Britain to react adequately or in a timely manner to the basic 
religious, political, economic, and social needs that created and 
encouraged opposition to the Union. They have described most 
British concessions to Irish demands as expedient measures de-
signed to frustrate agitations before they became insurrections. Ac-
cording to this thesis, these hastily designed sops to Irish Catholic 
complaints were palliatives rather than remedies; their deficiencies 
created new and deepened old grievances, and, in the long run, 
antagonized rather than conciliated majority Irish opinion. 
There can be little quarrel with the thesis that Irish national-
ism owed much to British ignorance of and insensitivity toward 
conditions in Ireland and Irish points of view. Still, it is too easy to 
blame sectarian strife, economic exploitation, and the denial of 
political and cultural sovereignty in Ireland entirely on the inadequa-
cies of British politicians. Even when viewed from a contemporary 
perspective the complexity of the Irish Question defies simple solu-
tions, and in their attempt to respond to Irish discontent British 
2 Introduction 
Introduction 3 
leaders have been confronted with the limitations placed on political 
action by the party system; economic and political dogmas; cultural, 
religious, and class conflict in Ireland; and the pressures and preju-
dices of British public opinion. 
At first glance the Irish Question appears to have been essen-
tially religious in nature. Protestants controlling the Irish Parliament 
in 1800 accepted the Act of Union as a compact with coreligionists 
on the other side of the Irish Sea to maintain their privileged position. 
Although the Crown and the Tory party endorsed Protestant Ascen-
dancy, the Catholic majority in Ireland refused to accept an apartheid 
policy that would condemn it to a permanent inferiority. But sectari-
anism in Ireland involves much more than theology. 
For the most part, Protestants were the educated, propertied, 
prosperous, and politically and socially dominant class. Ulster Pres-
byterians were businessmen, shopkeepers, professionals, members 
of the gentry, and tenant farmers. As Noncomformists dissenting 
from the Protestant Church of Ireland, they suffered discrimination 
for a considerable period of time, but not nearly to the same extent 
as Catholics. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
New Light Presbyterians, influenced by the liberal spirit of the 
Enlightenment, displayed tolerance toward Catholics. But the Evan-
gelical triumphed over the New Light strain, and Anglicans and 
Presbyterians found common ground in fervent no-popery. At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century there was a substantial Catholic 
middle class, a small aristocracy and gentry, and a few successful 
professionals, but in general Catholics represented the landless, 
rack-rented, illiterate, and politically underprivileged portion of the 
Irish population. While most of the emotional content of the Irish 
Question centered on the sectarian issue, its essence was the attempt 
of a besieged minority, aided by an alien legislature, to maintain 
religious, political, economic, and social dominance over a deprived 
and resentful majority increasingly aware of the power of organized 
and disciplined numbers. 
Irish nationalism emerged in the nineteenth century as a 
badge of dignity and a promise of hope for a people who in the 
century before had lost these qualities. As a mass enterprise, nation-
alism was born in the struggle for Catholic Emancipation and revi-
talized in the agitations for Repeal, Home Rule, and tenant right. 
Because the demoralized Irish masses at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century had little sense of ethnicity, the United Kingdom 
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Parliament might have forestalled Irish nationalism by immediately 
including Catholic representatives and by quickly addressing prob-
lems in Ireland. When it failed to do so, Daniel O'Connell mobilized 
Catholics for religious and political purposes, creating a political 
nationalism; later Young Ireland defined and propagandized a cul-
tural dimension of Irish nationality. Together they made Irish Catho-
lics conscious of their strength, provided them with an identity, and 
convinced them of a spiritual superiority over the "materialistic" and 
"bloodthirsty" Sassenachs holding them in bondage. The obstinancy 
of the Protestant Ascendancy in resisting logical and just concessions 
to the religious, economic, and political needs of the Catholic major-
ity, coupled with the repeated failures of Westminster to cope with 
these problems, strengthened the political and cultural aspects of the 
national movement and made a solution of the Irish Question short 
of self-government unlikely. 
Generally Whig, Radical, and Liberal politicians found it eas-
ier to deal with Irish discontent than their Tory and Conservative 
counterparts. On the British left there was considerable support for 
such reforms as Catholic Emancipation, an expanded Irish suffrage, 
a state system of Irish elementary education, and restrictions on the 
wealth and influence of the established church. Nevertheless, in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, even those with a liberal dispo-
sition exhibited mental and emotional blocks when confronting 
Catholic demands. Laissez-faire doctrines, an important element of 
the liberal creed, served the interests of industrial England, but were 
inapplicable to such Irish problems as landlord-tenant relations, 
unemployment, overpopulation, and the consequence of these diffi-
culties-famine. Radical advocates of the separation of church and 
state obstructed the development of adequate systems of secondary 
and university education in Ireland because the Irish, Catholic and 
Protestant, were reluctant to accept any plan that separated religious 
and secular schooling. All leftist factions, though friendly to various 
forms of Continental and Latin American nationalism, were cool to 
Irish claims of sovereignty. They insisted that the Union was essen-
tial to Britain's defenses and to the maintenance of the empire, and 
they accepted the common Protestant position that the purpose of 
Irish nationalism was Catholic supremacy. 
After 1868 the Liberal party made it increasingly clear that it 
was willing to go to previously rejected lengths to pacify Ireland. This 
remarkable change of position resulted from William Ewart Glad-
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stone's sincere desire to solve the Irish Question, Liberal abandon-
ment of doctrinaire laissez faire for a more flexible approach to 
economic problems, and Charles Stewart Parnell's success in organ-
izing a disciplined, talented, and determined Irish parliamentary 
party. More importantly, late nineteenth-century Liberals could not 
ignore the appeal of chauvinistic and imperialistic conservatism to 
the impulses of a substantial section of the newly enfranchised 
working class. To balance the growing appeal of the Conservative 
party, Liberals needed a working arrangement with Irish nationalists in 
the Commons. This fit the needs of Parnell, who realized that the 
success of Home Rule necessitated an accord with one of the British 
parties. Since the Liberals needed the Irish, even at the cost oflimiting 
the property rights of landlords and establishing a legislature in 
Dublin, and the Irish needed the Liberals, though it meant coopera-
tion with British secularists, Parnell and Gladstone concluded an 
alliance that weathered many storms and persisted into World War I. 
Conservative politicians could not bid as high as Liberals for 
Irish party backing because they were bound by religious convic-
tions, class privileges, and property concerns to the Protestant Ascen-
dancy in Ireland. Irish Protestants depended on British Conservatives 
to champion their cause in Parliament against the ambitions of the 
Catholic democracy. In doing so, Conservatives at Westminster were 
protecting their own interests. They knew that concessions to Irish-
Catholic agitations would establish precedents encouraging radical 
assaults on the property and power of the British upper classes. 
Since Conservatives controlled the House of Lords, they 
could veto legislation tending to curb their class privileges or to 
weaken the connection between Britain and Ireland. When the 
House of Lords made it clear in 1893 that it would never consent to 
Home Rule, Irish nationalists finally realized that constitutional 
methods of agitation would not succeed as long as the peers enjoyed 
the power to prevent Irish independence. Therefore, elimination of 
the veto power of the Lords became a major plank in the Irish party 
platform. This helped narrow the gap between Irish nationalists, 
British radicals who viewed the Lords as an obstacle preventing the 
final victory of democracy, and Labour MPs who considered the 
peers a barrier to socialism. 
Conservative resistance to Irish reform and self- government 
rested on a strong foundation, the anti-Catholic essence of British 
nativism. Since the religious conflicts of the sixteenth century, the 
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English considered Catholicism a menace to British traditions, val-
ues, and institutions. "Bloody" Mary's persecution of Protestants; 
Spain's employment of Catholic subversives to dethrone Elizabeth 
I; the Armada threat; the Catholic issue in the struggle between the 
Stuarts and Parliament; and the contests of the seventeenth, eight-
eenth, and early nineteenth centuries with Catholic France all gave 
Catholicism an alien and subversive image in Britain. As late as the 
early twentieth century, respectable British newspapers and peri-
odicals frightened and excited their readers with "revelations" of 
popish plots and Jesuit conspiracies to undermine the Protestant 
foundations of the British constitution. Since the British Catholic 
population was timid, quiet, and relatively small, Ireland with her 
millions of discontented Catholics served as a convenient whipping 
boy for no-popery zealots. 
After the Act of Union Britons were reluctantly forced to 
acknowledge the existence of the Irish Question. Irish debates oc-
cupied a disproportionate amount of parliamentary attention, to the 
detriment of vital British and imperial legislation. Irish agitations-
Catholic Emancipation, the tithe war, Father Mathew's temperance 
movement, the anti-Poor Law campaign, tenant right, and Repeal-
were reported, distorted, and exaggerated in the British press. Curi-
osity about a geographically close but culturally remote partner in the 
Union guaranteed interest in Irish writers and journalists who described 
Ireland and the Irish for British readers. Nineteenth-century economic 
developments also encouraged Irish-British contacts. Every year sub-
stantial numbers oflrish peasants supplemented meager incomes by 
working the British harvest, and factory employment possibilities 
attracted permanent Irish settlement in British industrial cities. 
Newspaper stories about Ireland and personal associations 
with the Irish did not encourage British respect. Many Britons 
decided that contempt for law and order was part of the Irish national 
character. Their Protestant, nativist sensibilities were offended by 
the militant Catholic and anti-British views of popular Irish leaders. 
Britain's industrial and agrarian working classes resented the compe-
tition of Irish labor. All levels of British society rejected Irish immi-
grants, who spoke English in a strange if melodious manner, 
demonstrated prodigality in financial matters, drank to excess and 
engaged in drunken brawls, worshipped God in a "superstitious" and 
"idolatrous" manner, and were overly submissive to their clergy, 
agents of the dreaded and hated pope in Rome. 
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In reality, Irish working-class conduct was not much different 
from that of the English, Scots, and Welsh of the same social strata. 
But, aware of British hostility and lonely and uncomfortable in an 
urban environment, transplanted peasants from Ireland clung to-
gether in tenement neighborhoods. In doing so they accentuated 
their ethnic vices and peculiarities. British critics of the Irish seldom 
tried to understand the psychological or sociological reasons for Irish 
delinquency and clannishness. Instead, they preferred to bolster 
their egos by attributing Irish behavior patterns to a basic weakness 
of character and the malignant nature of popery. From 1800 to 1922 
the Irish played a role in the British mindset similar to blacks in the 
American. They had a useful economic function doing the menial 
work other people were too weak or too proud to do; they entertained 
(the happy, shiftless stage Irishman with the rich and comic brogue); 
they frightened (they were brutal, wild, lawless, uncivilized); and 
they were convenient targets for the release of inferiority complexes 
and sadistic tendencies. In response to social and economic condi-
tions, their own weaknesses, and British attitudes, many Irish culti-
vated the stereotype that the British had designed for them. 
British anti-Irish Catholic opinion, made more formidable by 
each expansion of the electorate, was a significant emotional factor 
in British politics, making it difficult for Parliament to approach Irish 
issues objectively. In the 1840s Sir Robert Peel, as part of his Irish 
policy, attempted to detach the Catholic hierarchy and clergy from 
the ranks of Irish nationalism by easing the financial burdens of their 
church. His efforts antagonized British opinion and the ultra-Tory 
wing of the Conservative party, which had never forgiven him for 
conceding Catholic Emancipation in 1829. In revenge for Peel's 
endowment of the Roman Catholic seminary at Maynooth and his 
work in repealing the Corn Laws, ultra-Tories, combined with Whigs 
and Irish Repealers, turned Peel out of office. The cost of vengeance 
was a seriously weakened Conservative Party and the political con-
fusion and instability of the 1850s and 1860s. 
British nativism continued to influence the course of British 
politics in the last half of the nineteenth and the early decades of the 
twentieth centuries. Gladstone also discovered that British opinion 
could respond unfavorably to government efforts to satisfy Irish-
Catholic needs and demands. Like Peel, he split his party in an attempt 
to solve the Irish Question. With the completion of the Irish-Liberal 
alliance, followed by a Liberal schism over Home Rule, the anti-Catho-
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lie, anti-Irish orientation of British opinion became the most power-
ful weapon in the Conservative, renamed Unionist, party arsenal and 
the Irish alliance the most vulnerable chink in Liberal armor. 
Peel's and Gladstone's attempts to reconcile Irish aspirations 
with British domestic and imperial interests in the face of hostile 
British opinion and dissent within their own parties produced some 
of the most dramatic episodes in nineteenth-century British history. 
However, the most illuminating example of the influence of the Irish 
Question on British politics, and the difficulty of solving this ques-
tion in an atmosphere dominated by no-popery sentiment, occurred 
between 1910 and 1914, when the third Home Rule bill brought 
Britain to the precipice of civil war. 
By 1910 reforming Liberal and Unionist governments had laid 
to rest almost all Irish grievances concerning land, religion, voting, 
and education. But Irish nationalism had survived and taken on an 
existence independent of the issues that had created and nourished 
it. In 1910 and 1911 Irish nationalists played the leading role in the 
dramatic defeat of their old enemy, the House of Lords. When the 
third Home Rule bill came before Parliament in 1912, it brought 
about a direct confrontation between Irish nationalist-British Liberal 
and Irish Protestant-British Tory alliances. British politicians had no 
bribes left to offer as an alternative to Home Rule, and without the 
absolute veto of the Lords there was no legal barrier to its ultimate 
victory. Since Unionists had lost the constitutional game, they de-
cided to encourage and support Ulster Protestant threats of civil war. 
In August 1914 Britain was rescued from the grim dilemmas of the 
Irish Question by the onset of World War I. 
When Sir Edward Grey, the foreign secretary, told Parliament 
on August 3, 1914, that Germany's invasion of Belgium would lead 
to a British declaration of war, John Redmond, chair of the Irish 
parliamentary party, rose in the Commons and said that Irish nation-
alists were prepared to join with Irish unionists in a war against 
German authoritarianism and militarism and in defense of the integ-
rity of small nations such as Belgium. Parliament passed the Home 
Rule bill, and the government suspended its operation until after the 
war so that the problem of Ulster Protestant opposition to Catholic 
majority rule could be dealt with in a calmer atmosphere. 
British Conservative and anti-Irish Catholic antagonism to 
Home Rule and the limp response of the Liberal government to 
Ulster Protestant intimidation began to damage the reputation and 
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standing of the Irish party. When the slaughter on the Western Front 
ended, a weary Britain encountered a new generation oflrish nation-
alists disillusioned with British politics and British constitutionalism. 
They placed their confidence in the bullet and the grenade. 
During Easter Week 1916, members of the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood and socialist james Connolly's Irish Citizen Army engi-
neered a revolt against British rule. Armed might crushed the Dublin 
rising, but the decision of the Westminster government to execute . 
its leaders achieved the "blood sacrifice" goal of Patrick Pearse, 
poet-leader of the rebellion. People who had opposed the rebels now 
honored them as martyred heroes. 
In the December 1918 general election, the heirs of Easter 
Week running as Sinn Fein republicans destroyed the Irish party. 
Victorious candidates refused to go to Westminster, established an 
Irish parliament, the Dail, and tried to govern the country in the 
name of the Irish Republic. In January 1919 passive resistance to 
British rule evolved into a guerrilla war of liberation. But Ireland's 
most valuable weapon in the struggle was British and world opinion, 
which insisted that Britain heed its World War I claim to respect 
national self-determination. After failing to appease Irish nationalism 
in 1920 by the creation of two Home Rule parliaments, one for six of 
the nine Ulster counties, the other for the rest of the country, in 1921 
Prime Minister David Lloyd George finally offered Sinn Fein rebels 
dominion status in the form of an Irish Free State. 
Because it involved an oath of allegiance to the British mon-
arch, a considerable minority fought a brutal and costly civil war 
against dominion status. The Free State prevailed and then demon-
strated that the treaty with Britain was a steppingstone to complete 
independence. Its delegates to Commonwealth conferences ex-
panded the definition of dominion self-government, culminating in 
the 1931 Statute of Westminster that declared the freedom and 
equality of all Commonwealth members. Employing opportunities 
provided by the Statute, Eamon de Valera, the leading political 
opponent of the Free State, as leader of the Irish government was 
able by 1939 to make his country a republic in fact if not in name. 
Resisting tremendous pressures from Britain and the United States, 
Ireland demonstrated her sovereignty by maintaining neutrality in 
World War II. In 1948 a coalition government, deciding to steal a 
march on de Valera's Fianna Fail party, left the Commonwealth and 
declared Ireland a republic. 
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One of de Valera's stated reasons for neutrality was British 
occupation ofNorthern Ireland. From the early days of the Free State 
until quite recently, partition has perpetuated bitterness in Anglo-
Irish relations. The situation has been exacerbated by the discrimi-
nation that the majority Protestant population has inflicted on the 
Catholic minority, and the indifference of British governments to 
injustices in the six counties. Although Ulster Protestants insist on a 
cultural and religious uniqueness and a Britishness that separates 
their community from Catholic Ireland, politicians in the south have 
reenforced the psychological border that divides the two Irelands by 
fostering a Gaelic Irish identity and a confessional state that reflects 
the values, ethos, rules, and regulations of the Catholic church. 
After 1922 most Northern Ireland Catholics retreated into 
ghettos of despair; a few joined the Irish Republican Army in its futile 
efforts to end partition through violence. In the late 1960s well-edu-
cated Catholic moderates whose social mobility had been blocked by 
institutional and Protestant discrimination, joined with socialists, 
liberal Protestants, and radical university students in a civil rights 
movement to establish equality in housing, employment, voting, and 
social services. When Protestant mobs, encouraged by the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary and prominent Northern Ireland politicians, 
began to assault civil rights demonstrators, violence erupted. To 
protect Catholic ghettos from Protestant rage, Britain sent soldiers 
into the six counties in August 1969. Until they functioned as agents 
of the Northern Ireland government, Catholics welcomed them, but 
since early 1971 the IRA has been at war with British troops. For over 
twenty years Northern Ireland has experienced bombings and ter-
rorist attacks by the IRA on the army, and a pattern of sectarian 
murders. At present the death toll exceeds 3,100. 
At first, conflict in Northern Ireland intensified old animosi-
ties between Ireland and Britain. But when television cameras fo-
cused on Northern Ireland and publicized the discrimination that 
existed there and Britain's neglect of civil rights violations and social 
inequities, Westminster finally accepted responsibility for the situ-
ation. In March 1972 it suspended the Northern Ireland Parliament 
and ruled the six counties from Westminster. Since then Britain has 
tried to establish power-sharing assemblies in Northern Ireland, and 
has speeded up the effort started by the deposed Northern Ireland 
government to end sectarian discrimination in housing, voting, gov-
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ernment employment, and social services. At present Catholics con-
trollocal government in areas where they are a majority. 
Meanwhile, in the Irish Republic politicians recognized that 
Ulster violence was spreading from north to south. They also realized 
that the Republic's emphasis on the Gaelic tradition and its catering 
to Catholic interests and pressure groups made it impossible to 
achieve a pluralistic society necessary for a united Ireland. Conse-
quently, since the 1970s the Republic has become more secular in 
spirit and institutions. These changes have made little impression 
on Ulster Protestants, but they have made life more pleasant and 
promising for citizens in the twenty-six counties. 
Since the beginnings of the Northern Ireland crisis coopera-
tion and mutual understanding have replaced animosity and suspicion 
in Anglo-Irish relations. From the Sunningdale meeting in Decem-
ber 1973 through the Downing Street conference in December 1993, 
leaders of Britain and Ireland have worked out a common approach 
to Northern Ireland. Britain has extended to the Republic an advi-
sory role in the administration of the six counties, has agreed not to 
stand in the way of a united Ireland, and promised to implement such 
unity if it ever has the consent of a majority ofNorthern Ireland citizens. 
Ireland has said that it will not try to end partition by force, has 
accepted the principle that the fate of Northern Ireland depends on 
the will of its majority, and has promised to investigate and probably 
change those elements in its constitution offensive to Northern 
Ireland Protestants, specifically territorial claims on the six counties. 
Although the British and Irish governments have reached a 
consensus on the present and future of Northern Ireland, one that 
has the approval of most people in the two countries, the future of 
the six counties remains unclear. At the end of August 1994, Sinn 
Fein, the political arm of the Republican movement, persuaded the 
IRA to agree to a ceasefire as a prelude to negotiations on the future 
of Northern Ireland. In October unionist gunmen also agreed to stop 
shooting. Shortly after, Britain's prime minister, John Major, agreed 
to negotiations involving Britain, the Irish Republic, and all inter-
ested parties in Northern Ireland. But it will be difficult to maintain 
peace and to achieve a consensus between unionists and nationalists. 
Most Protestants and Nonconformists continue to consider them-
selves British and culturally distinct from Catholics. Some Catho-
lics, less fanatic in their lrishness than Protestants are in their 
Britishness, are prepared to accept equality in the United Kingdom 
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as a more realistic and practical priority than an undivided Ireland. 
But there is a militant Catholic minority, some fed on the mythology 
of "blood sacrifice" Irish republicanism, who insist that Britain must 
withdraw from Northern Ireland, and that the six counties must join 
the other twenty-six in an undivided Irish nation. Finding a lasting 
compromise between these extremes will tax the ingenuity of British 
and Irish governments, and test the goodwill that has recently devel-
oped between them. 
1 
Catholic 
Emancipation 
1800-1829 
Although the English were in Ireland as early as the twelfth cen-
tury, they never gained effective control until Hugh O'Neill, the Earl 
of Tyrone and the leader of Ulster resistance, surrendered to Lord 
Mountjoy, Queen Elizabeth's deputy, on March 30, 1603, six days 
after her death. Elizabeth introduced the most important factor, 
religion, into the complexity of the Irish Question. Since his church 
retained traditional theology, the Mass, and the sacraments, Henry 
VIII's defiance of papal authority did not greatly disturb Irish Catho-
lics. Elizabeth's church, however, was Protestant in doctrine and 
worship, and she planted Protestants on lands seized from Catholic 
rebels. Catholics, heretofore lukewarm papists, began to defend their 
religion against Protestantism as a dimension of English conquest 
and colonization. Since early in the seventeenth century, religion in 
Ireland has symbolized culture and nationality. 
Despite a small number of English and Scottish intruders, 
before 1607, when O'Neill, Hugh O'Donnell, and other northern 
clan chiefs fled Ireland in fear of their lives (the "Flight of the Earls"), 
Ulster was the most Gaelic, and therefore the most potentially 
rebellious Irish province. To remedy this situation, James I, the first 
Stuart king, planted colonies of English Protestants and Scottish 
Presbyterians on lands confiscated from departed clan chiefs. 
With woeful consequences, Old English Catholics, descen-
dants of Henry II 's Norman vassals, and Gaelic coreligionists tried to 
reverse their misfortunes by siding with Charles I during his war with 
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Parliament in the 1640s. Oliver Cromwell crushed them, confiscating 
their property, "driving them to Hell or Connacht." Not discouraged 
and still trying to recoup losses, Irish Catholics joined James II when 
he fought for his throne in Ireland. In 1691 William III, the victor, 
signed a benevolent peace treaty with Old English and Gaelic Catho-
lics, but the exclusively Protestant Irish Parliament, demanding 
revenge, refused to honor the king's agreement. Instead, it enacted 
legislation restricting the Catholic Church and depriving Catholics 
of property and political rights. Officials lightly enforced the religious 
aspects of the Penal Laws, but rigidly imposed their political and 
property clauses. Anti-Catholic legislation coerced most members of 
the Catholic aristocracy and gentry to either leave the country or to 
turn Protestant in order to protect their property and retain political 
and social status. Middle- and lower-class Catholics remained true to 
their faith. 
The Penal Laws divided Ireland between a virtually property-
less and powerless 75 percent Catholic majority and a 25 percent 
Protestant Ascendancy and Dissenter minority. Like Catholics, Dis-
senters, largely Presbyterian, were less than first-class citizens, a fact 
that drove hundreds of thousands of them to North America. But the 
Protestant Ascendancy Irish Parliament passed toleration acts for 
Nonconformists and shared with them an intense hatred and suspi-
cion of Catholics. 
During the eighteenth century, English colonists in Ireland 
and America became Anglo-Irish and Anglo-American patriots, using 
Lockean political theory to demand an increase in self-rule. Exploit-
ing Britain's preoccupation with the war in America, Anglo-Irish 
volunteers, mobilized to defend Ireland against a possible Bourbon 
invasion, intimidated the British into conceding free trade and Irish. 
parliamentary sovereignty. 
A Dublin parliamentary majority insisted on maintaining 
Catholic exclusion from the Irish nation. Britain, however, had a 
different agenda. Engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the 
armies of the French Revolution, England feared that France would 
attempt an invasion of the British Isles, and that Ireland, with its class 
and religious antagonisms, was a natural target for such a strategy. If 
France invaded and occupied Ireland, Britain would be trapped in a 
vise between an Ireland dominated by an old enemy and a Western 
Europe infused with the spirit of revolution. British politicians also 
wanted the best possible relations with their Austrian Hapsburg 
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Catholic ally in the struggle against France. Therefore, London 
pressured Dublin into modifying the Penal Laws. The Irish Parlia-
ment removed penalties involved in mixed marriages, permitted 
Catholics to have schools, to enter the legal profession, to vote on an 
equal footing with Protestants, to bear arms, and to be eligible for 
minor civil and military positions. In 1795 the Irish government 
endowed a Roman Catholic seminary at Maynooth in County Kildare 
to keep Irish candidates for the priesthood away from the Continent 
and French Revolution ideology. Despite these concessions, the 
Irish Parliament still denied Catholics access to political office. 
Inspired by the liberal tenets of the Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution, a number of Protestants and Nonconformists in 
1791 organized the Society of United Irishmen to promote parlia-
mentary and political reform, including Catholic Emancipation. 
Frustrated by government oppression, the United Irishmen, in alli-
ance with Catholic agrarian radicals, turned from reform to revolu-
tionary republicanism. 
The United Irishmen flourished in Ulster, providing sub-
sequent republican movements with a once-upon-a-time myth of 
Catholic-Protestant unity against the English oppressor. But the 
Orange Order founded in 1795-the product of a bloody skirmish in 
County Armagh (the Battle of the Diamond) between two agrarian 
secret societies, the Catholic Defenders and the Protestant Peep 
O'Day Boys-was probably a more accurate barometer of Ulster 
Protestant sentiment than the United Irishmen. Orangemen then 
and now have been dedicated to a never-ending war against popery 
and Catholic nationalism. 
In 1798 widespread rebellion broke out in Ireland. In Wexford, 
Orange yeomen from Ulster crushed a Catholic peasant revolt, and 
in Antrim the government used Catholic militiamen to smash a 
Protestant rising. In Mayo, French General Humbert arrived with a 
thousand soldiers. Pike-carrying Catholic peasants joined him not to 
fight for "liberty, equality, and fraternity," but for the "pope and the 
Blessed Virgin." After a string of stirring French victories, Lord 
Cornwallis defeated Humbert. British authorities executed Catholic 
rebels while returning French captives to their homeland. 
The unsuccessful but destructive 1798 rebellion confirmed British 
anxieties, shared by many members of the Irish Protestant Ascen-
dancy, that French-inspired political radicalism and an aggressive 
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Catholicism endangered the stability of Ireland and the security of 
Britain. William Pitt the Younger, the British prime minister, and his 
Cabinet decided that the Irish Parlian;1ent lacked the public confi-
dence and the financial resources to insure the tranquility oflreland 
or her immunity from French intrigue. Lord Cornwallis, the lord 
lieutenant, and Lord Castlereigh, the chief secretary, approached 
John Fitzgibbon, the earl of Clare, and other Irish Protestant leaders 
with an offer of union with Britain. 
Although many members of the Protestant Ascendancy were 
attracted by the British offer, believing that a joining of the two 
islands would prove economically beneficial to Ireland while at the 
same time guarding their privileged position against the threats of 
French radicalism in the form of Jacobinism and Romanism, a ma-
jority of Protestant leaders were hostile to Pitt's plan. They felt that 
the British Parliament might make concessions to Catholic agitation, 
and that the transfer of power to Westminister would diminish the 
political influence of the Irish aristocracy and threaten Irish economic 
interests. British negotiators won substantial support from Catholic 
prelates, namely, Dublin's archbishop, John Thomas Troy, by sug-
gesting to them, with the approval of Pitt, an advocate of Catholic 
Emancipation, that a Westminster Parliament would deal more ob-
jectively with their claims than the Protestant Ascendancy Parlia-
ment in Dublin. Disagreeing with their bishops, many patriotic 
Catholic lay leaders preferred to place their hopes for a better Irish 
future in an Irish Protestant Parliament than in an alien British 
legislature. 
The Irish Parliament rejected the notion of a united kingdom 
in 1799, but a year later the British government acquired a few 
converts from among anti-unionists, and persuaded a large number 
of neutrals to endorse the British connection. That year a majority 
of the MPs in the Irish Parliament voted the extinction of their 
country's legislative independence. Traditional interpretations of the 
Act of Union have attacked Britain for using patronage positions and 
peerages to bribe members of the Irish Parliament. But the use of 
patronage to win votes was an accepted practice in eighteenth-
century Ireland and Britain. And those who voted for the Union did 
so for a variety of reasons, as did those who voted against it. Motives 
on both sides were sometimes disinterested and thoughtful, some-
times selfish and mercenary. 
In 1800, then, members of the Protestant Ascendancy traded 
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Ireland's sovereignty for a guarantee of their privileged position, one 
hundred seats in the British House of Commons and thirty-two 
places in the House of Lords (four bishops and twenty-eight lay 
peers), a merger of the Churches of England and Ireland, and the 
amalgamation of the Irish and British treasuries (completed in 1817). 
But associations between Britain and Ireland were not as complete 
as those between England and Scotland. Ireland retained an admini-
stration comprised of a lord lieutenant and a chief secretary and their 
staffs, and separate courts, police, prisons, and a number of agencies 
and departments of government. 
Throughout the nineteenth century law-and-order mandates 
indicate that from a British perspective Ireland was more a colony 
than an integral part of the United Kingdom. To curb agrarian 
violence and to prevent insurrection the Westminster Parliament 
frequently passed coercion bills that temporarily shelved the British 
constitution in Ireland by suspending habeas corpus, imposing cur-
fews, and permitting arms searches. As Irish chief secretary (1812-
18), and later as British home secretary, Sir Robert Peel created police 
forces on both islands (which is why the Irish have called constables 
"Peelers" and the British have referred to them as "Bobbies"). 
Policemen in Britain functioned quite differently from those in 
Ireland. In England, Scotland, and Wales, constables served and 
protected their communities. In Ireland they not only prevented and 
punished crime and disorder, they also acted as a security force 
sustaining British rule. By 1867 Peel's Peace Preservation Force had 
evolved into the half-police, half-soldier Royal Irish Constabulary, a 
model for paramilitary security units throughout the empire. 
The Dublin Parliament held its last session in College Green 
on August 2, 1800; on January 28, 1801, Irish representatives took 
their places at Westminster. Now that Ireland was a part of the United 
Kingdom, the Irish Question took center stage in British politics. It 
became the most perplexing, persistent, emotional, and perhaps the 
most difficult problem confronting Britain and Ireland during the 
two succeeding centuries. 
While the Act of Union was not responsible for the social, 
religious, economic, or even all of the political dimensions of the Irish 
Question, it complicated an already difficult situation. Religion was 
the most obvious area of tension in Irish society. Due to the opposi-
tion of the king, the House of Lords, and the British public, Pitt could 
not keep his promise to emancipate Catholics. Therefore, the Irish 
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majority entered the Union as second-class citizens. In addition, they 
were taxed to support the established church, which ministered to 
the spiritual needs of only about 13 percent of Ireland's people 
(Presbyterians, Methodists, Quakers, and other Nonconformists also 
paid tithes). The Protestant minority not only enjoyed a favored 
religious position but also owned most of the property in the country 
and occupied a monopoly of Irish seats in Parliament and positions 
in government. 
When Ireland became part of the United Kingdom it had a 
small Catholic gentry and an expanding Catholic middle class, the 
product of the early Penal period when Catholics, denied property 
purchase, had to turn their energies and ambitions to commerce and 
the lower ranks of the professions. Although the position of the 
Catholic gentry and middle class had substantially improved in the 
course of the eighteenth century, they still were frustrated by remain-
ing Penal Laws, which denied them a significant role in directing 
Irish affairs. They agitated for relief legislation that would permit 
them to sit in the House of Commons and the House of Lords, hold 
government office, advance in the professions, and win social pres-
tige in the Irish community. In their agitation for political rights, they 
had little contact with or concern for the lower classes, comprising 
the overwhelming majority of the Catholic population. 
Most Irish Catholics during the early nineteenth century were 
tenant farmers or agricultural laborers. As a group they were dehu-
manized, demoralized, and largely illiterate, possessing neither the 
hope of progress nor the desire for improvement. Few tenants had 
farms larger than fifteen acres; many had only about five. Agricultural 
laborers were fortunate to have the use of an acre to grow food for 
their large families. A typical rural dwelling was a mud cabin with a 
dirt floor that could turn into a muddy mire in heavy Irish rains, and 
a vermin-saturated thatch roof. Often there was not even one window 
to let in fresh air. Since a pig was often the only valuable family 
possession, it was kept in the cabin in bad weather. Naturally these 
living conditions resulted in disease and an extremely high mortality 
rate. If a person somehow managed to survive childhood, scurvy, 
cholera, tuberculosis, and malnutrition would probably cut him or 
her down before middle age. But despite the prevalence of disease 
and hunger and the lack of medical care, Ireland had a population 
explosion that began midway through the eighteenth century and 
lasted into the early nineteenth. In 1781 the estimated population of 
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Ireland was 4,048,000; in 1841 the census recorded it at 8,175,000, an 
increase of more than 100 percent in sixty years. 
Irish men and women tended to marry young and their large 
families produced a population growth that triumphed over high 
infant mortality rates, sickness, subsistence sized agricultural plots, 
and famine. Poverty seems to encourage the sexual urge, and for Irish 
Catholics desire was satisfied in marriage. In their miserable exist-
ences, sex and the companionship of husbands, wives, and children, 
like good and even bad whiskey, were a comfort and an escape. But 
an important factor encouraging relatively early marriages, and the 
consequent fecundity of Irish women, was the potato, a vegetable 
that is easy to cultivate, flourishes in bad soil, and makes a nutritious 
meal. In the period before the Great Famine, most rural folk ate only 
potatoes and drank a little milk to wash them down. The average 
Irishman devoured ten pounds of potatoes a day, sometimes consum-
ing them half cooked so that they would take longer to digest. 
Unhappily, reliance on the potato meant frequent famines. The 
Great Hunger (1845-49) was not the first time fungus and/or bad 
weather had ruined the potato crop. 
A rapidly expanding population strained an already weak 
agrarian economy. Except for linen manufacturing and shipbuilding 
around Belfast, there was little industry in Ireland to provide an 
employment alternative to farming. Exploiting a land shortage, land-
lords were able to raise rents for holdings far beyond their value, and 
they could always find desperate people willing to pay. To accommo-
date a growing population and to earn a few shillings and pence to 
pay their landlords, tenant farmers subdivided their small plots. As 
Irish farms decreased in size, Irish agriculture increased in ineffi-
ciency. Land hunger fostered avarice, evictions, class war, and vio-
lence. 
Since landlords had the support of the law and the authorities, 
a number of secret societies such as the Ribbonmen and the White-
boys flourished in Ireland. They burned hayricks and maimed cattle 
to punish landlords and those who occupied farms of those evicted 
for nonpayment of rent; they also shot bailiffs who represented 
rack-renting landlords. But class conflict extended beyond landlords 
and tenants. Quite often tenant farmers exploited agricultural labor-
ers who also organized secret terrorist groups to impose some sort of 
moral economy in rural Ireland. Occasionally, secret societies also 
targeted Catholic priests with reputations for charging excessive dues 
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and fees for religious services such as baptisms, marriages, and 
funerals. Protestant tithe collectors were other victims of intimida-
tion and violence. 
Frequently, Irish landlords lived in Britain, and this absentee-
ism aggravated rural social and economic problems in Ireland. Resi-
dent landlords were more likely to be interested in the quality of 
agriculture practiced on their estates. They might work at improving 
the cultivation techniques of their tenants and show a humane 
interest in their welfare. Agents of absentee landlords, on the other 
hand, were often quick to evict and were likely to pay more attention 
to the collection of rents than to increasing the productivity of the 
estate. Of course, it is difficult to prove that absentees were not as 
kind or humane as resident landlords, but they did deny to Ireland 
the income derived from their property, thus frustrating the devel-
opment of domestic trades and industries. Non-resident proprietors 
were more British than Irish in points ofview, and the loss of such a 
large proportion of the aristocracy retarded the development of a 
vital, intelligent, and influential Irish political and economic opinion. 
Relations between landlords and tenants were more cordial in 
Ulster than in Leinster, Munster, or Connacht. Ulster custom per-
mitted a tenant to sell his interest in the farm when he left, protecting 
him somewhat against eviction and an unfair rent increase. But in the 
south and west, if a tenant improved his farm by draining, fencing, 
or fertilizing the land, or by repairing buildings, he increased its value 
and the landlord might raise the rent. If the tenant could not pay, the 
landlord could evict him without compensation for the changes he 
had made. As a result, tenant farmers in Leinster, Munster, or Con-
nacht seldom improved their farms, and the quality of agriculture in 
Ulster was much higher than in the rest of the country. Perhaps 
landlord-tenant relations in Protestant Ulster were relatively harmo-
nious because shared religious beliefs muted class conflict. 
Intelligent observers recognized the unhealthy condition of 
the Irish economy, but politics, religious divisions, and classical 
liberal economic theories prevented remedies. All shades of British 
political opinion, refusing to consider limitations on property rights, 
argued that the agrarian situation in Ireland was a moral problem 
beyond political solution. Although Whigs and Radicals were willing 
to give the Irish a greater share in shaping their destiny through 
political reform, and were sympathetic to equality between Catholics 
and Protestants, laissez-faire dogmatism, so important in their circles, 
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opposed suggested government public works or emigration projects. 
While some people on the left were prepared to consider alterations 
in Irish economic and social structures, Tories were adamant in 
opposing any concessions that might diminish Protestant Ascen-
dancy. They considered criticisms of the privileged position of the 
Protestant Church and the Protestant aristocracy and gentry an 
assault on property rights. They were convinced that Catholic Eman-
cipation would encourage Irish agitation and nationalism and open 
the door to further demands for reform. They thought that radical 
change in Ireland would endanger the Union and ultimately the 
empire, and inspire assaults on the British status quo. 
In Ireland, the Catholic Committee, representing the upper 
social and economic levels of the Catholic community, conducted the 
campaign for Emancipation. Before it could prevail upon Whigs and 
Radicals to translate good intentions into a specific policy that would 
defeat Tory obstinacy, the Committee had to mobilize the peasant 
majority and clergy behind Emancipation. This was a difficult task 
because members of the Catholic upper and middle classes had little 
contact with or respect for the rural proletariat, and tenant farmers 
and agricultural laborers, oppressed by political and economic sys-
tems, were poor materials for a successful agitation. Catholic Ireland 
needed a leader possessing the genius to unite and lift the spirits of 
its demoralized and depressed people, and to give them the hope 
and confidence necessary for effective political action. 
Daniel O'Connell, the architect of modern Irish political na-
tionalism, answered this need. No other Irish leader has had as much 
local or international significance. In the early nineteenth century he 
was one of the most discussed personalities in Europe: to the embat-
tled left he was a symbol of hope and a promise of the future; to the 
nervous aristocracy on the right he represented the enemy attempt-
ing to tear down the walls of entrenched privilege. O'Connell dedi-
cated his talents and his energy to the interests of Ireland, but the 
principles he represented, the objectives of his ambitions, and the 
methods of his agitations had consequences for democratic and 
liberal causes in every country within the framework of or in contact 
with Western civilization. In the aristocratic and ultra-conservative 
age of Metternich, he was a successful tribune of the people. 
O'Connell translated democratic theory into successful practice by 
mobilizing millions of illiterate Irish peasants into a disciplined, 
organized national force. Using it as a weapon, he compelled a powerful, 
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aristocratic British government to make concessions to Irish-Catholic 
demands. 
Of course, members of the British establishment despised 
O'Connell. Their newspapers and periodicals described him as a 
mendacious, avaricious vulgarian stirring up the Irish masses in order 
to fill his pockets with donations from ignorant and impoverished 
peasants. Conservative journalists and politicians told the British 
public that the Irish demagogue was the leader of a vast conspiracy 
to subvert the constitution and empire by imposing popery on the 
British Isles and separating Ireland from Britain. Since hostility to 
Catholicism was the basic ingredient in British nativism, O'Connell 
was a natural target for British Tories manipulating Protestant pas-
sions to preserve and perpetuate existing economic, social, and 
religious structures throughout the United Kingdom. 
With O'Connell's entry into politics, the Irish Question be-
came the leading emotional issue dividing British parties and public 
opinion. O'Connell gave lessons to British politicians in the tech-
niques of political organization and agitation. His successors in the 
leadership of Irish nationalism continued the instruction. 
Born on August 6, 1775, O'Connell in British terms was a 
member of the Irish Catholic gentry, but to Irishmen he was a Kerry 
clan chieftain. His father was Morgan O'Connell, but his childless 
uncle Maurice, head of the family, adopted him. Maurice, through 
the friendship of Protestant neighbors, had managed to maintain his 
property during Penal times, and had substantially increased the 
family wealth in successful smuggling operations. Some of the 
O'Connells had earned military reputations in the service of the 
Bourbons and Hapsburgs. Because the Penal Laws prohibited open 
Catholic education in Ireland, Maurice sent his nephew first to St. 
Orner and then to Douai in northern France for secondary schooling. 
Because of the chaos caused by the French Revolution, O'Connell 
finished his studies in London and stayed there to train for the bar 
at Lincoln's Inn. Conservative clerical teachers and exposure to the 
French Revolution on the Continent influenced O'Connell to be-
come a permanent opponent of the use of physical force for political 
change. Theobald Wolfe Tone, his Society of United Irishmen com-
rades, and Robert Emmet occupy prominent places in the pantheon 
of Irish nationalist heroes; O'Connell saw them differently, describ-
ing 1798 as a foolish waste of lives and property and the misdeed that 
led to the Act of Union. Robert Emmet's 1803 Dublin insurrection 
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was a miserable failure, but his articulate and passionate speech from 
the dock inspired generations oflrish nationalists. O'Connell was not 
moved by Emmet's bravery or oratory, stating that a man who caused 
so much bloodshed and so many deaths had no right to compassion. 
O'Connell's antipathy to revolutionary violence, however, did 
not erect a mental block against liberal reform. While at Lincoln's 
Inn he avidly read such exponents of liberal democracy as William 
Godwin, Thomas Paine, and Jeremy Bentham. Echoing the princi-
ples of Godwin and applying them to his own country, he argued that 
Ireland's freedom would be won through the pressures of mobilized 
public opinion rather than bullets or bayonets. O'Connell defined 
himself as a Utilitarian, and became a friend and loyal disciple of its 
founding father, Bentham. For a time he rejected the tenets of 
orthodox Christianity and embraced Deism. In time he regained his 
faith, but retained the liberal political attitudes of the Enlighten-
ment. 
Because he intended to practice law in Ireland, O'Connell 
finished his studies at Dublin's King's Inn, and in 1798 was admitted 
to the Irish bar. In 1802 he married his cousin Mary O'Connell of 
Tralee. Uncle Maurice at first disapproved of what he considered an 
unwise match, but Mary proved an asset to Daniel's political career. 
She provided him with a great deal of love, wise political advice, and 
the peace and security of a happy home. Seven children born of their 
marriage-four sons and three daughters-reached adulthood. 
Since they were barred from government office and the honors 
of their calling, the law was a difficult profession for Catholics. They 
had to be content with unimportant cases and meager fees. O'Con-
nell worked diligently and used his perceptive insights into the Irish 
character as well as his superior intelligence, quick wit, and oratorical 
skill to become the best cross-examiner and persuader of juries in 
Ireland. Fees for defending Irish Catholics were small, but his prac-
tice was large. By 1828 he had a yearly income of between £6,000 and 
£7,000. 
O'Connell used courtroom settings to propagandize his politi-
cal convictions. In addressing juries, he often criticized British rule 
in Ireland, and appealed for Catholic civil rights. When O'Connell 
entered politics, Catholic Emancipation was the big issue. Leader-
ship of the Catholic Committee was in the hands of a small Catholic 
aristocracy and gentry with the support of a larger but just as moder-
ate middle class. At Westminster, Henry Grattan, hero of 1780s 
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Anglo-Irish patriotism and a foe of the Act of Union, commanded the 
parliamentary advocates of Catholic civil rights. The cause attracted 
most Whigs and a few Tory MPs, and on occasion could mobilize a 
parliamentary majority. In defying Irish-Catholic and parliamentary 
opinion, Tory administrations could rely on George IV's Protestant 
conscience, the House of Lords, and anti-Catholic British opinion. 
Catholic Emancipation did have a compromise chance of 
success: an arrangement limiting the independence of the Catholic 
Church in Britain and Ireland. Tory leaders indicated a willingness 
to repeal political restrictions on Catholics in exchange for govern-
ment input into and veto rights over Rome's selection of bishops for 
the United Kingdom. Most prominent British Catholics, some of the 
Irish Catholic hierarchy, most notably Archbishop Troy, Grattan, the 
British Whigs, and even Pope Pius VII, anxious to have British 
support against Bonaparte, found the compromise acceptable. 
O'Connell joined a number of other Catholic laymen in op-
posing the veto. As a proponent of separation of church and state, he 
argued that government intervention in the affairs of the Catholic 
Church would be detrimental to both religion and politics. His main 
motive in resisting a Britain-Rome compromise was his commitment 
to Irish nationalism. O'Connell realized that the Emancipation issue 
could arouse and recruit Catholics in Ireland for nationality. He 
understood that although the vast majority of Irish bishops and 
priests, to mollify British and Anglo- Irish Protestant and Ulster 
Presbyterian anti-Catholicism, had not participated in politics, most 
were the sons of farmers and shopkeepers, and enjoyed the confi-
dence and respect of the laity. Therefore, they were natural leaders 
of the rural populace. If the government gained control over the 
nomination of bishops, it could use them as tools of British policy in 
Ireland. O'Connell knew that an indifferent or hostile hierarchy 
would stand in the way of an effective national movement. He 
reasoned that it would be better to postpone Catholic Emancipation 
if it meant the sacrifice of the most important institution in Ireland 
to British influence. He succeeded in rallying a considerable segment 
of hierarchical and clerical opinion against the veto. His efforts 
delayed Catholic Emancipation, but they enlisted bishops and 
priests for Irish nationalism. 
The veto issue split Catholic ranks, and for years the Emanci-
pation cause drifted. But in 1823, O'Connell, Thomas Wyse, and 
Richard Lalor Sheil, a Vetoist, met at the Wicklow mountain home 
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of Christopher Fitz-Simon, O'Connell's son-in-law, and founded the 
Catholic Association. It took time for the new organization to catch 
on. During the first few months, meetings were poorly attended. 
Then in 1824 O'Connell formulated the strategy that made the 
Catholic Association the model for all popular agitations in Britain 
and Ireland during the nineteenth century. O'Connell borrowed 
organizing and fundraising techniques from eighteenth-century Brit-
ish Methodism and radicalism. Full members of the Association paid 
a guinea in yearly dues, but anyone could become an associate 
member for just a shilling paid in penny monthly installments. 
Catholic chapels became recruiting centers for the Emancipa-
tion agitation. In sermons priests urged parishoners to join the Asso-
ciation. Encouraged by strong messages from the pulpit, Catholics 
paid their penny dues at tables set up outside chapel doors. The 
"Catholic rent" not only swelled the Association's treasury, it also 
enlisted mass support and enthusiasm. With little money to spare, 
tenant farmers were giving up the pleasures of liquor and tobacco to 
advance Catholic Emancipation. Their sacrifice committed them to 
a cause that provided a cohesive group identity, a purpose, and hope 
for the future. 
From the beginning it was obvious that the Catholic Associa-
tion was more than just a vehicle for Emancipation. O'Connell and 
his colleagues demanded a variety of reforms, including Repeal of 
the Union. British politicians recognized the danger to British rule 
in Ireland from a movement with such popular support and with such 
a vast income. In mass meetings O'Connell condemned violence and 
insisted that his followers employ constitutional methods to secure 
their civil liberties. He argued that mobilized public opinion was a 
more effective instrument of change than physical force. Neverthe-
less, behind O'Connell's explicit constitutional rhetoric there was an 
implicit threat of force. He warned British politicians that if they 
were not prepared to come to terms with a constitutional agitation, 
the Irish masses, now mobilized and full of expectations, might turn 
in frustration to leaders preaching violence as a solution to their 
problems. 
When the government outlawed the Catholic Association, 
O'Connell used his legal dexterity to reorganize and expand its 
activities. In meetings at the Dublin Corn Exchange, Association 
members protested tithes and demanded mass education, rights for 
tenant farmers, an expanded suffrage, the secret ballot, parliamen-
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tary reform, and repeal of the Union. Irish newspapers paid more 
attention to Association proceedings than they did to Westminster 
debates. In fact, the Association had become an unofficial Irish-
Catholic parliament. During the Catholic Emancipation agitation, 
O'Connell had expanded a Catholic into an Irish identity, and in-
jected liberal-democratic principles into the bloodstream of Irish 
nationalism. 
The 1826 general election was the Association's first test of 
strength. Thomas Wyse created a powerful Catholic organization in 
Waterford and nominated a pro-Emancipation Protestant, "Villiers 
Stuart, to challenge Lord George Beresford, who had held the seat 
for twenty years. Priests steeled the courage of forty-shilling free-
holders (lifetime leaseholders of a house or land with an annual rent 
of forty shillings) to vote against the wishes of their landlords. The 
Association's Waterford triumph encouraged a number of other con-
stituencies (Louth, Monaghan, Westmeath, Cork City, Galway) to 
support other pro-Emancipation Protestant candidates, and priests 
again successfully competed with landlords for the votes of tenant 
farmers. Victories in 1826 elated the Catholic Association, strength-
ened the confidence of Catholics, alarmed the Anglo-Irish Protestant 
Ascendancy, and troubled the government. 
Six months after the election, poor health necessitated the 
resignation of Lord Liverpool as prime minister. Since George Can-
ning, his successor, was sympathetic to Catholic Emancipation, 
O'Connell slowed down the pace of agitation to give Canning time 
to author and present to Parliament a Catholic relief bill. Within a 
few months, Canning was dead, the Duke of Wellington was prime 
minister, and another anti-Catholic, Peel, was home secretary and 
government leader in the Commons. Wellington appointed C.E. 
Vesey Fitzgerald, MP for Clare, to the presidency of the Board of 
Trade, forcing him to contest his seat in a by-election. 
Fitgerald was a popular landlord and a friend of Emancipation, 
but the Association decided to oppose him with a Catholic candidate. 
O'Connell reluctantly accepted the challenge. Engaged in a direct 
struggle with the enemy, the government threw massive resources 
and energy into the contest. But O'Connell had the priests and the 
tenant farmers behind him, and together they easily defeated the 
government, Fitzgerald, and Clare landlords. 
Returns from Clare compelled Wellington and Peel to make a 
difficult decision. In conscience they opposed Emancipation but the 
Catholic Emancipation 27 
alternative was bleaker. Irish Catholics could become dangerous if 
denied the fruits of victory. Government suppression of their hopes 
could encourage an increase in anti-Union sentiments. In addition 
there was the possibility that O'Connell's followers might reject his 
constitutional methods and attempt to gain their objectives through 
physical force. In any event, if the government did not concede 
Emancipation, the task of ruling Ireland would be difficult and costly. 
And if there was a rebellion in Ireland, many pro-Catholic MPs in 
the Commons would criticize the government more harshly than 
Irish rebels. Politicians also feared that turmoil in Ireland would 
encourage lawlessness in other parts of the United Kingdom. Indus-
trialism had fostered economic and social discontent in Britain, 
manifested in riots, destruction of machinery, and demands for par-
liamentary reform. 
In order to preserve the Union and peace and stability in 
Britain as well as Ireland, Wellington and Peel decided to ignore 
British anti-Catholicism and the right wing of their own party by 
conceding Emancipation in the 1829 Catholic Relief Bill. But playing 
the role of vindictive rather than good losers, they also strengthened 
Irish landlord political influence by abolishing the forty-shilling 
franchise, forced O'Connell to recontest Clare (he won at consider-
able expense), outlawed the Catholic Association, and made elected 
Catholic MPs take an insulting oath of allegiance. 
Many of his followers criticized O'Connell's sacrifice of forty-
shilling voters as a betrayal of nationalism and democracy. Indeed, it 
is difficult to understand his surrender on this issue. He protested 
publicly but without enthusiasm. In 1825, during failed negotiations, 
O'Connell had agreed to exchange government endowment of 
Catholic priests (a contradiction of a former position) and the end of 
the forty-shilling franchise for Catholic Emancipation. At the time, 
he expressed the opinion that the landlord- controlled tenant farmer 
vote was not a free expression of opinion. Catholic Emancipation's 
victory, however, had demonstrated the nationalistic and democratic 
potential of the peasant electorate. Perhaps O'Connell in 1829 did 
not energetically defend the interests of people who brought him 
election wins in 1826 and 1828 because he was unwilling to split 
Catholic leadership ranks; many upper- and middle-class Irish and 
British Catholics were not admirers of peasant democracy. 
After the Catholic Relief Act Catholics could sit in both houses 
of Parliament and were eligible for all offices in the United Kingdom 
28 The Irish Question 
except those of regent, lord chancellor, and lord lieutenant and lord 
chancellor of Ireland. The elimination of the forty-shilling vote 
reduced the Irish electorate from over one hundred thousand to 
about sixteen thousand. Still, it was theoretically possible that Irish 
Catholics could return a substantial number of their coreligionists to 
the Commons. Wellington expected Catholic Emancipation to result 
in sixty Irish-Catholic MPs. He exaggerated Catholic possibilities. 
Since MPs were not salaried, and election campaigning and London 
residency during parliamentary sessions were costly, few Catholics 
could afford political careers. As late as 1874, after a considerable 
extension of the suffrage and the adoption of the secret ballot, a 
general election returned only forty-nine Irish Catholics. But there 
were Protestant nationalists and liberals prepared to serve Irish-
Catholic constituents at Westminster. 
While Catholic Emancipation elevated the significance of 
Irish opinion in Parliament, it also altered British politics. The Tory 
party, which Peel rechristened Conservative in 1834, was never the 
same after the Catholic Emancipation crisis. Its ultra-right wing 
fought and rallied British and Irish no-popery opinion against con-
cessions to Catholics to the bitter end. Ultras never forgave Welling-
ton and Peel, particularly the latter, for betraying the Protestant 
British constitution. Under Tory pressure, Peel had to surrender his 
seat for Oxford, though he won another for Westbury. A number of 
ultra-Tories embraced parliamentary reform because they said that 
the people were more reliably conservative and anti-Catholic than 
the aristocracy and gentry. Charging that Parliament had surrendered 
to popery in defiance of the constitution and British public opinion, 
in 1830 they joined Whigs in toppling the Wellington administration, 
clearing the way for a reform Parliament. 
Realizing that British democracy, although it embraced no-
popery, posed as much of a threat to their vested interests as Irish 
nationalism, Tories soon abandoned their brief flirtation with popu-
lism. Their distrust of Peel, however, was permanent, opening a 
fissure in Conservative unity that never completely closed, deep-
ened under the stresses of the 1840s, and finally split the party into 
progressive and reactionary wings. 
Events in Ireland during the 1820s offered valuable examples 
and precedents for British radicalism. O'Connell launched the first 
successful democratic mass movement in Europe. In efforts to reform 
Parliament, the British left followed O'Connell's formula for mobi-
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lizing public opinion, collecting funds and pressuring the govern-
ment with the alternatives of reform or possible revolution. Radical 
political unions resembled the Catholic Association. Later, free-trad-
ers would also borrow O'Connell's techniques in their victorious 
campaign against the Corn Laws. 
Catholic Emancipation encouraged the spread of popular sov-
ereignty beyond parliamentary reform. In 1829 George IV lost a 
major battle with Parliament, signalling the declining power of the 
monarchy. Emancipation also was a victory of the Commons over the 
Lords, an initial triumph in a long struggle for power that would 
finally conclude with the 1911 Parliament Act, another Irish nation-
alist contribution to the evolution of British democracy. 
By conceding Catholic Emancipation, Peel and Wellington 
hoped to preserve law and order and the Union. They also intended 
to squelch Irish nationalism by lessening Irish-Catholic discontent. 
But Britain had delayed Catholic political rights too long, and only 
conceded them under duress with humiliating strings attached. In-
stead of gratitude, Irish Catholics felt confidence in their united 
strength. Emancipation encouraged them to use the power of mobi-
lized and disciplined opinion to demand other changes, such as 
religious equality, security for tenant farmers, an expanded suffrage 
with a secret ballot, and, eventually, self-government. The agitation 
for Catholic Emancipation had fostered Irish nationalism, enhanced 
O'Connell's position as leader of the Irish Catholic nation-in-waiting, 
and launched a new era in Irish protest that would complicate British 
politics and alter British institutions. 
Unfortunately; the rise of a Catholic peasant democracy with 
national aspirations heightened sectarianism in Ireland. Protestants 
worried about the permanence of their Ascendancy, and became 
more emotionally attached to the Union as their salvation. Even more 
than before, religion in Ireland symbolized cultural and political 
loyalties as well as faith and worship. 
Catholic Emancipation reverberated beyond the United 
Kingdom. With its commitment to liberal democracy; O'Connell's 
nationalism politically civilized its ally, Catholicism. When Alexis de 
Tocqueville made his journey through Ireland in 1835 he was amazed 
at the enthusiasm for popular sovereignty among Catholic bishops 
and priests at a time when Rome championed aristocratic power and 
privilege. During the nineteenth century Irish immigrants became 
the religious, political, education, and labor leaders of an expanding 
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American Catholicism. Their adherence to liberal democratic values 
hastened their adjustment to the American political consensus, and 
enabled them to direct other European Catholics who followed them 
to the United States into a similar accommodation. Irish emigrants 
to various parts of the British Empire (which would evolve into 
Commonwealth nations) have had a similar experience. 
2 
Repeal 
1829-1845 
When O'Connell entered the House of Commons in 1829, most 
political experts predicted that he would fail in his new role and 
disappear as a significant factor in British and Irish politics. They said 
that since it took years to acquire the skills and influence to become 
a leader in the Commons, he was too old at fifty-four to launch a 
parliamentary career. According to pundits, a man had to be a skilled 
debater to command the attention of other MPs. They predicted that 
while O'Connell's demagogic style, which combined earthiness, 
blarney, exaggeration, and invective, might impress Irish peasants, 
it would only antagonize British gentlemen. 
The experts underrated O'Connell. He was an immediate 
force at Westminster, laboring hard for his country while adroitly 
playing the parliamentary game. To please the folks back home, 
O'Connell on occasion would scurrilously bait opponents, but most 
often he adapted his style to the Westminster setting. Even enemies 
had to concede that he was one of the leading debaters in the 
Commons. He had a melodious, powerful voice and effectively used 
it to present his country's grievances, pleading the case for Irish 
reform and self-government. 
In the early 1830s O'Connell fought for repeal of the Act of 
Union, but Tory and Whig governments were equally determined to 
destroy nationalist agitation in Ireland. In fact, the Whig administra-
tion that took office in 1830 demonstrated more diligence in curtail-
ing repe.al efforts than had Wellington and Peel. Although Whig 
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leaders courted O'Connell's support with offers of government of-
fice, Lord Anglesey, the lord lieutenant, and Lord Stanley, the chief 
secretary, quickly outlawed every political organization the Irish 
leader initiated. 
O'Connell deserves much of the credit for the passage of the 
1832 Reform Bill. His influence was both direct and indirect. Radical 
leaders who led the agitation in Britain for parliamentary reform 
modeled their tactics on O'Connell's Emancipation campaign. Their 
political unions were copies of the Catholic Association. Radical 
newspapers reported and exaggerated discontent in Britain, warning 
the government that there were only two alternatives: reform or 
revolution. Not all Whig leaders were convinced that revolution 
would follow a failure to reform, but like Peel and Wellington in 1829, 
they could not afford to take a chance. 
O'Connell directly aided the cause of parliamentary reform by 
supporting it with public speeches and with Irish support in close 
votes. Liberal values and Irish nationalism motivated his conduct in 
the Commons. In many ways his Be nth amite Utilitarianism was more 
applicable to urban industrial Britain than it was to rural agrarian 
Ireland. But as a champion of popular sovereignty he wanted to make 
the Commons more representative of public opinion, and as an Irish 
nationalist he hoped that a liberalized British Parliament might 
concede reform and perhaps even Repeal to Ireland. 
The Reform Bill did not satisfy O'Connell's expectations. It 
increased the Irish electorate to around 93,000 (less than the pre-1829 
total), and raised Irish representation in the Commons from 100 to 
105. But in comparison to other segments of the United Kingdom, 
the Bill shortchanged Ireland. The Catholic Relief Bill had estab-
lished a £10 freehold county franchise in Ireland. The Reform Bill 
included a £10 borough franchise and added holders of land worth 
£10 with a twenty-year lease to the county franchise. None of these 
changes significantly increased the electorate or diminished the 
influence of the landlord class. As a result of the Reform Bill, 1 person 
in 115 voted in Irish county elections in contrast to 1 in 24 in England, 
1 in 23 in Wales, and 1 in 45 in Scotland. In Irish cities the franchise 
was 1 in 22, in England and Wales it was 1 in 17, and in Scotland 1 
in 27. O'Connell insisted that an increase of five MPs in the Commons 
did not adequately represent the quickly expanding Irish population, 
but British politicians replied that Parliament represented property, 
not people. 
Repeal 33 
Despite his disappointment with the Irish Reform Bill, 
O'Connell refused to cut his ties with the Whigs and ignored the 
condescending manner in which Lords Grey and Melbourne and 
other members of the Whig aristocracy treated him. He believed that 
the Tories would always sustain Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland, 
and that the Whigs offered the only possible avenue to constructive 
change. 
In the 1830s-as it had in the 1820s and would continue to 
do-the Irish Question helped to ideologically clarify and define 
British politics: Catholic Emancipation divided the Tories, and Whig 
responses to O'Connell's demands split their party. In 1834 important 
Whigs such as Sir James Graham, Edward Stanley, the earl of Ripon, 
and the duke of Richmond left the Cabinet protesting proposed 
legislation that would permit the government to interfere with prop-
erty rights and violate the Protestant church by applying its surplus 
revenues in Ireland to general public services. Before the end of the 
1830s, these defectors had moved to the Conservative benches. 
Under the pressure of Irish nationalist opinion, but against his 
better judgment, O'Connell introduced a Repeal motion in the 
Commons in 1834. The humiliating results-only one British MP 
supported it-convinced him that the British Parliament would 
never seriously consider Irish self-government until it had the 
backing of an organized, disciplined, massive, and enthusiastic agi-
tation. 
During the first five years that O'Connell supported the Whigs 
his rewards were meager. Only Lord Stanley's 1831 Irish Education 
Bill, establishing a state-supported system of national elementary 
schools, made a significant positive change in Irish life. In order to 
minimize religious conflict, national schools offered nondenomina-
tional instruction in secular subjects but various sects could provide 
religious lessons for their own members. 
Protestants objected to a "Godless" system outside their con-
trol. At first, most Catholic leaders welcomed the opportunity to raise 
the cultural level of their people, but later, when the church hierarchy 
developed a spirit of boldness and self-confidence, Archbishops Paul 
Cullen (Dublin), the ultramontane, and John MacHale (Tuam), the 
nationalist, condemned the national schools. The former said they 
were instruments of Protestant proselytism; the latter considered 
them agents of British rule. When Catholics began to attack the 
national schools, Protestants switched their position and began to 
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defend them to avoid government financial aid in support of a 
denominational education system where most of the schools would 
be Catholic. However, by the mid-nineteenth century the national 
schools had already in fact if not in name become denominational. 
In Catholic districts priests headed school boards, and in Protestant 
areas parsons or vicars performed the same function. 
The national system of education in Ireland had implications 
for Britain. In Ireland the government had experimented with a 
system of state-supported, theoretically secular education at a time 
when it was afraid to take such a risk in Britain. The Irish experiment 
was a victory for British radicalism, increasing pressure for nonde-
nominational state-financed schooling in Britain. 
For five years the Whigs enjoyed the benefits oflrish nation-
alist support without the inconveniences of an open alliance. Then, 
in 1835, the balance of political forces in the House of Commons 
forced them to come to terms with O'Connell. The Lichfield House 
Compact, an alliance between Whigs, Radicals, and Irish Repealers, 
promised O'Connell improvements in the administration of Irish 
affairs in exchange for his guarantee to keep the Whigs in office and 
aid them in their efforts to govern Ireland. In effect, this meant that 
O'Connell had agreed to abandon the agitation for Repeal in return 
for a promise of reform. Of course, the Tories denounced the Whig-
Radical-Irish combination as a dishonorable and unholy alliance and 
some Irish nationalists agreed with that interpretation. Lords Russell 
and Melbourne replied that there was nothing in the Lichfield House 
Compact contrary to Whig principles, and O'Connell insisted that 
his arrangements with the Whigs did not'violate his political convic-
tions. 
O'Connell advocated Repeal as the only plausible answer to 
the Irish Question. He said that only the Irish could solve the 
political, religious, social, and economic problems unique to their 
agrarian, almost feudal and manorial country. O'Connell knew that 
because they were the only people who could afford the luxury of 
politics-with its election expenses and service without compensa-
tion-upper-class Protestants would dominate an Irish parliament. 
But he was confident that Irish Catholic opinion and a large Catholic 
electorate would influence Protestant members of an Irish Lords and 
Commons. And he expected that time would bring changes increas-
ing Catholic representation in a Dublin legislature. 
Although O'Connell believed that under the Union Irish 
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needs were subordinate to British interests, and urged self-govern-
ment for his people, he was willing to let British politicians prove him 
wrong. The Irish leader often said that he would accept the Union 
as a permanent arrangement on the following conditions: that Britain 
treat Ireland as an equal partner and endeavor to promote her pros-
perity, and that Parliament discuss Irish issues in Irish and not British 
terms, giving them a sympathetic hearing. 
Except when making speeches to Irish audiences, O'Connell 
was not a fanatic nationalist. He did not subscribe to the romantic 
cultural nationalism that emerged in the early nineteenth century. As 
a disciple of Bentham, he was more interested in the personal liberty, 
happiness, and economic security of the Irish people than in such 
abstract concepts as cultural sovereignty or the folk soul. Although 
he doubted that the Protestant-dominated Parliament, representing 
an increasingly British urban industrial society, could ever have the 
patience, the sympathy, or the understanding to solve the problems 
of Catholic, agrarian Ireland, O'Connell, in the Lichfield House 
Compact, gave the Whigs another opportunity to prove to Ireland 
the advantages of the Union. 
Melbourne's administration did place three important Irish 
bills on the statute books. In 1838 it commuted the tithe to a tax on 
landed property, theoretically freeing Catholic tenant farmers from 
the obligation of financing Protestantism. That same year, Parliament 
applied the controversial principle of the British Poor Law-the 
workhouse test for relief-to Ireland, but the Irish Poor Law did not 
go into effect until 1842. The Irish Municipal Reform Bill, which 
cleared Parliament in 1840, opened Irish city government to Catholic 
participation. Of these three bills, the Poor Law is perhaps the best 
example of the insensitivity of a British Parliament legislating for 
Ireland. 
In 1833 the British prime minister, Lord Grey, appointed the 
Irish Poor Law Commission, including prominent Catholic, Protes-
tant, and Presbyterian clerics, to investigate poverty in their country 
and to recommend remedies. After two years spent collecting and 
evaluating evidence, the Commission submitted a report in 1836 
rejecting the British Poor Law as inappropriate for Ireland. It pointed 
out that poverty was not a disgrace there and that the pauper had an 
important role in society. Wandering beggars brought news and 
entertainment into peasant cottages and provided people with an 
opportunity to practice Christian charity. Commissioners said that 
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Irishmen would resent the government locking the poor in work-
houses like criminals. And they insisted that Ireland could not afford 
the British system. Nearly two-and-a-half million people in Ireland 
were on the verge of starvation. To place all of them in workhouses 
would overburden the financial resources of an underdeveloped 
country, and paying poor rates would reduce many others to mendi-
cancy. Instead of a poor law, the Commission recommended more 
voluntary relief agencies, public works projects to provide employ-
ment and improve the economic potential of the country, and state-
financed emigration. 
Lord John Russell, Whig leader in the Commons, ignored the 
report of the Irish Poor Law Commission. According to his Utilitarian 
logic, what suited Britain would fit Ireland. He sent George Nicholls, 
a British Poor Law official, across the Irish Sea to conduct another 
poverty survey. After only six weeks of research, he advised a British 
model poor law, and Russell and Parliament accepted his recommen-
dation. 
O'Connell was not satisfied with the fruits of the Whig alli-
ance. The Tithe Act failed to meet his demand for the disestablish-
ment of Protestantism, and it did not keep landlords from raising 
rents to compensate for the tax they paid to the established church. 
While O'Connell's arrangement with the Whigs prevented him from 
vigorously opposing the Poor Law, he voted against it. He also 
complained that the Whigs did not increase the Irish parliamentary 
franchise or Irish representation in the Commons, and that they did 
not do enough to curb Protestant Ascendancy. 
Although Whig legislation disappointed O'Connell, Thomas 
Drummond, Irish undersecretary, did diminish Protestant influence. 
He appointed Catholics civil servants, magistrates, and other legal 
officials, and he told landlords that they had duties as well as rights. 
Drummond also outlawed and drove the Orange Order underground. 
Unfortunately, the liberal and tolerant spirit in Dublin Castle died 
with Drummond in 1840. 
In 1838 O'Connell decided to warn Melbourne that he must 
earn continued support from Irish nationalist MPs. He organized the 
Precursor Society as a prelude to a revival of Repeal agitation and 
again demanded substantial Irish reforms. When it was clear that the 
Whigs would not introduce any more important Irish legislation, 
O'Connell decided to implement his threat. In April1840 he chaired 
the first public meeting of the National Association of Ireland, 
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rechristened in 1841 as the Loyal National Repeal Association. Like 
the Catholic Association, the new organization met at the Corn 
Exchange, Burgh Quay, Dublin, and later at a new nearby building, 
Conciliation Hall. Only a hundred people attended the first meeting, 
and just fifteen of them applied for membership. This apathetic 
response was an indication that many nationalists feared that O'Con-
nell's alliance with the Whigs revealed his insincerity in regard to 
Repeal, and that he intended the new organization only as an instru-
ment to intimidate Melbourne. 
O'Connell modeled the Repeal organization on the Catholic 
Association. Members paid one pound in annual dues. Those who 
contributed ten pounds or more were called Volunteers, and could 
wear a uniform similar to the one worn by the Irish Volunteers when 
they forced a British government, fearful of a French invasion, to 
grant free trade and parliamentary sovereignty to Ireland in 1782. To 
obtain mass support for Repeal, O'Connell followed the Catholic 
Association formula, inviting tenant farmers and city and town work-
ers to become associate members for a shilling a year, paid in install-
ments of a penny a month or a farthing a week. In urban and rural 
parishes, Repeal wardens, men selected by local clergy and approved 
by the Association, collected dues and sent them, along with names 
of contributors, to Dublin. They also encouraged Repeal enthusiasm 
in their districts and established reading rooms where those involved 
and/or interested in the movement could read nationalist newspapers 
and pamphlets. Performing functions associated with later Irish-
American precinct captains, wardens were the main cogs in the 
Repeal machinery. 
For its first three years, the Loyal National Repeal Association 
made little progress in its goal to enlist the backing of Irish opinion. 
Most of the energetic and bright lawyers who had helped O'Connell 
construct an effective Catholic Association were now successes in 
their profession, reluctant to jeopardize their economic and social 
standing by supporting an anti-British movement with few prospects 
of success. Many, such as Richard Lalor Sheil, were loyal Whig MPs, 
and some held government office. Until1843 even the Catholic hierar-
chy seemed indifferent to Repeal. But in late 1842 O'Connell did 
acquire lieutenants from a new generation of talented young men. 
On October 15, 1842, the first issue of the Nation appeared. It 
combined the talents of Thomas Osborne Davis, John Blake Dillon, 
and Charles Gavan Duffy-three young men in their twenties, 
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trained in the law and experienced in journalism. Davis was an 
Anglo-Irish Protestant; Dillon and Duffy were Catholics; Davis and 
Dillon had attended Trinity College; Davis was from Dublin, Dillon 
from Connacht, and Duffy from Ulster. Liberalism and romantic 
nationalism inspired all three. 
Duffy, Dillon, and Davis founded the Nation "to create and 
foster public opinion and make it racy of the soil." They defined a 
nation as something beyond a political state; it was essentially a 
cultural and spiritual entity formed by history and tradition. They 
insisted that true Irish sovereignty depended on cultural inde-
pendence and integrity as well as self-government. 
Although Continental cultural nationalism inspired Young Ire-
land, as the Nation writers came to be called, they also drew from local 
sources. Influenced by the Scotsman James MacPherson's somewhat 
bogus translations of the Ossianic poems and tales, some Anglo-Irish 
Protestants in the late eighteenth century, intellectually fascinated 
with the Gaelic past, founded the Royal Irish Academy. In their 
poetry, patriotic ballads, and harp festivals, the Society of United 
Irishmen also furthered interest in Irish antiquities. Early in the 
nineteenth century, Thomas Moore's Irish Melodies and the historical 
novels of Lady Morgan (Sydney Owenson), the "Wild Irish Girl," 
both popular in Irish and British circles, romanticized Gaelic Ireland. 
In the 1830s Eugene O'Curry and John O'Donovan, two Catholics 
involved in the Ordnance Survey, 1831-1846, that remapped Ireland 
in a scientific manner, recovered and translated many old manu-
scripts, establishing a scholarly foundation for Gaelic studies. 
Samuel Ferguson, a Trinity-educated Belfast Protestant, was 
another important early Gaelic scholar. In the 1830s he wrote for the 
Dublin University Magazine. The DUM was a Tory voice, but it pro-
moted Irish cultural nationalism to save and strengthen the Union. 
Ferguson and his colleagues pleaded with Irish Protestants to form 
a common bond with the Catholic majority through interest in 
Ireland's history and culture, especially the Gaelic tradition. They 
believed that cultural nationalism could be a satisfying alternative to 
political nationalism, and that a distinct Irish identity could exist 
within the context of the United Kingdom. 
If Young Ireland did not quite create Irish cultural nationalism, 
the young men at the Nation packaged and presented it better than 
those who had come before. O'Connell's political nationalism, forged 
in the struggle for Catholic Emancipation, provided the Nation with 
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an eager audience. In their weekly paper, Davis, Dillon, Duffy and 
their colleagues favorably compared the spiritual qualities of peasant, 
agrarian Ireland with the materialism of urban, industrial Britain. An 
Irish Parliament, they said, would protect their country from the 
contamination of an alien, decadent culture. Young Icelanders 
blamed the British-planned, -organized, and -controlled national 
schools for sabotaging the Irish cultural heritage and imposing British 
values. (Actually, the national schools expanded the reading audi-
ence for the Nation.) They envisioned their role as assuming the 
responsibility of educating their countrymen to know and appreciate 
their own history, language, and culture. 
Among others, the Nation attracted the talents of Thomas 
MacNevin, Daniel Owen Madden, John Mitchel, John O'Hagan, 
Thomas D'Arcy McGee, and Thomas Francis Meagher. In their 
essays they praised the high standards of early Christian Irish culture 
and the contribution made by Irish missionaries to the spread of 
civilization in Western Europe. They also wrote about the Irish 
patriots who resisted Dane, Norman, and English invaders. The 
Nation did more than exalt the past; it also tried to encourage a 
cultural revival, publishing the best in contemporary Irish writing. 
Poems by James Clarence Mangan and stories by William Carleton, 
probably the two most significant literary talents in Ireland during 
the first half of the nineteenth century, and the work of other creative 
writers and scholars appeared in the Nation. The paper invited 
readers to submit essays, poems, and ballads. Many of the nationalist 
songs still enjoying popularity among the Irish at home, in Britain, 
the United States, and throughout the Commonwealth first appeared 
in the Nation. 
The Irish language was an important Young Ireland cause. The 
Nation urged its preservation where it survived and its revival where 
it had vanished. Young Icelanders said that Irish expressed the mind 
and soul of a unique, indigenous culture, and that English, a foreign 
tongue, represented cultural as well as political colonialism. 
Dillon, Duffy, Davis, and associates attempted to separate the 
Irish and Catholic identities. They pleaded for harmony among all 
religious communities and stressed the common nationality of all 
those calling Ireland their home. The Nation gave equal attention to 
the patriotic contributions of people from all traditions. In discussing 
common grievances, it insisted that everyone in Ireland would profit 
from Repeal. 
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News coverage played a secondary role to the Nation's cultural 
and propaganda efforts. The paper usually borrowed news stories 
from other newspapers, and centered Young Ireland talent on edito-
rials, poetry, historical essays, biographical sketches, patriotic ballads, 
and reviews. In addition to advocacy of the Irish language, editorials 
endorsed and preached cultural and political nationalism, sectarian 
harmony, tenant right, mass education (cultural and vocational), and 
political reforms consistent with liberalism and democracy. The 
Nation had such an immediate impact that it quickly attracted the 
attention of Parliament. British MPs lauded Young Ireland ability, 
but condemned its radical anti-British ideology. 
Neither the appeals of the Dublin University Magazine nor the 
Nation enlisted much Anglo-Irish Protestant or Ulster Presbyterian en-
thusiasm. To them the Gaelic tradition represented Catholicism and 
nationalism, both dangerous to their security and standing. They 
continued to look to the British connection as their safeguard. But 
Young Ireland ideas found a home in the hearts and minds of those in 
an insecure Irish-Catholic middle class looking for a message that would 
lift their egos by telling them that they were products of and partici-
pants in a unique and significant historical and cultural tradition. 
O'Connell welcomed Young Irelanders to the Loyal National 
Repeal Association, but he was always a little suspicious of his young 
allies. Since his Irish commitments were rooted in a Benthamite 
concern for the bread-and-butter issues of politics, he never really 
understood the uncompromising cultural nationalism of Young Ire-
land. On political platforms, O'Connell never hesitated to tell the 
Irish that they were the most virtuous, handsome, and intelligent 
people in the world, and that they lived in a country unmatched in 
physical beauty or in economic potential. This was not cultural 
nationalism; it was blarney used to lift spirits demoralized by over a 
century of ignorance, oppression, and poverty. 
O'Connell sincerely loved his country and its people, Protes-
tant, Nonconformist, and Catholic, and he was proud of his position 
as the Irish chieftain. He had little time, however, for excursions into 
the Gaelic past. His Utilitarian views are well illustrated by his 
attitude toward the Irish language. Unlike the Young Irelanders, he 
knew, spoke, and occasionally used Irish in political speeches, some-
times to confuse police reporters, but he was opposed to preservation 
efforts. To him, the Irish language was a symbol of inferiority and a 
barrier to progress. O'Connell was so occupied with the future of 
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Ireland that he had little time for its past. He wanted the Irish to have 
all of the cultural and technological advantages of nineteenth-cen-
tury living. O'Connell, an enthusiastic reader of Dickens, did not 
hate England or English culture. He admired Britain's technological 
advances, its constitution, political institutions, and liberal tradition, 
and wanted them for his own people. 
Since the cosmopolitan O'Connell could not understand or 
sympathize with the spirit of cultural nationalism that had spread 
through Europe and entered his own country in the form of Young 
Ireland, he distrusted the militant tone of the Nation and sometimes 
ridiculed its literary efforts. On the other hand, Young Icelanders 
were often impatient with O'Connell's pragmatism, flirtations with 
the Whigs, vulgarity, willingness to compromise Repeal for reform, 
affinity for the Catholic hierarchy and clergy, and despotic control 
over the Repeal Association. The Nation and O'Connell disagreed 
on British Chartism (a British working-class effort to achieve eco-
nomic and social change by democratizing the political system), Corn 
Law repeal, and federalism. Young Ireland viewed the Chartists as 
representatives of the British democracy, and therefore natural allies 
of Irish nationalism against the common enemy, the British aristoc-
racy. O'Connell condemned the Chartists, particularly his old enemy 
Fergus O'Connor, for employing methods of agitation that tended to 
encourage violence. True to his Utilitarian, free-trade convictions he 
opposed the Corn Laws. In rebuttal, the Nation held the position that 
protection was necessary for the welfare of the Irish agrarian econ-
omy, and that free trade would benefit industrial Britain at the 
expense of Ireland. Young Ireland was prepared to work with Irish 
federalists in a common attack on British domination in Ireland, but 
considered the limited Irish Parliament they proposed as inadequate 
for Irish needs. O'Connell was inclined to accept a federal arrange-
ment as a settlement of Irish claims if he could get British politicians 
to make-and Irish opinion to accept-such an offer. 
Despite differences in temperament, methods, and policy, 
Young Icelanders realized that O'Connell had the allegiance of the 
Irish masses and that without him the national movement would 
collapse. Therefore, they were gentle in their criticism of the old 
man. They submitted to his leadership in the Repeal Association, 
and their propaganda efforts contributed to the revival of national 
enthusiasm. About eight thousand people purchased the Nation, but 
its influence extended beyond that number. The paper was in 
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Repeal reading rooms, and all over the country illiterate peasants 
crowded into thatch-roofed cottages to listen to the local scholar read 
Young Ireland poems, essays, and editorials. 
While O'Connell served as first Catholic lord mayor of Dublin, 
Repeal was moribund in 1842. When he completed his term, his old 
enemy, Sir Robert Peel, was prime minister of a Conservative gov-
ernment, and the Loyal National Repeal Association was meeting 
weekly at the Corn Exchange. Few English politicians or journalists 
took it seriously. Writers in British newspapers and periodicals de-
scribed O'Connell as a washed-up old demagogue agitating Repeal 
to keep his name before the Irish masses so he could collect money 
from naive, duped peasants. If this was his motive, he was unsuccess-
ful. The Irish people demonstrated their apathy toward Repeal by 
not contributing their farthings and pennies to the Association. Only 
the success of the Nation indicated that the goals of nationalism had 
a following. 
British and Irish indifference to Repeal irritated O'Connell, 
who loved the limelight, needed the annual tribute he received from 
the Irish people (financial compensation for sacrificing his law prac-
tice in order to serve in their interest), still had work to do for Ireland, 
and could not achieve his goals without the support, financial and 
moral, of the Catholic populace. So in January 1843 he decided to 
wage one more campaign for an Irish parliament or Irish reform, 
knowing that he had at his disposal the necessary ingredients for a 
successful agitation. 
Although Catholic Emancipation, reform of the municipal 
corporations, the national schools, and the conversion of the tithe to 
a rent charge paid by the landlord satisfied some Irish needs, these 
were halfway measures enacted in a surly, reluctant manner, and 
therefore did not extinguish Irish discontent. Poverty, Protestant 
Ascendancy, and the tenant-right issue remained to perpetuate ten-
sions between Britain and Ireland. When the government put the 
Poor Law into operation in 1842, all segments of Irish society ex-
pressed displeasure. Catholic, Protestant, and Presbyterian leaders 
united to condemn the workhouse test and the refusal to give outdoor 
relief (charity provided directly to people outside of an institutional 
framework). Irish Nationalists, Tories, and Whigs all protested the 
despotic powers of the Central Board of Poor Law Commissioners 
and complained about the expenses of operating a system designed 
for an industrial rather than an agrarian country. 
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Members of the upper and middle classes expressed their 
disapproval of the Poor Law in petitions to Parliament, platform 
speeches, and letters to newspapers. Tenant farmers often resorted 
to more spectacular and sometimes violent tactics. In many sections 
of the country they refused to pay poor rates, even when the govern-
ment sent the army to collect them. O'Connell, aware of how oppo-
sition to the Poor Law stimulated anti-British passions, encouraged 
the protest, and included an anti-Poor Law plank as a major part of 
his Repeal platform. His strategy produced quick results. In the 
spring of 1843, as the anti-Poor Law agitation tapered off, the Repeal 
Association grew in strength, numbers, and financial income. 
At the beginning of 1843 the most popular and influential man 
in Ireland, next to O'Connell, was Theobald Mathew, a Capuchin 
friar. Mathew had enrolled between four and five million people in 
his Temperance Society with a branch, complete with reading room 
and colorfully uniformed musical bands, in almost every country 
town. Even Ascendancy-dominated newspapers praised Mathew's 
efforts to curb the tendency of the Irish poor to escape misery in the 
bottle and the jug. Because temperance had continued the mass-
movement style that O'Connell had originated in the 1820s, the 
Repeal leader considered the self-control and the enthusiasm of 
Father Mathew's teetotalers a potential fountain of Repeal strength. 
He tried to lure them into the ranks of Repeal by endorsing their 
cause, describing temperance as the most powerful weapon in the 
arsenal of moral force. He said it would discipline nationalists and 
strengthen them for their struggle against British domination. 
Hoping to avoid partisan politics, Mathew refused to alienate 
Irish and British non-Catholics by associating temperance with Irish 
nationalism. But since he could not control or dictate the political 
loyalties or opinions of his followers, O'Connell succeeded in captur-
ing their attention and loyalty. At the height of Repeal enthusiasm, 
temperance bands played an important role at public meetings, and 
the Nation was prominent in Society reading rooms. 
After O'Connell had snared anti-Poor Law protesters and 
teetotalers, he persuaded the Dublin Corporation, along with other 
municipal and public bodies, to petition Parliament for a Repeal of 
the Union. Government officials aided Repeal recruiting by a series 
of tactical blunders. They awarded the Irish mail-coach contract to a 
Scottish company in preference to an Irish concern already holding 
the concession, thus forcing thousands of Dublin workers to face the 
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prospect of unemployment in an already job-starved city. Then they 
dismissed Dr. Phelan, the only Catholic Poor Law commissioner, 
without an explanation. When the government finally decided to 
amend the Poor Law, it made concessions to the gentry while ignor-
ing tenant farmer complaints. 
While the Repeal agitation was gaining momentum, Welling-
ton and Peel pushed an Irish Arms Bill through Parliament curtailing 
civil liberties, and the Irish lord chancellor, Sir Edward Sugden, 
dismissed magistrates who attended Repeal meetings (though he 
admitted they were legal and constitutional). The Arms Bill and the 
dismissal of the magistrates rallied Catholic barristers and solicitors 
to the Repeal standard, giving O'Connell the support of an influen-
tial segment of the Catholic middle class that had largely deserted 
him after Catholic Emancipation. 
In the spring of 1843 O'Connell began to hold Sunday public 
assemblies to petition Parliament for a Repeal of the Union, located 
in a different part of the country every week. Thousands crowded 
the roads on early Sunday mornings; many journeyed a long distance 
to attend the meetings. Priests said Mass for them on the hillsides, 
before they cooked potato breakfasts over turf fires. Priests, temper-
ance bands, local dignitaries, and lines of marching Repealers met 
O'Connell as he approached the selected town. They detached the 
horses and pulled his carriage by hand through the streets as women 
and children threw flowers in the path of the "Liberator." 
At these mass rallies, O'Connell told audiences of hundreds 
of thousands that they were the bravest, strongest, and most patient 
and virtuous people on the face of the earth. He predicted that before 
the year was out they would have a Dublin parliament, acomplished 
by the force of moral persuasion. He said that they would never fight 
unless attacked, but that would not happen. Peel and Wellington 
would surrender to Irish national opinion as they had in 1829. O'Con-
nell assured Repealers that an Irish legislature would solve the 
country's problems. Tenants would be secure on their farms, trade 
and commerce would flourish, and culture would thrive. Catholics, 
Protestants, and Nonconformists would live in harmony. There 
would be liberty of conscience with no established church. A free 
Ireland faithful to the Crown would live in peace with Britain. 
O'Connell always encouraged loyalty to Queen Victoria. He 
told his listeners that if her ministers, "Orange Peel" and Wellington, 
the "stunted corporal," denied Ireland its due, Victoria would use her 
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royal prerogative to establish a Dublin parliament. In preparation for 
independence, O'Connell promised to summon a pre-parliament, 
the Council of Three Hundred, and to establish arbitration courts so 
the people could seek an Irish rather than a British version of justice. 
By autumn, arbitration courts existed and operated with surprising 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
These Monster Meetings, as newspapers described them, 
were a tremendous success. Contributions poured into the Associa-
tion treasury. Five times during the late spring and summer the 
weekly Repeal rent exceeded £2,000, a fortune for the time. Much 
of the money came from the Irish in Britain and the United States, 
despite considerable Irish-American resentment of O'Connell's con-
demnation of slavery and its supporters. He said that he could not 
take blood money from defenders of black slavery to free Irish helots. 
O'Connell was ahead of his time in demanding not only emancipa-
tion but also full political and civil rights for blacks, fellow sons and 
daughters of God and equal members of the human race. 
Crowds at Monster Meetings and the size of the Repeal rent 
frayed Irish Protestant and Presbyterian nerves. They insisted that 
the government suppress the agitation and outlaw the Repeal Asso-
ciation. Earl DeGrey, the anti-Catholic lord lieutenant, supported 
their demand. 
Not until May of 1843 did Peel realize that O'Connell had 
mobilized a formidable challenge to British authority. As soon as he 
recognized the danger, the prime minister told Parliament that he 
would preserve the Union at all costs, but found it difficult to deal 
directly with O'Connell's agitation. Peel feared that anti-Repeal 
legislation might unintentionally embrace the Anti-Corn Law 
League, modeled on O'Connell's recipe for agitation. An attack on 
Repeal might unite Radicals, democrats, free-traders, and Irish na-
tionalists in a common crusade in defense of civil and political 
liberties. This would make O'Connell respectable in Britain and 
both the anti-Corn Law and Repeal agitations would become more 
difficult to handle. 
Once Peel rejected an anti-Repeal strategy that could provide 
O'Connell with British allies, he was forced to treat revitalized Irish 
nationalism with a policy of calculated indifference. His refusal to 
respond with coercive legislation or military action to O'Connell's 
boastful and aggressive orations infuriated the reactionary, anti-Irish, 
no-popery Tory core of the Conservative party, but his indifference 
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masked a carefully calculated plan to destroy O'Connell's influence 
in Ireland while at the same time eradicating the roots of Irish 
nationalism. By not acknowledging the significance of Repeal by 
either coercion or immediate conciliation, Peel hoped to demonstrate 
to Irish Catholics that the scarcely veiled threats of the agitation 
would not intimidate the government into conceding either Repeal 
or reform. He hoped that once they comprehended that O'Connell 
could not redeem any of his extravagant pledges, the Irish public 
would lose confidence in him and his tactics. Repeal would then 
dwindle into insignificance, and the British army could easily handle 
any nationalist hotheads who reacted with physical violence. 
While Peel and Sir James Graham, the home secretary, waited 
for their policy of indifference to deflate the Repeal balloon, they 
planned a long-range Irish policy to satisfy some of the needs and 
ambitions of the various components of the anti-Union coalition, and 
thus destroy Irish nationalism by eliminating the grievances that had 
created and nourished it. The government, however, had no inten-
tion of initiating reforms while agitation flourished and O'Connell 
enjoyed the confidence of Irish Catholics. Peel thought that conces-
sions to Irish demands in 1843 might encourage nationalists to 
believe that the government was susceptible to intimidation and 
inspire O'Connell to intensify agitation. He wanted an Irish policy 
that was more than a frightened, ill-considered response to Irish 
discontent. He intended to lay the Irish Question permanently to 
rest, and to make the Union between the two islands a true commu-
nity of interests and loyalties. 
Of course, there was a danger that O'Connell, to maintain his 
standing with his followers, would commit to revolutionary conspir-
acy. There also was the possibility that he might lose the reins of Irish 
nationalism to advocates of physical force. So Peel and Graham took 
out an insurance policy against the failure of their Irish strategy. They 
dispatched troops, weapons, ammunition, and supplies to Ireland, 
and stored arms there for possible use by Protestant and Presbyterian 
yeomen. The prime minister and home secretary also were deter-
mined that O'Connell and his chief lieutenants would suffer the 
consequences of their audacious challenge to British authority. Gra-
ham instructed the Irish law officers to collect evidence of sedition. 
When Peel told Parliament in May of 1843 that he was ready 
if necessary to use military force to maintain the Union, and when 
Sugden acted on this declaration by dismissing Repeal magistrates, 
Repeal 47 
O'Connell was convinced that the government would employ coer-
cion to smash his movement. In an effort to make Peel reconsider, 
and to preserve the enthusiasm and confidence of his supporters, he 
adopted a militant tone in his public speeches. He went so far as to 
suggest that he was prepared to conduct a defensive war against 
British troops. 
By late summer, however, O'Connell realized that Peel was 
out to destroy Repeal by undermining the confidence oflrish nation-
alists in his ability to deliver on his promises of freedom and reform. 
He feared that if the prime minister's strategy succeeded his follow-
ers might abandon constitutional nationalism. To protect them from 
those with dangerous messages and from the bullets and bayonets of 
British soldiers, O'Connell adopted a softer line in his speeches. He 
stopped promising Repeal in the near future, and said that it would 
be impossible to summon the Council of Three Hundred before the 
year was out. Instead of guaranteeing quick victories, O'Connell now 
asked Irish nationalists to support him in a long struggle for freedom. 
He warned against men who counseled violence and insisted that 
moral force would eventually triumph over the Tories and anti-Irish 
British opinion. 
By early autumn it was apparent that Peel's patience had 
achieved its objectives. O'Connell was preparing his followers for 
disappointment, the Repeal rent had declined, and Irish tenant 
farmers were neglecting agitation to concentrate their energies on an 
abundant harvest. Now that the enemy was in retreat, Peel made 
preparations to assume the offensive. He decided to prosecute Re-
peal leaders for sedition, and sent Lord DeGrey and Sugden to 
Dublin to supervise the arrest and prosecution of O'Connell and his 
lieutenants. They also received instructions to prevent the Repeal 
meeting scheduled for Sunday, October 8, in Clontarf, which was to 
be the year's last Monster Meeting. A tremendous crowd was ex-
pected to gather in the Dublin suburb; Repealers from Irish commu-
nities in Britain were crossing the Irish Sea for the event. 
Late Saturday afternoon, October 7, DeGrey issued a procla-
mation outlawing the Clontarf meeting because the original an-
nouncement-written and distributed when O'Connell was not in 
Dublin-indicated that it was designed as a military demonstration 
to intimidate the government. Rather than risk a massacre, O'Con-
nell complied with the order. A week later, authorities arrested him 
and six others (including Charles Gavan Duffy) and charged them 
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with sedition and attempting to subvert the loyalty of soldiers sta-
tioned in Ireland. In February 1844 a jury convicted, and a judge 
fined O'Connell and his associates £2,000 and sentenced them to a 
year m pnson. 
In September 1844 the British law lords, by a one-vote margin, 
reversed the decision of the Irish court on the grounds that the 
prosecution had drawn up an improper indictment and tried its case 
before a packed jury. After their release from Richmond prison, 
O'Connell and his friends were received as heroes by Dublin Re-
pealers. Celebration bonfires burned throughout the country. But 
O'Connell seemed to have little zest left for agitation. His decision 
to abandon the Clontarf meeting and his failure to exploit his legal 
vindication by intensifying nationalist activity did much to crush the 
Repeal spirit and to undermine confidence in constitutional methods 
of agitation. But the defeat of O'Connell and Repeal in 1843 was not 
a product of cowardice or faulty tactics so much as it was a misreading 
of the times. 
Like most political leaders, O'Connell became a captive of 
past successes. He expected Peel and Parliament to react to the 
popular outcry for Repeal in the same way they had to the Catholic 
agitation of the 1820s. In 1828-29 he had convinced Tory leaders that 
if they did not concede Catholic rights, the extremist element in 
Ireland might push him aside, take control of the movement, and 
then substitute physical for moral force. Fifteen years later, he 
seemed to assume that if Peel again faced the alternatives of conces-
sions to Irish nationalism or the potential chaos of violence, he would 
follow precedent and select the former. If the prime minister refused 
to bow to expediency, O'Connell hoped that Whig leaders in the 
Commons would exploit the Irish crisis to embarrass and perhaps 
topple the Conservative government. He thought that once in power, 
Russell and his colleague, Lord Palmerston, would probably try to 
quiet troubled Irish waters with a policy of conciliation and a renewal 
of the alliance with Irish nationalism. 
Apparently, O'Connell did not understand that while the Irish 
mood of 1843 resembled the one of 1829, the same was not true of 
the temper of the British Parliament. In the 1820s there were a 
considerable number of enlightened MPs favorable to Emancipa-
tion; Peel and Wellington knew in 1829 that any attempt to suppress 
the Catholic Association without conceding its goal would antagonize 
a considerable portion of the House of Commons. If an Irish revolu-
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tionary movement in resistance to government despotism enjoyed 
the sympathy of a respectable body of British opinion, the seeds of 
rebellion might spread to and take root in a Britain already saturated 
with social, political, and economic discontent. Catholic Emancipa-
tion was an Irish issue with British implications, and the govern-
ment's responsibility to preserve the Union and peace and order 
throughout the United Kingdom necessitated a compromise of Prot-
estant principles. 
In 1843 Whigs and Radicals as well as Conservatives and 
Tories rejected Repeal as a satisfactory solution to the Irish Question. 
They all agreed that an independent Ireland would weaken Britain's 
defenses and prepare the way for a dissolution of the empire. Con-
servatives and Tories also insisted that Repeal would permit an Irish 
Catholic majority to oppress an Irish Protestant minority. Whigs and 
Radicals maintained that the Union, if properly managed, could 
bring peace and prosperity to Ireland. During the Repeal crisis of 
1843 British no-popery joined pro-Union parliamentary opinion 
against Irish nationalism. Whigs and Radicals did not hesitate to 
exploit Irish discontent to embarrass the Conservative government, 
but Peel could count on their support in his determination to pre-
serve the Union. 
When Peel challenged O'Connell on the Clontarf meeting, 
the Irish leader had no realistic choice but to retreat. His nonviolent 
convictions, his commitment to constitutional methods of agitation, 
and his common sense would not permit him to lead his followers to 
slaughter in a futile insurrection against disciplined British troops. 
When he surrendered to the government ultimatum, O'Connell 
removed the most effective weapon from the arsenal of constitutional 
agitation-the implied threat of physical force if Britain refused to 
submit to the demands of majority Irish opinion. 
Confident that Repeal no longer was a live issue, by the 
beginning of 1844 Peel and Sir James Grahamwere ready to convert 
their Irish policy into legislation. Before doing so, Peel instructed 
reluctant officials in Dublin Castle to appoint as many Catholics as 
possible to government office, indicating Britain's intention to prove 
that the United Kingdom embraced all of the Irish people, Catholic, 
Protestant, and Nonconformist as equal citizens, and demonstrating 
that the Union promised rich benefits for their country. When De-
Grey, the lord lieutenant, protested that few Catholics had the 
qualifications for government positions, Peel replied that if some 
50 The Irish Question 
exceptions were not made, Catholics would never have the ambition 
or incentive to acquire the necessary credentials for occupational and 
social mobility. 
Although it included concessions to each of the clerical, agrar-
ian, and middle-class components of the nationalist coalition, the 
main purpose of Peel's new Irish policy was to detach priests from 
popular agitation. Peel accepted a thesis popular in British intellec-
tual and political circles that members of the Irish Catholic clergy 
fermented populist protests because they were financially depend-
ent on the ignorant anti-British masses. He decided that the best way 
to detach the clergy from mass movements was to guarantee them 
and their church economic security. Peel also knew that separating 
priests from nationalism presented many risks. If the task was not 
handled with tact and superb diplomacy, it would alienate British 
no-popery, reactionary Tories in the Conservative party, the Irish 
Catholic hierarchy and clergy, and even Rome. 
The government began its operation by asking Pope Gregory 
XVI to condemn the nationalist activities oflrish bishops and priests. 
By pointing out to Prince Clemons Furst von Metternich the dan-
gerous implications of clerical nationalism in Ireland for all of 
Europe, and particularly for the multi-ethnic Hapsburg empire, the 
British persuaded the Austrian premier to endorse their request to 
Rome. William Petre, the British emissary to the Vatican, told the 
pope that if his government could obtain the support of the Catholic 
Church in Ireland for efforts to maintain the Union and social order, 
Peel's Irish policy might culminate in the endowment of Catholicism 
in that country. Rome welcomed this possibility and the opportunity 
to establish friendly relations with Britain, so Cardinal Fransoni, 
prefect of propaganda, wrote to the Irish hierarchy advising them to 
cease political activities and to concentrate their energies on spiritual 
matters. Only a small minority of the bishops heeded his counsel. 
In the autumn of 1844, Peel and Graham initiated the legisla-
tive phase of their Irish policy with the Charitable Bequests Act, 
which eliminated many remaining Penal Law restrictions on the 
Catholic Church's opportunities to inherit or bequeath property. Peel 
and Graham intended the Charitable Bequests Act as a demonstra-
tion of government intentions to render justice to Catholics. In 
addition, Peel also hoped to use Catholic bishops on the Charitable 
Bequests Board as agents in his effort to persuade Irish-Catholic 
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clerical and middle-class opinion that cooperation with the British 
government promised more benefits than anti-Union agitation. 
O'Connell condemned the Charitable Bequests Act as 
inadquate and as a lever for the British government to exert influence 
over the hierarchy and clergy. Archbishop MacHale and a number of 
other bishops also attacked the measure. Archbishop Daniel Murray 
and a few other prelates accepted the Act and agreed to sit on the 
Charitable Bequests Board. This schism in the ranks of the hierarchy 
enlarged a split that had begun with the debate over the national 
education system in the 1830s. Murray viewed the national schools 
as imperfect but still a progressive infuence in Irish life. MacHale 
and his friends wanted an open system of endowed Catholic educa-
tion. The feud within the hierarchy was bitter, with both sides 
frequently appealing to Rome. 
In the spring of 1845 Peel made another friendly gesture to 
Irish Catholicism by introducing a proposal to increase and convert 
into a permanent endowment the annual grant to the Roman Catho-
lic seminary at Maynooth. In the 1790s the Irish Parliament had 
established the seminary in Kildare to keep Irish candidates for the 
priesthood out of French Revolution-influenced seminaries on the 
Continent. After the Act of Union, Britain believed it had an obliga-
tion to continue maintaining Maynooth. Yet, every year when the 
grant came up for renewal, it provoked a wave of anti-Catholic 
hysteria, embittering relations between Britain and Ireland. Peel 
hoped that the Maynooth Bill would remove the seminary as an 
annual issue and at the same time convince Catholic bishops of his 
government's friendly attitude, thereby smoothing the way for a 
more extensive endowment of their church. However, the hostility 
of British no-popery to the bill, in and out of Parliament, offended 
Irish Catholics and ensured that the government would approach 
further endowment with caution. Nevertheless, Peel courageously 
resisted Tory-engineered anti-Catholic prejudice, and with the sup-
port of the Whigs passed the Maynooth Bill. 
Fallowing the Maynooth controversy within his own party, the 
prime minister turned to the educational needs of the Irish middle 
class, providing them with something more than Protestant Trinity 
College as a higher education opportunity. The government's Irish 
Colleges Bill established three provincial Queen's colleges (at Cork, 
Galway, and Belfast) organized on the principle of mixed or nonde-
nominational education. Peel assumed that the first two would have 
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Catholic majorities while the last would enroll mostly Presbyterians. 
Peel and Graham hoped that in a university setting, Protestants and 
Catholics would mingle in a secular environment, emancipating 
middle-class Catholics from nationalism and clericalism by making 
them realize that they had interests independent of religion and more 
important than Repeal. In Britain the Colleges Bill met minimum 
opposition, but in Ireland O'Connell attacked mixed education as 
anti-Catholic in spirit and forced the church hierarchy to condemn 
the bill's provisions. 
In 1841 and 1848, on the urging of Archbishop MacHale, the 
pope condemned the Queen's Colleges. At the Synod ofThurles in 
1850, with Archbishop Cullen of Armagh presiding, the Irish hierar-
chy forbade Catholics to attend or to accept teaching or administra-
tive posts in the colleges. The following year Rome endorsed the 
decision of the Irish bishops. 
Because O'Connell's position on the Colleges Bill was incon-
sistent with his freedom of conscience views and his appeals for 
Catholic-Protestant harmony, it is fair to assume that he was sacrific-
ing principle for his perceived need to keep Catholic bishops in the 
nationalist fold. Believing that Catholic-Protestant interaction in 
colleges would result in a decline of sectarianism and an increase in 
a common Irish identity, thus strengthening nationalism, Young 
Irelanders endorsed mixed education. This disagreement over 
higher education initiated an open feud that ended with the seces-
sion of Young Ireland from the Repeal Association in 1846. 
The Colleges Bill was the last portion of Peel's Irish policy to 
pass through Parliament. He attempted to conciliate Irish tenant 
farmers by appointing the Devon Commission to investigate their 
relations with landlords and then to recommend legislation. Lord 
Stanley introduced a bill in the House of Lords based on the findings 
of the Devon Report and designed to introduce a moderate tenant 
right. But the government withdrew from the legislative contest 
when many Whigs and Conservatives indicated that they would not 
tolerate even a minor limitation on property rights. 
Peel's Irish policy achieved many of its desired goals. Rome 
had condemned active clerical nationalism, and several Catholic 
bishops were cooperating with government efforts to lighten the 
financial burdens on their church. The Charitable Bequests Board 
gave Peel the opportunity to continue negotiations with them in his 
effort to demonstrate the Union's potential benefits for Irish Catholi-
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cism. And despite the negative response in Britain to the Maynooth 
Bill, the Irish hierarchy and clergy appreciated Peel's generous in-
tentions and his courage in the face of British anti-Catholicism. 
Finally, although O'Connell, the bishops, and the pope condemned 
the Queen's Colleges, the education issue did create a conflict within 
Irish nationalism, an ideological clash between Young and "Old" 
Ireland which eventually destroyed the unity of Repeal. 
O'Connell denied Peel total victory by shrewdly playing on 
Irish-Catholic suspicions of British intentions. During the Charitable 
Bequests debate, he told the Irish people that the British govern-
ment was attempting to conclude an arrangement with Rome at the 
expense of Irish liberty. O'Connell's tactics forced the bishops to 
publish the Fransoni letter, intensifying distrust of British motives 
and lessening respect for Rome among Irish Catholics. Publication 
of Fransoni's epistle also forced Archbishop Murray and British 
officials to deny any intention of a concordat between the British 
government and the Roman Catholic Church. By emphasizing the 
danger of an understanding between London and the Vatican, 
O'Connell repaired the breach in Catholic nationalist unity opened 
by Peel's Irish policy to a certain extent, and made the hierarchy 
cautious about considering endowment by the British government. 
When British anti-Catholicism reacted to the Maynooth Bill, it 
helped O'Connell persuade his constituency that Peel's generosity 
was not a reflection of British popular attitudes toward the Irish. 
Even the split in Repeal ranks over the Colleges Bill did not appear 
fatal in 1845. Old and Young Ireland were still in basic agreement on 
the aims and methods of agitation. 
It is impossible to evaluate accurately the success of Peel's 
Irish policy by the only valid test-its influence on the course of 
Anglo-Irish affairs. In 1845 famine devastated Ireland, provoking 
social disorder, forcing Peel to temporarily abandon his efforts to fully 
integrate Ireland into the United Kingdom. In the spring of 1846, 
arguing that the potato blight in Ireland necessitated putting an end 
to agricultural protection, the prime minister introduced legislation 
repealing the Corn Laws. Confronted with agrarian crime, he also 
introduced an Irish coercion bill. The government's "protection of 
life" bill would have placed considerable police power in disturbed 
districts, imposed a curfew on the population, sentenced its violators 
to fifteen years transportation, and collected fines to compensate 
victims of violence. On the afternoon of June 25 the Lords passed 
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the free trade measure. That evening in the Commons, protectionist 
Tories, in a vengeful mood, joined Whigs, Radicals, and Irish nation-
alists in defeating Peel on Irish coercion, destroying his Conservative 
government. The Corn Law dispute emphasized a split in the Con-
servative party that began with Catholic Emancipation and intensi-
fied during Peel's effort to solve the Irish Question through fairness 
to Ireland's Catholic majority. 
Since Peel's aborted effort to destroy Irish nationalism through 
concessions to its various interests contributed to the fall of his 
administration, no British leader dared confront the Irish Question 
in all its complexity until Gladstone took office in 1868. By that time 
Irish nationalism had assumed an identity independent of the eco-
nomic, political, and religious grievances that had created and nour-
ished it, and Britain had forfeited an opportunity to destroy it with 
justice and kindness. 
3 
Famine, Revolution, 
Republicanism 
1845-1870 
At the beginning of 1845, O'Connell, now approaching seventy and 
no longer energetic or robust, still chaired Repeal Association meet-
ings. While he had lost his zest for mass agitation, he had proved a 
clever tactician in responding to Peel's efforts to destabilize Irish 
nationalism. Beginning with the dispute between O'Connell and 
Davis over the Colleges Bill, factionalism disrupted the Repeal 
Association. Young Irelanders distrusted O'Connell's renewed flir-
tation with the Whig party as a cynical betrayal of Irish nationalism. 
They described his Benthamite Utilitarianism as a materialistic 
"pig" philosophy, inappropriate to Irish needs or traditions, and they 
decried the sectarian tone of his nationalism. Although most were 
Catholic, Young Irelanders wanted to remove religious colorations 
from Irish identity and unite Catholics, Protestants, and Noncon-
formists in a common nationality. O'Connell, a believer in private 
conscience and separation of church and state, did not intend to 
replace Protestant with Catholic Ascendancy, but he knew that it was 
Catholic issues and Catholic mobilization that had produced Irish 
nationalism, and he was not convinced that it was yet strong enough 
to survive without the cooperation of bishops and priests. O'Connell 
also distrusted what he considered intellectual pretensions and secu-
larism among Young lrelanders. He also worried that many of the 
articles in the Nation praising the Society of United Irishmen and the 
revolutionary heroes of 1798 might inspire violence among people 
tormented by the Great Famine. 
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In July 1846, in an attempt to purge physical force elements 
in the Repeal movement, O'Connell introduced a resolution de-
manding that all members reject revolution or leave the Association. 
After Thomas Francis Meagher, with great fervor, insisted that the 
Irish, like the American founding fathers, had a right to defend 
liberty with their lives, Young lrelanders, led by William Smith 
O'Brien and Charles Gavan Duffy, walked out of Conciliation Hall 
and founded the Irish Confederation. O'Brien, a Protestant landlord 
and Whig MP from County Clare, had decided in 1843 that the 
British Parliament would never render justice to Ireland. The next 
year he joined the Repeal Association and served as its acting head 
when O'Connell was in prison. Young Ireland's idealism attracted 
O'Brien; O'Connell's pragmatism often revolted him. When the 
showdown came, he chose idealism. 
Despite O'Connell's genuine fears, revolution was only a 
theoretical issue in 1846. Young lrelanders were still constitutional 
Repealers. Although scarlet fever had taken the life of Thomas 
Osborne Davis in 1845, the Irish Confederation had most of the 
talent, but O'Connell had the numbers. Most Irish nationalists fol-
lowed their priests in remaining loyal to the Liberator and "Old Ire-
land." The split in Irish nationalism was certainly ill-timed, occurring 
when Ireland was going through a crisis that would alter its history. 
In 1845 a potato fungus originating in North America arrived 
in Ireland via the Continent, causing a famine that persisted through 
1849 with aftershocks that were felt until185 1. Since they had to sell 
their grain crops and livestock to pay excessive rents, millions of 
people depended on the potato as their sole means of sustenance. 
During the Famine at least a million and a half died of starvation or 
from diseases associated with hunger-cholera, fever, and scurvy; 
many millions came close to death; and at least another million 
crossed the Atlantic in fever-infected coffin ships or swarmed across 
the Irish Sea to Cardiff, Glasgow, and Liverpool. 
Irish nationalists in the nineteenth century claimed-there 
are still people in Ireland and among the Irish of the diaspora who 
hold this view-that Ireland suffered so much and lost so many 
people during the Famine because the British government tried to 
solve the Irish Question by exterminating a large proportion of its 
population. This is too simple an explanation for a complex situation. 
Much Famine misery resulted from an inefficient and unproductive 
agricultural system that had existed before the Union. Death, dis-
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ease, and emigration were also the products of a population explosion 
encouraged by a primitive agrarian economy and a potato diet. When 
the Famine began to decimate Ireland, British officials diligently la-
bored to mitigate the disaster, often donating their own money to feed 
the Irish poor. Many British physicians fell victim to fever while 
treating the Irish sick. People in Britain, including the queen and mem-
bers of the royal family, contributed to Famine relief. British religious 
groups, particularly the Quakers, raised funds, ministered to the sick, 
and distributed food to the hungry. On rare occasions, never involving 
Quakers, some Protestant groups insisted Catholics change religion in 
exchange for food, giving rise to the denigrating term "Souper" in 
Ireland for a person who sells his faith for a mess of pottage. 
In the Famine's first year, Peel's administration spent 
£8,000,000 in relief efforts. In contrast, the Whig government's reac-
tion to the crisis did give Irish nationalists an excuse to raise the 
genocide charge. In a period when the Irish masses were dying of 
hunger and disease or were going into exile, the United Kingdom 
was the most prosperous country in the world. Yet the government 
refused to use the full resources of Britain and the empire to save its 
Irish partners in the Union. From 1845 to 1851 Britain spent only £15 
million on Famine relief (compared to the £70 million later expended 
during the Crimean War). Committed to laissez-faire dogmatism, 
government officials did not provide enough food to meet immediate 
needs or design public works projects to stimulate the economy. 
They argued that Famine relief should not interfere with normal 
commercial activity, compete with private business, discourage per-
sonal initiative, make the Irish psychologically dependent on gov-
ernment charity, or interfere with private property or individual 
responsibility. In the Famine's darkest hours, Nassau Senior, a dis-
tinguished economist prominent in Whig circles, lamented that in 
1848 only a million Irish people would die, an insufficient number 
to solve the population problem. 
Anti-Catholicism certainly figured in British responses to Irish 
hunger. Many English, Scots, and Welsh believed that poverty and 
ignorance were endemic to Catholicism, and that the Irish were 
paying for their religious choice. Sectarian prejudice influenced 
Charles Edward Trevelyan, undersecretary of the Treasury, the man 
most responsible for government relief measures, who proclaimed 
the Famine a divine punishment on a wicked, perverse people. 
In many ways the Irish suffered an experience during the 
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Great Famine similar to Jews a century later. Both groups were 
victims of what Albert Camus defined as ideological murder, the 
sacrifice of the lives of men, women, and children to economic, social, 
or political theories. Certainly the Nazis were more ruthless, heart-
less, and consistent in the application of racist principles than Treve-
lyan and his colleagues were in enforcing the dogmas of political 
economy, or in designing a Famine relief policy that reflected their 
dislike of Catholicism. But Irish people dying of hunger or crowded 
into the bowels of an emigrant ship in the 1840s would have had scant 
consolation in knowing that their predicament was not the result of 
race hate but the price they must pay for their religion and for Britain 
to maintain a free-enterprise economy. 
The Famine was the most significant event in nineteenth-
century Irish history: it destroyed whatever chance Peel's Irish policy 
had of soothing Irish-Catholic opinion; left the Irish with bitter 
memories and an intense hatred of Britain, emotions they would pass 
on to their children and grandchildren on both sides of the Atlantic; 
pushed the agrarian issue into the forefront of the Irish Question; 
multiplied and institutionalized emigration; and altered the direction 
of Irish nationalism and the complexion of Irish politics. 
O'Connell returned to the Whig alliance in 1845, helping to 
depose Peel in 1846, and then giving the Russell administration his 
loyal support. Still, the Whigs never adequately rewarded the Irish 
leader for his years of service. In the 1830s O'Connell had kept them 
in office and helped push their legislation through the Commons. 
Whigs repaid him by cheating Ireland in the 1832 Reform Bill and 
proposing solutions to Irish problems concerning tithes, municipal 
government, and poverty that were inadequate or unsuitable for the 
Irish situation. Through it all O'Connell retained confidence in them 
as the only realistic hope for Irish reform, and in the Famine crisis he 
again turned to them for help. In February 1847, as a fading old man 
with a voice not much louder than a whisper, he rose in the House 
of Commons and begged Britain to help his starving people. British 
MPs listened with attention, then ignored his plea. Broken-hearted 
and close to death, O'Connell set out for Rome in late March of 1847. 
In Paris he received the homage of French liberals for his contribu-
tions to the advance of liberalism and democracy. O'Connell never 
reached the Holy City. He died in Genoa on May 15, 1847. His heart 
is buried in Rome while his body rests underneath a giant round 
tower in Dublin's Glasnevin cemetery. 
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While O'Connell created modern Irish nationalism and de-
signed the tactics of constitutional agitation used by the Irish and 
other peoples in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, he left 
Repeal in a shambles. His alliance with the Whigs split the move-
ment into Young and Old Ireland factions and destroyed what re-
mained of an Irish party in the House of Commons. Inadequate 
returns from the Whig alliance, the failure of Repeal in 1843, and 
devastation by famine weakened the appeal of O'Connell's style of 
nationalism, leaving the field to Young Ireland's cultural version. 
After Daniel O'Connell died, his son John inherited leader-
ship of the Repeal Association, but not his father's charisma or 
political genius. While the Repeal Association was slipping into 
irrelevance, a tactical controversy between John Mitchel and Charles 
Gavan Duffy disrupted the Irish Confederation. 
Mitchel, a Unitarian from Ulster and a barrister by training, 
first contributed to the Nation in 1842. Three years later, on Duffy's 
invitation, he joined its staff as assistant editor. With the other Young 
Irelanders he seceded from the Repeal Association in 1846. By 1847 
Mitchel had lost confidence in the tactics of constitutional nationalism 
and in Young Ireland's goal of enlisting the Protestant gentry. He 
believed that the Ascendancy placed its property interests above Ireland. 
He argued that landlordism, a bulwark of the Union, should be destroyed, 
and that the property oflreland should be distributed among its people. 
Mitchel insisted that taking up the agrarian issue was the best way 
for the Confederation to build a powerful nationalist movement. 
Mitchel borrowed many of his ideas from James Fintan Lalor, 
a member of a prominent nationalist family. Lalor's father, Patrick, was 
active in the anti-tithe agitation of the 1830s. His younger brother, 
Peter, was a Repealer who later emigrated to Australia where he won 
acclaim as a labor leader and government minister in Victoria. James 
Fintan Lalor did not share his family's enthusiasm for Repeal. He 
believed that a solution to the land question deserved priority over the 
demand for an Irish parliament. In 1843 he wrote Peel to say that Repeal 
could be destroyed by concessions to the needs of tenant farmers. 
Impressed with Lalor's intellect and his powerful journalistic 
style, Duffy invited him to voice his views in the Nation in 1847. In 
a series of letters, Lalor expressed his opinion that the land question 
was more important than Repeal, and argued that the only way Irish 
nationalism could retain mass support was by endorsing the cause of 
tenant farmers. He described moral-force agitation as an exercise in 
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futility, and derided O'Connell's distinctions between legal and illegal 
protest. Lalor said that as long as the British government defined what 
was legal and illegal, constitutional nationalism would alwavs be 
limited by restrictions imposed by its enemy. He suggested that Irish 
nationalism build its strategy around only one consideration, the best 
interests of Ireland, and recommended an agitation against rent 
payments to destroy landlordism and paralyze British rule in Ireland. 
Persuaded by Lalor's logic, Mitchel adopted a variation on his strat-
egy in early 1848-a campaign against the payment of poor rates. 
Strategies proposed by Lalor and Mitchel offended O'Brien's 
conservative landlord nationalism. He believed their radicalism 
would destroy the Confederation's hope of persuading Protestants to 
join the national movement. When Duffy agreed with O'Brien, 
Mitchel resigned from the Nation and took the dispute over nation-
alist tactics to the Confederation for a decision. To counter Mitchel, 
Duffy recommended the formation of an independent parliamentary 
party to publicize Irish grievances and convert British parliamentary 
and public opinion to the justice of Repeal. If the Irish party failed 
to make an impression on the British Parliament, and if British 
opinion remained hostile to Irish reforms, he said that Irish MPs 
should retaliate by obstructing British legislation in the House of 
Commons. Duffy proposed that while the Irish party was presenting 
Ireland's case at Westminister, nationalists at home should organize 
and use their franchise to win control over the agencies of local 
government. If Irish MPs were finally ejected from the Commons for 
practicing obstruction, he said that they could return to an Ireland 
under nationalist domination, and that Britain would eventually have 
to surrender to a united and disciplined national opinion capable of 
mobilizing effective passive resistance to the Union through its 
control of parliamentary representation, city corporations, Poor Law 
boards, and grand juries. 
In contrast to Duffy's, Mitchel's plan was simple, direct, and 
revolutionary. He advised the Confederation to mobilize the people 
against rents and poor rates. After a long deliberation, a majority of 
the Confederation sided with Duffy. Mitchel resigned from the 
organization and began publishing his own weekly newspaper, The 
United Irishman. It advised readers to prepare for revolution by 
collecting and becoming proficient in the use of weaponry. Mitchel's 
editorials pleaded with nationalists to drive the British out of their 
country, to establish an Irish republic, and to abolish landlordism. 
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In February 1848, when Young Irelanders learned that French 
liberals and socialists had overthrown Louis Phillipe and established 
the Second Republic, they, like liberal nationalists in Belgium, Ger-
many, and various parts of the Hapsburg empire, were caught up in 
revolutionary enthusiasm and optimism. Mitchel rejoined the Con-
federation, editorials in the Nation took on the same militant tone as 
those in The United Irishman, O'Brien and his colleagues tried to enlist 
John O'Connell and Irish conservatives in a national front, Young 
Irelanders made contact with friends of Irish freedom in the United 
States and the Chartists in Britain, O'Brien led a delegation to Paris 
to congratulate the leaders of the Second Republic and to secure their 
support and aid for an Irish revolution, and Confederate clubs 
throughout the country were ordered to gather arms and prepare for 
battle. While O'Brien was prepared to lead an uprising against British 
rule in Ireland, he had no intention of declaring war on property. His 
distrust of agrarian radicalism convinced Mitchel to leave the Con-
federation again. 
Attempting to forestall revolution, British authorities arrested 
O'Brien, Mitchel, and Thomas Francis Meagher in May. When juries 
could not agree that they were guilty of sedition, the court released 
O'Brien and Meagher, but a packed jury, using a new treason felony 
law, convicted Mitchel, and a judge sentenced him to fourteen years' 
transportation. Meanwhile, plans for an insurrection stalled. Confed-
eration leaders failed to win the cooperation of John O'Connell or 
the leaders of Protestant Ireland; the Catholic clergy remained hos-
tile to Young Ireland; French republicans, anxious to win British 
acceptance of their new government, refused military aid to Irish 
nationalists; and Irish peasants, demoralized by hunger, disease, 
emigration, and the split in Irish nationalism did not have the means 
or the will to fight. 
In July, however, the arrest of Duffy, government seizure of 
the Nation offices, and the suspension of habeas corpus pushed 
Young Ireland into rebellion. It had neither the materials nor the 
leadership for success. O'Brien was a sincere patriot and a brave man, 
but he lacked the necessary ruthlessness and was too committed to 
property rights to direct a peasant revolt against the Crown and the 
landlord establishment. The small number of peasants who answered 
O'Brien's call came with pikes to fight rifle-armed policemen and 
soldiers. During a brief July 29 engagement in Widow McCormack's 
cabbage patch in Ballingarry, County Tipperary, the army and constabu-
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lary easily routed this small, hungry, poorly-equipped army com-
manded by intellectuals full of zeal but lacking military experience. 
By August 1848 some Young Irelanders were in prison awaiting 
trials that would end in sentences of death commuted to Tasmanian 
transportation. Others were on the run, looking for means of escape 
to France or the United States. In a time of crisis the Catholic priests 
and people of Ireland had rejected O'Brien and his colleagues, and 
the forces of the Crown had beaten them in battle, but 1848 was only 
a temporary defeat for Young Irelanders. They had lost a fight but in 
the long run won emotional and intellectual allegiances to Irish 
nationalism. The failures of 1848 became heroes for future genera-
tions of Fenians, Home Rulers, Gaelic Leaguers, and Sinn Feiners. 
Over time, Young Irelanders proved that they were the most 
talented group yet to have served their country. Thomas D'Arcy 
McGee helped establish the federated Dominion of Canada and was 
a member of its cabinet. Duffy became prime minister of Australia's 
Victoria province. Thomas Francis Meagher became a brigadier . 
general in the Union army in the American Civil War and was later 
named governor of the Montana territory; he drowned in the Missouri 
River on his way to take office. John Blake Dillon returned from exile 
in the United States to play a prominent role in Irish politics during 
the 1860s. John Martin, Mitchel's brother-in-law, cofounded the Irish 
Home Rule movement and the Irish parliamentary party in the 
1870s. Other Young Irelanders organized the Irish Republican Broth-
erhood in Ireland and Britain and its Fenian Brotherhood counterpart 
in the United States. As a journalist in the United States, John 
Mitchel, a racist in contrast to O'Connell's cosmopolitan liberal nation-
alism, fought abolitionism and defended the Confederate cause in 
the Civil War. Voters in the 1870s twice elected him MP for Tippe-
rary, but the government denied him his seat as a convicted felon. 
After the 1848 fiasco, Duffy was the only prominent Young 
Irelander left in the country. Five times the government prosecuted 
him for sedition, but brilliant defense tactics by his attorney, Isaac 
Butt, and the inability of juries to reach a unanimous decision, 
enabled him to avoid transportation. After release from prison, Duffy 
revived the Nation. With new allies, Dr. John Gray, a Protestant who 
was part owner of the leading nationalist daily newspaper, The Free-
man's Journal, and Frederick Lucas, owner and editor of the Tablet, a 
Catholic weekly, he set out to blend the ideas of Lalor and Mitchel 
with his own recommendations to the Irish Confederation. 
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Duffy and his friends proposed an independent Irish party in 
the British House of Commons primarily dedicated to the issue of 
tenant rights. They believed that an agitation that concentrated 
on agrarian grievances would unite the Protestant tenants of Ulster 
in common cause with Catholics of the same class throughout the 
country. They expected that a successful example of Catholic-
Protestant cooperation would break down old barriers of suspicion 
and animosity, clearing the way for an inclusive Irish nationalism. 
Encouraged by Duffy, Lucas, and Gray, representatives of 
tenant societies from all four Irish provinces began to discuss common 
goals and methods of achieving them. This dialogue produced the Irish 
Tenant League, which had the following stated aims: fair rents 
established by impartial evaluations, secure tenures for farmers who 
paid their rents, and the right of tenants when leaving to sell their 
interests in farms they had occupied. The existence of the Irish 
Tenant League encouraged a number of Irish MPs to join an inde-
pendent Irish party. They promised their constituents to remain aloof 
from British parties and not to support any government unwilling to 
enact a comprehensive program of tenant right. The new party reached 
the summit of its influence in July 1852 when a general election 
returned forty-eight Irish MPs pledged to independent opposition 
and tenant right. But within a few months it began to disintegrate. 
From the start, the independent Irish party lacked coherence: 
it was a coalition of the Irish Tenant League and the Irish Brigade. 
The Brigade, the "pope's brass band" to its detractors, was the 
response of a small group of liberal Irish MPs to Lord John Russell's 
1851 Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, which threatened to prosecute and 
punish Catholic clergymen who took territorial church titles derived 
from the United Kingdom. It was a cheap effort by the prime minister 
to exploit no-popery anger following Pius IX's decision to create a 
diocesan structure for the Catholic Church in England. 
Insulted by British Liberal courtship of prejudice, George 
Henry Moore, MP and father of the novelist George Moore, organ-
ized a small group of Irish parliamentarians to punish Russell by 
voting with the opposition in an effort to destroy the Whig govern-
ment. The passage of the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill so aroused Irish-
Catholic opinion that Moore decided to keep the Brigade in 
existence as an independent party. To give it constituency support, 
Brigade MPs organized the Catholic Defence Association of Great 
Britain and Ireland in August 1851. 
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Gray's Freeman's Journal endorsed the Brigade and the Catho-
lic Defence Association. Duffy respected the talent and integrity of 
Moore but had doubts with regard to some other Brigade MPs. In 
August 1851, however, he assisted William Sharman Crawford, MP, 
the Ulster tenant-right leader and champion of a federal contract 
between Britain and Ireland, in completing an alliance between the 
Brigade and the Irish Tenant League. This arrangement seemed a 
good bargain for tenant righters. It gave the League powerful parlia-
mentary representation without committing the nondenominational 
movement to the Catholic goals of the Brigade. 
Shortly after the general election of 1852, two independent 
Irish party members, William Keogh and John Sadleir, both Brigade 
MPs, broke their pledge of independent opposition by accepting 
office in Lord Aberdeen's Peelite-Whig coalition government. Dub-
lin's Catholic Archbishop, Paul Cullen, condoned their apostasy. 
Cullen was a close friend of Pius IX and had been rector of both the 
Irish and the Propaganda Colleges in Rome. In 1848 he had wit-
nessed Giuseppe Mazzini's expulsion of Pius IX from Rome, and had 
rescued the Propaganda College by placing it under the protection 
of the United States government. The next year Pius IX appointed 
Cullen archbishop of Armagh and primate of the Catholic Church in 
Ireland. He succeeded Murray as Archbishop of Dublin in 1852. 
Cullen considered Duffy the Irish Mazzini, Young Ireland a local 
version of Young Italy, and the independent Irish party a vehicle for 
secular and revolutionary ideas. Instead of independent opposition 
at Westminster, Cullen preferred that Irish-Catholic politicians co-
operate with the Aberdeen administration in an effort to win conces-
sions for Catholicism, particularly in the area of education. He was 
happy to see two Catholics, Sadleir and Keogh, in office. 
Duffy was convinced that the treason of Sadleir and Keogh, 
and the support of Cullen and other bishops for their defection, 
destroyed the independent Irish party. By 1855 he had lost confi-
dence in the movement he had helped establish and in his ability to 
shape the future of Irish nationalism. Duffy sold the Nation to A.M. 
Sullivan, a young nationalist from County Cork, and sailed to Aus-
tralia. As an old man, he returned to Ireland as Sir Charles Gavan 
Duffy, endorsed the Home Rule movement, and inspired Irish na-
tionalism with books on Young Ireland, Thomas Davis, and the 
independent Irish party. 
The defection of Sadleir and Keogh and the conduct of some 
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of the Catholic bishops did damage the independent Irish party, but 
there were other factors, just as important, that contributed to the 
demise of the Irish Tenant League and its parliamentary repre-
sentation. Aberdeen's government attracted the support of Ulster 
tenant farmers. Memories of hardships faced together during the 
Great Famine fostered a temporary solidarity in the ranks of the Irish 
peasantry. But the population decline from death and emigration 
increased the size of Irish farms. This significant change in the 
agrarian economy, plus a series of good harvests and rising agricultural 
prices in the 1850s, improved the Irish standard ofliving in terms of 
diet and housing. Relative prosperity relieved the insecurities and 
cooled the anger of tenant farmers, especially in the north where they 
had better relations with landlords than in the other three provinces. 
With the horrors of the Famine fading into the background, ancient 
religious animosities reemerged and undermined the effort to create 
a united Irish opinion directed to the destruction of the manorial 
economic and social system. 
The 1850s were also a time of landlord political resurgence. 
With the Catholic hierarchy split on political policy and tactics, the 
aristocracy and gentry were able to construct an effective organiza-
tion that returned fifty-seven Conservative Irish MPs in the general 
election of 1859. The pro-Italian nationalism, anti-papal positions of 
Whig leadership contributed to this success. Cardinal Wiseman of 
Westminster and some Irish bishops encouraged Irish voters in 
Britain and Ireland to support Conservative candidates. 
The independent Irish party's difficulty in finding suitable 
candidates aided the revival of landlord politics. The prohibitive 
expenses involved in contesting an election and then living in Lon-
don without a salary while Parliament was in session made politics a 
vocation for the affluent. Most Irishmen in a position to pursue a 
parliamentary career were landlords hostile to peasant economic, 
political, and religious interests. Candidates prepared to gamble 
small fortunes to represent nationalist and tenant-farmer constituen-
cies could not always be relied on to keep their pledges once sepa-
rated from voters by the Irish Sea. Irishmen anxious to acquire status, 
prestige, and wealth were often willing to sell their allegiance in 
exchange for government office. 
By 1858 only twelve MPs wore the independent Irish party 
label. A year later, it ceased to exist; most remaining members moved 
to the Liberal benches. In the 1860s a number of Irish Liberal MPs 
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were active in the National Association, committed to government 
financial support for Catholic elementary, secondary, and university 
education, disestablishment of the Protestant Church, and tenant 
right. George Henry Moore and John Blake Dillon put the Associa-
tion together and enlisted the support of Archbishop Cullen and 
other members of the Catholic hierarchy. 
Under Cullen's leadership the Catholic Church in Ireland 
experienced what Professor Emmet Larkin has described as a "De-
votional Revolution." Before the Famine, Catholicism in urban cen-
ters and in the Anglicized eastern parts of Ireland already had a 
spiritual resurgence manifested in parish missions, increased atten-
dance at Mass, and interest in a number of devotional practices. But 
in the Gaelic-influenced, impoverished west, pagan superstition 
often competed with orthodox Catholic beliefs. During his Irish 
travels, de Toqueville observed that Irish Catholics, even in remote, 
rural areas, were more devout and consistent in their religious prac-
tices than those on the Continent. Still, many were not diligent in 
attending Mass. A shortage of priests. and chapels, ignorance of 
post-Council of Trent (1545-63) Catholic dogmas, and a feeling of 
shame about wearing tattered clothes to religious services contrib-
uted to low church attendance. 
Famine deaths and emigration not only eased pressures on the 
Irish agrarian economy, they also assisted a reformation in Irish 
Catholicism. The poorest, and therefore the most ignorant, segment 
of the Catholic population suffered most of the Famine casualties, 
and demographic change reduced the shortage of priests and chapels. 
In post-Famine Ireland it was easier for the clergy to instruct the laity, 
and a more affluent peasantry saw a connection between religious 
practice and social respectability. 
Associations between Catholicism and nationalism were mutu-
ally beneficial. The struggle for civil rights had united Catholic Ireland 
behind O'Connell's leadership, and bishops and priests had been 
recruiting agents and lieutenants in the Emancipation and Repeal 
agitations. Through the course of the nineteenth century Catholic 
and national identities merged, intensifying each other. Catholic 
devotionalism became a visible sign of fervent Irishness. Despite the 
protests of those national leaders who have preferred a more inclusive 
view of Irishness, in no other country except possibly Poland have 
religion and nationality been so closely connected as in Ireland. 
Building on Famine-induced population and economic 
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changes and the strong associations between nationality and religion, 
Cullen transformed Irish Catholicism. He ended public controver-
sies among the hierarchy; recruited large numbers of priests, broth-
ers, and nuns to serve the spiritual and educational needs of the laity; 
built churches and schools; encouraged Mass attendance, reception 
of the sacraments, and popular devotions; and made the Irish Church 
the most dedicated and obedient servant of Rome. Irish Catholics 
not only generously contributed to their parishes, they sent vast sums 
to Rome, and furnished priests, nuns, and brothers to the diaspora 
and remote British colonies. Ireland was a victim of colonialism, but 
the Irish Catholic Church was a vast spiritual empire. 
Under Cullen the Irish Catholic Church was a more politically 
and socially conservative institution than in O'Connell's time. Al-
though still closely tied to their peasant roots, the hierarchy and 
clergy were less inclined to lead and participate in populist agitations 
than the preceding generation. This has to be stated in qualified 
terms because in Ireland men of the cloth continued to be more 
politically active than Catholic or Protestant clergy in other countries. 
A relative decline in nationalist involvements may have been 
the result of the Church's growing prosperity, increased clerical 
self-confidence, and a secure position of priestly leadership in the 
Catholic community. Another factor was Cullen's close contact and 
friendship with the pope. Pius IX's Rome was the most conservative 
capital in Europe. Close ties between Dublin and the Vatican de-
creased Gallicanism and increased ultramontanism in the Irish 
Church. Localism, however, would continue to influence the char-
acter of Irish Catholicism. 
Because of his denunciation of Young Ireland and F enianism 
and his hostility to Home Rule, a large section of nationalist opinion 
has viewed Cullen, made a cardinal in 1866, as a villain. In the bitter 
Christmas dinner episode in James Joyce's Portrait of the Artist, Simon 
Dedalus sarcastically referred to Cullen as "another apple of God's 
eye!" But when he worked with the National Association in the 
1860s, Cullen revealed a concern for the economic plight of his 
people and showed a more flexible approach to politics than his 
reactionary friend, the pope. He was prepared to collaborate with 
Liberals at Westminster to achieve reforms for Ireland and, although 
he demanded government financial support for Catholic education, 
Cullen did endorse the principle of separation of church and state. 
But the ultramontane and anti-nationalist Cullen weakened the 
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influence of the National Association by personal negotiations with 
British politicians, and by using English Henry Edward Cardinal 
Manning to exert pressure at Westminster. In addition, the Irish 
cardinal's excessive fear of Protestant proselytism, and his view that 
the interests of Catholicism and the welfare of Ireland were insepa-
rable made him insensitive to the nationalist spirit of his own country 
and to important ideas, trends, and issues of the modern world. 
The National Association worked closely with British radicals 
and Dissenters in the Liberation Society to disestablish the Protes-
tant Church and to advance democracy by extending the franchise 
to the working class. The compact between Irish Catholics in the 
National Association and British Protestant radicals contributed to 
the passage of the Second Reform Bill (1867) and to the Irish 
legislation of the first Gladstone administration. British no-popery-
revitalized by the 1870 Vatican Council, agrarian outrage in Ireland, 
and the reluctance of Irish Catholics to help the disestablishment 
movement in Britain-alienated further British Liberal support for 
Irish reform, but this in some ways ideologically incompatible Irish-
Liberal alliance followed the precedent of the O'Connell-Whig con-
nection and prepared the way for the later coalition between Liberals 
and Home Rulers. 
Although the National Association included respected repre-
sentatives of national and tenant-right interests and championed 
popular causes, it never succeeded in capturing the emotional com-
mitment of most Irish Catholics. After the failure of constitutional 
and parliamentary efforts in the 1840s and 1850s, many Irish nation-
alists were ready to try physical force methods of liberating their 
country. Emigration played a major part in the opinion swing from 
constitutional to revolutionary nationalism. 
The Famine institutionalized and hastened the pace of emi-
gration as a safety valve for Irish poverty, with parents raising most 
of their children for export. From 1845 to 1891 over three million 
entered the United States, while many others crossed the Irish Sea 
to find employment in British cities. Unprepared psychologically or 
vocationally for industrial environments, they became the most un-
derprivileged element in urban Britain and America. Irish immi-
grants did the dirty, hard work that Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-
Americans were too proud or too weak to do. They built railroads, 
dug canals, mined coal, and washed dishes and scrubbed floors in 
the homes of the upper and middle classes. Anglo-Protestants in 
Famine, Revolution, Republicanism 69 
Britain and in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia despised dirty, 
ignorant Irish papists, and British and American working classes 
hated them as cheap labor competition. Rejected by others, the Irish 
lived in miserable circumstances, producing many juvenile delin-
quents, petty thieves, mental cases, and alcoholics. 
Since the Irish were among the worst victims of British indus-
trialism, they made substantial contributions to Chartism in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, to the unskilled labor movement of the 
1880s and 1890s, and to the spread of Syndicalism (a movement to place 
the "means and modes" of the industrial economy in the hands of labor 
unions through the technique of a general strike) and the growth of 
the Labour party in the twentieth century, but they were no more 
radical than the English, Scottish, or Welsh working classes. Because 
they were in a country with more social mobility and economic 
opportunity, in general Irish Americans were more conservative in 
their economic and social views than the Irish in Britain. They were 
significant in the development of the labor movement in the United 
States, but they placed a great deal of faith in the urban political 
machines they created and/or dominated to solve their problems. 
But good times came slowly to Irish pioneers of the American 
urban ghetto. Anglo-Americans loathed them as a massive social prob-
lem polluting their cities; they detested them even more because they 
were Catholic. As in Britain, nativism in the United States was con-
structed on anti-Catholic foundations. Embittered Irish Americans 
channeled their sense of alienation into a fanatic hatred of Britain as 
the source of their misery in the old world and the cause of their exile 
to the new, where they again encountered poverty and prejudice. 
In anti-British Irish nationalism, the diasporic Irish found 
psychological escape from the unpleasant realities of economic dep-
rivation and slum dwelling. The myths of Irish cultural nationalism, 
taught by Young Ireland, gave them pride and identity. When faced 
with poverty and social inferiority it was consoling to dream of the 
past glories of the Irish race and to blame others for their present 
wretched condition. And it was both pleasant and exciting to believe 
that, though poor, the Irish were really more noble, moral, and 
spiritual than "materialistic, inhuman, and bloodthirsty Saxons." For 
the Irish in the English-speaking world, nationalism as well as relig-
ion was an opiate. 
In 1858 James Stephens founded the Irish Republican Broth-
erhood (IRB); that same year John O'Mahony and Michael Doheny 
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established its American counterpart, the Fenian Brotherhood. All 
three men were veterans of 1848. O'Mahony, a Gaelic scholar, named 
the American organization after the Fianna of ancient Irish sagas. 
Fenianism became the popular designation of republicanism in Brit-
ain and Ireland as well as the United States. The IRB was a secret 
revolutionary society dedicated to the establishment of a democratic 
Irish republic. Stephens was "head centre" of the Republican move-
ment in Ireland and Britain; O'Mahony had the same title in the 
United States. 
Stephens recruited bright young journalists who resented the 
O'Connellite and Young Ireland establishments blocking their paths 
to recognition; revolutionary republicanism gave them a podium and 
an audience. Thousands of enthusiastic young men enlisted in Fe-
nian circles in Britain, Ireland, the United States, and Canada. In 
Ireland, the IRB provided recreational activities in a country where 
opportunities for social intercourse were extremely limited. In the 
United States, Fenian picnics with food, drink, games, and speeches 
offered entertainment for Irish working-class families. Fenianism 
recruited a substantial number of Irishmen serving in the British 
army, and during the American Civil War many Irish lads enlisted in 
the Union and Confederate forces in order to gain military experi-
ence, intending to employ it someday against Britain. 
While the vast majority of republicans in Ireland, Britain, and 
the United States were from the industrial and agrarian working 
classes, Fenianism, unlike O'Connell's Catholic and Repeal Associa-
tions, the Irish Confederation, the independent Irish party, or the 
National Association, consciously ignored social and economic is-
sues. But it did adopt the premise from O'Connell and Young Ireland 
that Irish nationalism was above religious or class differences. Feni-
ans believed that a democratic republic would serve as a panacea for 
Ireland's ills. 
John Martin and William Smith O'Brien, returned to Ireland 
from Australian penal exile, opposed the IRB, as did other forty-
eighters. John Mitchel, Thomas Francis Meagher, and Thomas 
D'Arcy McGee criticized Fenianism in the United States, though 
Mitchel later changed his mind. A.M. Sullivan and his brother, T.D., 
in the Nation associated Fenians with agrarian terrorist organizations 
such as the Ribbon societies in a blanket condemnation of physical-
force nationalism. But the most powerful enemy of Republicanism 
was the Cullen-led Roman Catholic hierarchy. Bishops attacked the 
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secret character of the IRB and its revolutionary strategy. To Cullen, 
Fenians were dangerous secularists out to destroy throne and altar, 
radicals inspired by the excessively democratic and violent environ-
ment of the United States, and Irish disciples of the Italian physical-
force nationalists, Mazzini, Camillo Benso Cavour, and Giuseppe 
Garibaldi. Kerry's bishop, David Moriarity, informed the laity that "hell 
isn't hot enough or eternity long enough" to punish IRB members. 
From the original condemnation of the Fenians in 1858 until 
1865, Cullen managed to keep his fellow bishops and Irish priests 
hostile to republicanism, though there were, of course, exceptions. 
Since most clerics came from tenant-farmer families, they shared the 
grievances and hatreds of their class. Some were bold enough to defy 
their superiors by giving prayers and sympathy to republicans. Father 
Patrick Lavelle, a Mayo priest, defied Cullen in 1861 by delivering 
a eulogy at the IRB-staged Dublin funeral of Terence Bellew 
McManus, a veteran of 1848 who had died in San Francisco. Lavelle's 
superior, Archbishop MacHale, who never went so far as to endorse 
the IRB but remained on good terms with Fenians and accepted their 
charitable donations, shielded him from Cullen's wrath. 
The American Civil War interrupted Fenian activities, but 
when it ended American republicans told Stephens to prepare his 
followers for action. Men who had commanded Union or Confeder-
ate troops infiltrated Ireland to train IRB units for combat. American 
pressure forced Stephens to plan a rising for 1866, but a factional 
dispute in the United States cut off military supplies to Ireland. At 
their 1865 convention in Philadelphia, Fenians adopted a new con-
stitution, substituting a president for head centre and making him 
responsible to a General Congress divided into a Senate and House 
of Delegates. President O'Mahony wanted to focus on an Irish 
revolutionary strategy, but Colonel William R. Roberts, the Senate 
leader, insisted that Irish Americans invade and conquer Canada, 
leaving Stephens and the IRB responsible for activities in Ireland. 
Rather than have his inadequately equipped followers face the 
superior weaponry of the army and constabulary, Stephens post-
poned the insurrection. 
When a British spy in the offices of the Irish People, the IRB 
newspaper, supplied the government with incriminating documents, 
officials shut it down and arrested such prominent members of the 
staff as Charles Kickham, the Irish novelist, Jeremiah O'Donovan 
Rossa, founder of the Skibbereen Phoenix Society, which had merged 
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with the IRB in 1858, Thomas Clark Luby, an amateur historian of 
some merit, and John O'Leary, friend of and nationalist inspiration 
for William Butler Yeats. Stephens also went to jail, but a young IRB 
member, John Devoy, the future leader of the Clan na Gael in the 
United States, arranged his escape. After his rescue, Stephens left for 
America, hoping to end the feud between O'Mahony and the Fenian 
Senate, and to persuade them to send guns and ammunition to 
Ireland. But Stephens was such a difficult personality that his pres-
ence encouraged rather than ended American Fenian dissension. 
While Stephens was in the United States, British authorities 
took the IRB by surprise, transferring Irish soldiers serving in their 
own country to Britain, suspending habeas corpus, and arresting a 
number of prominent republicans. In futile gestures of defiance, 
republican units in various parts of Ireland took up arms against the 
British in March 1867. The Royal Irish Constabulary and the army 
easily defeated these small bands of poorly armed rebels. 
With Fenians in prison, and their cause no longer a serious 
threat, even priests, much to Cullen's disgust, expressed sympathy 
for the brave if misguided heroes. An incident in England added to 
Catholic clerical and lay pro-Fenianism. In September 1867 an IRB 
unit in Manchester freed Irish-American Fenians Colonel TJ. Kelly 
and Michael Deasy from a police van in Manchester. During the 
incident someone shot and killed a constable. Authorities arrested 
three members of the rescue party, W.P. Allen, Michael Larkin, and 
Michael O'Brien, and tried them for murder. They admitted to being 
present when the incident took place but denied firing the fatal 
bullet. Anti-Irish hysteria surrounded the trial. Jurors found the 
prisoners guilty, and a judge sentenced them to death. With the 
execution of the "Manchester Martyrs" a wave of anger against 
British injustice swept over Ireland. Some bishops and priests were 
active in the Amnesty Association, which had been founded to obtain 
commutation of Fenian prison sentences. But Odo Russell, the 
British representative at the Vatican, with the support of Bishop 
Moriarity and with promises of benefits to the church in Ireland, 
persuaded Pius IX to issue a condemnation of the IRB. This created 
more pro- than anti-Fenian sentiment among Irish Catholics. 
Deciding to take advantage of a more friendly climate of 
opinion and to increase their organizational efficiency, Fenians de-
posed Stephens and O'Mahony and restructured republicanism on 
both sides of the Atlantic. By 1870, however, Fenianism was retreat-
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ing from the Irish stage, and Home Rule, a new expression of 
constitutional nationalism, was waiting in the wings. 
Although Fenianism did not seriously challenge British rule in 
Ireland, it, along with the efforts of the National Association, per-
suaded William Ewart Gladstone, prime minister following the 1868 
general election, to initiate Irish reform. Under his guidance, Whigs, 
Radicals, and Peelites finally coalesced into an effective Liberal 
party. Following in the footsteps of his mentor, Sir Robert Peel, 
Gladstone decided that it was expedient for the British government 
to subvert Irish nationalism by eliminating the grievances sustaining 
it. In 1869 he attempted to conciliate Irish Catholics by disestablish-
ing the Irish Protestant Church, and the next year he pushed a Land 
Act through Parliament. This measure attempted to guarantee the 
security of tenant farmers by making landlords compensate them for 
improvements they made to the property and for the disturbance 
they suffered when evicted for any reason except nonpayment of 
rent. Gladstone believed that the expense of eviction would force 
landlords to think twice before clearing their estates. John Bright 
authored a clause in the act offering government loans of up to two-
thirds of the purchase price to tenants who wanted to buy their farms. 
Since the Land Act permitted eviction without compensation 
if rents were not paid, it failed as an instrument of tenant security. 
Landlords could raise rents and then evict if tenants were unable to 
pay. Since loan terms were unmanageable for most farmers, the 
Bright clause did not significantly increase the number of peasant 
proprietors. In fact, in the severe agrarian depression that began in 
the late 1870s evictions dramatically increased. 
While inadequate as a means of solving the agrarian dimension 
of the Irish Question, the Land Act was a precedent. It broke down 
some resistance to government action in the area of private property, 
thus smoothing the way for meaningful legislation in the early 1880s. 
And the Bright clause pointed to the final solution oflandlord-tenant 
conflict-peasant proprietorship. Because the Land Act was the first 
major interference by government with the traditional rights of 
property, it had implications for the British as well as the Irish. By 
expanding government responsibility in social and economic areas, 
the Land Act was a significant step in the evolution of British 
liberalism from its early nineteenth century laissez-faire start to its 
collectivist welfare-state agenda of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 
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Gladstone's efforts to solve the Irish Question were too timid 
to satisfy Irish nationalist opinion and too radical for the tastes of 
British Conservatives, who exploited his Irish policy to rally no-popery, 
anti-Irish prejudices against the Liberals. In addition, Gladstone's 
friendly intentions toward Ireland encouraged Catholic bishops to 
expect concessions in the area of denominational education. 
Although he empathized with Irish-Catholic complaints that 
they were denied facilities and opportunities for higher education, 
as the leader of a party dependent on the votes of British Noncon-
formists and one that had just disestablished the Irish Protestant 
Church, Gladstone could hardly endow Cullen's Catholic University. 
In 1873 he proposed a compromise he believed would answer the 
demands of Catholics for higher education without contradicting the 
principle of separation of church and state in Ireland. His Irish 
university bill would have expanded Dublin University into a na-
tional institution with affiliated sectarian colleges. The university 
would have offered no lectures or examinations in controversial and 
divisive subjects such as theology, history, or moral philosophy. Af-
filiated colleges, however, would have been free to offer courses and 
certificates in these fields. 
As opponents of nondenominational higher education since 
the Queen's Colleges debate of the 1840s, Catholic bishops rejected 
Gladstone's proposal as inadequate. They argued that without a 
government endowment, the Catholic affiliate within Dublin Uni-
versity could not academically compete with Oxford and Cambridge, 
two Protestant British universities, or with Trinity College in Dublin, 
another well-endowed center of Protestant studies. Influenced by 
the hierarchy's criticism, a number oflrish Liberal MPs voted against 
the university bill, defeating it, forcing Gladstone to call for a January 
1874 general election. Expanded by the Reform Bill of 1867, and 
emancipated by the secrecy of the 1872 Ballot Act, partly the result 
of nationalist, priest, and landlord intimidation in Irish by-elections, 
the British electorate returned a Conservative majority to the House 
of Commons, and Benjamin Disraeli succeeded Gladstone as prime 
minister. In Ireland, the contest between Liberals and Conservatives 
was of minor importance compared to the return of fifty-nine MPs 
pledged to Home Rule. 
4 
Home Rule 
1870-1880 
Isaac Butt, Home Rule's founding father, was born in 1813, the son 
of a Donegal Protestant vicar. While a brilliant student at Trinity 
College he cofounded and for a time served as editor of the Dublin 
University Magazine, the most intelligent conservative journal in nine-
teenth-century Ireland. As previously mentioned, in Butt's time the 
DUM promoted Irish cultural nationalism as an alternative to the 
political variety. After earning his degree in 1836, Butt stayed on at 
Trinity to teach political economy and, at the same time, studied for 
the bar at the King's Inn. In 1838 Butt resigned his academic position 
to practice law. As a young Tory barrister, he championed Protestant 
Ascendancy, no-popery causes. Butt's articulate argument against 
the Irish Municipal Reform Bill before the House of Lords impressed 
British and Irish Tories. He was one of the few Protestants serving 
in the reformed Dublin Corporation, where he debated Repeal with 
O'Connell in 1843. 
Butt's defense of Protestant Ascendancy unionism was more 
than narrow self-interest. He described himself as a Burkean conser-
vative and an Irish patriot. Butt believed that the British connection 
provided Ireland with an enlightened constitution that protected 
property and political rights, and that the union of church and state 
guaranteed that religious values would guide ordinary and political 
conduct. He also was convinced that the Union promised peace and 
stability, necessary conditions for the advance of the Irish economy 
and standard of living. 
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Since Butt was raised and educated within the narrow confines 
of Protestant Ascendancy, he naturally shared its apprehensions 
concerning Catholic nationalism. He believed that Catholics were a 
superstitious and seditious rabble that threatened the Union, social 
order, enlightened religion, property rights, and cultural values. His 
conservative, Anglo-Irish Protestant attitudes motivated him to resist 
what he considered the advance of chaos and anarchy. 
Butt's passage from unionism to nationalism actually began 
when he lectured in political economy at Trinity College. In opposing 
laissez-faire dogmatism, he insisted that the British government had 
a responsibility to foster a healthy Irish economy. Conservative com-
mitments made him reluctant to suggest changes in the system of 
landholding; instead he recommended tariffs to protect Irish industry 
and agriculture. Butt's economic nationalism would eventually ex-
pand and take on new dimensions. 
By the late 1840s Butt realized that Protestant Ascendancy 
posed a major threat to social stability and conservative principles of 
government. It provoked anger and discontent, driving the Catholic 
clergy and laity into the arms of demagogues preaching radical 
change. Butt decided that if religious and economic benefits were 
extended to Catholics without placing serious restrictions on the 
rights of property or the Protestant Church, the Union could be 
preserved. The Irish of diverse classes and faiths would work to-
gether for the progress of their country. 
In an 1847 pamphlet, "Famine in the Land," Butt repeated 
criticism of British laissez faire, suggesting an alternative program of 
government relief: public works projects to provide employment and 
at the same time increase economic potential, expanded transporta-
tion facilities to stimulate industrial and agricultural production, and 
sponsored emigration to relieve the strain of overpopulation. Butt 
concluded by warning Britain that it could no longer depend on class 
and religious divisions in Ireland to preserve the Union. He said that 
the Famine was teaching Irish classes and creeds the value of coop-
eration. He predicted that if unity of feeling survived the existing 
crisis, and if British politicians persisted in ignoring the needs of 
Ireland, the Union would perish. 
In 1848 Butt provided legal defense for Young Icelanders, 
blaming British misgovernment and economic policies for compel-
ling them to rebel. He insisted that Repeal was a constitutionally 
valid objective. Butt argued that the government's response to the 
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Famine indicated that British politicians lacked the knowledge or 
competence to deal with Irish problems. He intimated that an Irish 
parliament dealing with local affairs might not be inconsistent with 
the spirit of unionism or a danger to the empire. 
During their trials, Butt asked Duffy, Meagher, and O'Brien 
to endorse him for a seat in the House of Commons. Duffy and 
Meagher agreed on the condition that he declare himself a Repealer. 
Evidently Butt was not yet ready to take such an advanced position. 
Instead, from 1852 until 1865, he served as an undistinguished 
Conservative MP. His positions on Irish issues, however, did reveal 
an evolving nationalism. He endorsed tenant right, pressed for ex-
tensive railroad construction in Ireland, and defended Catholicism 
against the attacks of no-popery bigots. After his defeat in the general 
election of 1865, Butt returned to Dublin to practice law and write 
pamphlets on the land question and denominational education. A 
brief stay in debtors' prison gave him unexpected if uncomfortable 
leisure to write. 
In analyzing the agrarian situation, Butt decided that secure 
tenures at fair rents, promptly paid, was a conservative solution that 
should satisfy both landlord and tenant. He also endorsed the appeal 
of Catholic bishops for government funds for Catholic schools. Butt 
insisted that Irish public opinion supported religious education as a 
way to preserve Ireland from the radical and secular ideas permeating 
Britain and threatening the spiritual values of the United Kingdom. 
Butt's conservative reform views led him to propose the dual estab-
lishment of Catholicism and Protestantism in Ireland. 
At considerable personal expense and inconvenience, Butt 
again came to the defense of Irish rebels during the 1867 Fenian 
trials, increasing his popularity and prestige in nationalist circles. 
After the trials, he served as president of the Amnesty Association, 
which had some success in commuting Fenian sentences. 
By the late 1860s Butt had lost confidence in the Union, 
deciding that the differences between industrial Britain and agrarian 
Ireland were too extreme to be reconciled in a common legislature. 
He feared that British social, political, and economic radicalism 
would spread to and corrupt Ireland. Butt determined that it was now 
time for conservatives to take the helm of Irish nationalism and steer 
it on a constructive course. He and George Henry Moore concluded 
that since the success of the North in the American Civil War had 
made federalism popular in British intellectual and some political 
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circles, leading to the North American Act, which established the 
Dominion of Canada, perhaps it was a key to the solution of the Irish 
Question. Moore died in early 1870, leaving Butt the task of putting 
the idea of a federated United Kingdom into motion. 
On the evening of May 19, 1870, forty-nine prominent Dub-
liners, most of them Protestant merchants, met at the Bilton Hotel 
to discuss Ireland's future. Butt summoned the gathering to exploit 
a perceived shift in Irish conservative opinion encouraging the pos-
sibility of collaboration between Catholics and Protestants in an 
agitation to restore the Irish Parliament. Angered by the disestablish-
ment of their church, frightened by the implications of the proposed 
Land Act, and troubled by the unhealthy condition of the Irish 
economy, Protestant leaders, especially those from the business class, 
denounced the economic, religious, and political consequences of 
the Union. Some demanded an Irish parliament to cope with unique 
local problems. 
Convinced by Butt's eloquence and logic, the meeting unan-
imously adopted two resolutions: the first called on the British 
government to approve an Irish parliament with complete control 
over Irish affairs; the second established the Home Government 
Association (HGA) to promote self-rule. The HGA held its first 
meeting at the Dublin Rotunda on September 1, 1870. As planned, 
it began as a relatively small, private organization dedicated to unit-
ing all classes and religions behind an effort to create public opinion 
in Britain and Ireland favorable to a federal arrangement between 
the two islands. Members were screened for admission and paid a 
pound annually as dues to cover operating expenses and the costs of 
publications. The HGA invited members of Dublin trade unions to 
become associate members for a yearly shilling. For every twenty 
associates, unions could delegate a regular member to attend Asso-
ciation meetings. Branches of the HGA emerged in various parts of 
the country. 
According to Butt's Home Rule plan, the Irish parliament of 
Lords and Commons would have jurisdiction over local resources and 
revenues. Westminster would retain authority over such common 
interests as colonial affairs, foreign policy, and imperial defense. The 
federal contract would not alter either the prerogatives of the Crown 
or the principles of the constitution. In order to attract the support 
and calm the fears and suspicions of the Protestant upper classes, the 
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HGA endorsed all existing religious and property rights, and prom-
ised not to discuss issues not directly related to self-government. 
In his 1870 book, Irish Federalism, Butt told Irish and British 
conservatives that Home Rule would prevent rather than encourage 
radical excesses in Ireland. He predicted that when the Irish enjoyed 
the benefits of self-government they would cease rebellious activi-
ties and become the most loyal supporters of the Crown and consti-
tution in the empire. He said Irish Catholics, influenced by their 
church to distrust radical democratic ideologies, under normal cir-
cumstances would follow conservative leadership. If these assur-
ances were inadequate to satisfy sceptics, Butt reminded his readers 
that a hereditary, largely Protestant and conservative Irish House of 
Lords would block radical proposals emanating from a democratic, 
mostly Catholic, House of Commons. 
Butt directed Irish Federalism at British and Irish conserva-
tives. And what he said was true: an Irish House of Lords could block 
Irish reform. But he hoped for something better. Like O'Connell, he 
believed that a Dublin parliament would be Irish in sentiment and 
point of view, and thus respond to Irish opinion. In time, he thought, 
even Irish peers would submit to the mood of the country and would 
fulfill their obligations to people who looked to the aristocracy for 
justice, mercy, and leadership. 
From the start the HGA enjoyed successes. The Dublin 
Corporation, Poor Law boards, town councils, tenant right organiza-
tions, and many newspapers endorsed its program. Local branches 
of the HGA in England and Scotland multiplied so rapidly that in 
1873 it was found necessary to create the Home Rule Confederation 
of Great Britain, with Butt as president. Many Confederation leaders 
and members were Fenians with more energy and devotion for Irish 
nationalism than members of the HGA. Their main task was the 
mobilization of the Irish vote in British cities behind candidates 
sympathetic to Home Rule. 
From January 1871 to August 1873, Irish voters returned eight 
Home Rulers to the House of Commons in by-elections, and six Irish 
Liberals already in Parliament declared that they were federalists. 
These victories were offset by the inability of the HGA to win the 
approval of the Protestant aristocracy and gentry or the blessing of 
the Catholic hierarchy. Butt made a special effort to enroll Protestant 
landlords in the HGA. He told them that tenant farmers were 
prepared to accept their political guidance; he also warned them that 
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this might be their last opportunity to reach a settlement with their 
Catholic neighbors. He cautioned Protestants that if they obstructed 
efforts to achieve an Irish parliament, they could expect little respect 
for their religion or property in a Home-Rule Ireland. 
In reaction to Gladstone's Irish policy, some Protestants did 
become Home Rulers. Fondly recalling the Irish Protestant nation 
of the eighteenth century, they thought that their interests might 
receive more respect in a revived Irish legislature, dominated by the 
upper classes, than in a Liberal-controlled British Parliament. When 
early enthusiasm cooled to sober reflection, many of them decided 
that there was a wide gap separating the ambitions of Irish Catholics 
and their own concerns. Now they were dealing with tenant farmers 
who could use the suffrage and the secret ballot to establish a peasant 
democracy. Perhaps, they decided, it would be better to rely on the 
protection of the British Parliament with its strong Protestant Con-
servative representation than on Catholic promises of moderation 
and good will. After the initial fervor of the spring and summer of 
1870, few Protestants joined the HGA, and many of those initially 
enrolled ceased to take an active part. According to the Nation, in 
1871 Protestants were two-fifths of the HGA membership and had a 
majority of three on its sixty-one man Executive Council. In June 
1872 the Nation reported that in the recent election for the Executive 
Council, Protestants cast only one-third of the ballots and Catholics 
had a majority of seven on the Council. Alfred Webb, a Quaker official 
of the Association, advised nationalists to abandon hope of "attaching 
any large number of our Protestant fellow countrymen." 
While Home Rule propaganda concentrated on wooing non-
Catholics, Butt and his colleagues understood the necessity of secur-
ing the good will of Catholic bishops and priests. This meant weaning 
them away from their admiration for Gladstone. Hoping that he 
would endow a Catholic university, the Irish hierarchy feared that 
Home Rule nationalism would antagonize the Liberal leader, alien-
ating him from the issue of Catholic education. When invited to join 
the HGA, many of the hierarchy and clergy said they would not 
participate in any movement dominated by anti-Catholic Protestants 
using Home Rule to undermine clerical influence with the people 
and to attack a Liberal government anxious to extend justice and 
friendship to Ireland. 
Because the Catholic hierarchy was cool to Home Rule, not 
many priests applied for HGA membership. From 1870 to 1873 only 
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two in Cullen's Dublin archdiocese joined the Association, and one 
later withdrew. The names of twenty Protestant and only twelve 
Catholic clergymen appeared on an 1870 Nation list of HGA mem-
bers. Some prominent politicians also avoided contact with a move-
ment frowned on by the hierarchy. Home Rule by-election 
candidates often met clerical opposition. Some priests were hostile 
to Butt when he successfully contested Limerick in 1871. Joseph 
Ronayne, victorious in a Cork city by-election, encountered the 
resistance of a number of clerics. Rowland Blennerhassett, a Protes-
tant landlord, managed to win a Kerry seat despite the antagonism 
of Bishop Moriarity. Joseph Biggar, however, suffered defeat in Derry 
because the bishop, Francis Kelly, and his clergy campaigned for the 
Liberal candidate, split the nationalist vote, and thus guaranteed a 
Conservative victory. Although Home Rule candidates usually sur-
mounted clerical opposition, the bitterness of the contests did noth-
ing to reconcile the Catholic hierarchy to federalism. 
After the House of Commons rejected the Irish university bill, 
HGA officials tried to exploit the bishops' dissatisfaction with Glad-
stone's proposal. In pronouncements condemning it, several prelates 
did advocate Home Rule as an initial step in the direction of denomi-
national education. A few went further by complimenting the pro-
gram and leadership of the Association. This apparent softening in 
the hierarchy's attitude encouraged a number of priests to endorse 
federalism. 
Many Home Rulers interpreted election victories and the 
conversion of Catholic priests to their cause as signs that the HGA 
had succeeded in educating Irish opinion on the merits of federalism. 
Now was the time, they said, to replace the Association with an 
organization open to public participation. Twenty-five thousand sig-
natures, including those of twenty-five MPs, appeared on a requisi-
tion calling for a national conference to discuss and plan the future 
of Home Rule. 
On November 18, 1873, the national conference convened in 
Dublin's Rotunda. During four days of meetings, nine hundred dele-
gates approved resolutions supporting a federal contract between 
Britain and Ireland, insisting that nationalist MPs were responsible 
to their constituents and future national conferences, and substitut-
ing the Home Rule League for the Home Government Association. 
Anyone paying one pound in annual dues and willing to accept the 
resolutions of the national conference could become a League mem-
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ber. Later, to provide Home Rule with more popular support, and to 
increase the income of the League, Butt borrowed an O'Connell 
tactic by creating associate memberships for a shilling a year. 
In three years Butt had done much to revitalize Irish nation-
alism after the failure of Repeal in the 1840s, of the independent 
party in the 1850s, and of the Fenian movement in the 1860s. 
Reactions to Gladstone's Irish policy assisted Butt's effort to convince 
Irish opinion that federalism would be the fulfillment of its aspira-
tions. When Irish farmers realized that the Land Act would not result 
in secure tenures at fair rents, and when the Catholic clergy discov-
ered that Gladstone had no intention of conceding their education 
demands, they moved into the ranks of Home Rule. Although the 
timid platform of the HGA offered no solutions to education and 
agrarian questions, priests and farmers were ready to use federalism 
as an outlet for their frustrations. They seemed to accept the Asso-
ciation's idealistic assumptions that an Irish parliament would be able 
to harmonize conflicting class, economic, and religious interests. 
Unfortunately, the HGA did not succeed in reconciling Irish 
Catholics, Anglo-Irish Protestants, Ulster Presbyterians and other 
Nonconformists. Nor was there, when considered realistically, much 
chance of resolving religious differences in the Ireland of the 1870s. 
Members of other sects were still too suspicious of Catholic motives 
to abandon their parochialism, siege mentality, and dependence on 
the British Parliament for protection in what they considered a 
hostile environment. Perhaps if the Land Act had proved more 
successful in increasing the security of tenant farmers, or if the 
Catholic hierarchy had been less determined to win government 
funds for their schools, a Catholic-Protestant alliance outside Ulster, 
where Protestants and Presbyterians were hopelessly hostile to Ca-
tholicism and nationalism, might possibly if not probably have re-
sulted. But without the land and education issues Home Rule could 
never have enlisted the support of the Catholic priests and people. 
And it was far more important for a nationalist agitation to have the 
allegiance of the Catholic majority than the Protestant minority. 
Butt's nationalist career peaked with the election of fifty-nine 
Home Rule MPs in the 1874 general election. This group met in 
Dublin and organized the Irish Home Rule parliamentary party, with 
Butt as chair. Party objectives, rules of conduct, and parliamentary 
strategy reflected his moderate inclinations. Home Rule MPs had to 
vote as a unit only on self-government. On other issues they could 
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act as their consciences and/or interests dictated. Butt rejected Char-
les Gavan Duffy's concept of a completely independent, strongly 
disciplined Irish party voting as a block on all legislation touching 
Ireland. He said that Home Rule MPs were not of one opinion on 
British, imperial, or even Irish matters, and that independent oppo-
sition would create the impression that they were Liberal allies. He 
also believed that tight discipline would force the party to have 
definite positions on land and religion, convincing Irish Protestants 
that Irish nationalism could not be separated from Catholicism and 
agrarian radicalism. 
Aware that by appeasing Protestant Ireland he risked alienat-
ing Irish Catholics, Butt urged Home Rule MPs as individuals, not 
as party members, to support his efforts to amend the Land Act, 
reform Irish suffrage, and promote denominational education. His 
please-all strategy was too complex. How many nationalists or union-
ists would distinguish between the actions of individual Home Rule 
MPs and their party program? 
Conciliation best describes Butt's parliamentary policy. He 
was convinced that the conservative principles underlying federalism, 
and the good manners and courtesy of the Irish parry at Westminster 
would finally persuade British MPs to consider the case for Home 
Rule with an open mind. He instructed his colleagues to conduct 
themselves as gentlemen in the Commons, always respecting its tradi-
tions and procedures. He also advised them to display their loyalty to 
the Crown, their willingness to share the burdens of empire, and 
their admiration for the principles of the British constitution. 
The results of the 1874 election and the formation of the Irish 
party excited optimism among Irish nationalists. By 1876, however, 
cynicism had replaced hope, and many considered the Irish party just 
another collection of opportunists exploiting nationalism to improve 
their own prospects. The failure of the party to meet the expectations 
of 1874 can be attributed to the unsatisfactory quality of its members, 
Butt's leadership inadequacies, and the miscalculations of his parlia-
mentary strategy. 
Like the Repeal party of the 1830s and 1840s, and the inde-
pendent Irish party of the 1850s, the Home Rule party of the 1870s 
suffered from less than mediocre talent. As previously discussed, 
financing an election campaign and providing for maintenance in 
London during parliamentary sessions were beyond the means of 
most sincere nationalists. This left the political field to men long on 
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cash but short on integrity and talent. The brief interval between the 
national conference and the 1874 general election made it impossible 
for the newly formed Home Rule League to exert much influence 
over the selection of candidates. Consequently, constituencies had 
no choice but to accept men who in many cases adopted federalism 
only to gain or retain seats in the Commons. Once elected, they 
neglected parliamentary duties and made light of Home Rule com-
mitments. Absenteeism was directly responsible for the defeat of two 
Irish franchise reform bills and weakened the party in other impor-
tant tests of strength. 
Butt's leadership deficiencies encouraged party apathy. While 
a skilled debater, a brilliant framer oflegislation, and a popular figure 
at Westminster, he was timid in parliamentary combat, reluctant to 
enforce party discipline, and, due to financial problems, negligent in 
regard to his duties. Butt's money woes necessitated frequent absences 
from the Commons when his ability and experience were needed. 
Butt's conciliation policy failed. The logic of federalism did 
not impress British MPs. They considered it another Irish attempt 
to destroy the United Kingdom and disrupt the empire. The Irish 
party's refusal to take stands on issues outside Home Rule and the 
freedom of action of its members irritated all shades of Irish opinion. 
Despite Butt's denial, Protestants were sure that Catholicism, agrar-
ian radicalism, and nationalism were an inseparable trinity. Catholics 
insisted that tenant right and religious education were intrinsic to the 
objectives of nationalism. They found it difficult to give their enthu-
siasm to a movement that divorced political from social, economic, 
and religious imperatives. 
Criticisms of Home Rule MPs and their party began during 
the parliamentary session of 1874 and had become widespread when 
Parliament adjourned in 1876. Tenant right leaders and advocates of 
denominational education accused Home Rule MPs of insincerity in 
pressing their grievances. Some suggested the abandonment of fed-
eralism for an agitation more sympathetic to Catholic and agrarian 
interests. T.D. Sullivan, editor of the Nation while his brother A.M. 
held a seat in the Commons, was critical of the Irish party's concili-
atory parliamentary policy. He advised it to employ obstruction as a 
proper response to the indifference British politicians displayed 
toward Ireland. Sullivan's suggestion was a major topic of newspaper 
debate in the summer of 1876; most of the nationalist press preferred 
obstruction to conciliation. 
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During the August 1876 Dublin convention of the Home Rule 
Confederation of Great Britain, delegates criticized the apathy and 
tactics of Home Rule MPs. They passed a two-part resolution: the 
first expressed loyalty to Butt, the second demanded a more disci-
plined, active party that would pursue an aggressive policy at West-
minster. Butt assented to the resolution, committing himself and the 
party to a more determined course of action. This promise was made 
under duress, and Butt, by his subsequent conduct in the Commons, 
indicated that he had no intention of complying. 
During the 1877 parliamentary session, the obstructive tactics 
employed by Charles Stewart Parnell and Joseph Biggar captured the 
attention and interest of Irish nationalists. Parnell, a Wicklow Prot-
estant landlord, had won a seat for Meath in an 1875 by-election. 
During his first two years at Westminster he seldom spoke but was 
always present for debates and votes. Parnell had been impressed by 
Joseph Biggar's experiment with obstruction during the parliamen-
tary session of 1875. Biggar, a Belfast Protestant provision merchant 
who later became a Catholic, had been a member of the IRB and sat 
on its Supreme Council until expelled in 1877 for his Home Rule 
commitment. In the 1874 general election, nationalist voters in 
County Cavan elected him their MP. The next year he delayed 
passage of an Irish coercion measure by reading long passages from 
parliamentary blue books. Biggar's conduct outraged Benjamin Dis-
raeli, the prime minister, and other Conservatives. It also disgusted 
Butt, who insisted that Home Rulers should act like gentlemen and 
play by the accepted rules of the parliamentary game. 
In 1877 Parnell and Biggar, assisted by a handful of colleagues, 
impeded the government's agenda with motions to adjourn or to report 
progress, and with amendments to almost every bill on the docket. 
Some of the amendments were quite constructive, but they necessi-
tated long discussions, seriously delaying the legislative timetable. 
Many British newspapers and periodicals depicted Parnell and 
Biggar as uncouth Irish ruffians. Butt described their tactics as 
insubordination that threatened the existence of the Irish party. He 
condemned obstruction as a negative tactic that would intensify 
anti-Irish sentiment in Britain by encouraging a conviction that the 
Irish were incompetent to govern themselves. 
Parnell and Biggar denied that their diligent attendance in the 
Commons, frequent motions, and numerous amendments consti-
tuted an attempt to paralyze the machinery of government. They 
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described their actions as an effort to insure adequate discussion of 
important issues at convenient times. Parnell argued that if consci-
entious devotion to duty delayed the legislative schedule, it was 
proof that the British Parliament should share its complex burdens 
with subordinate assemblies. 
Parnell rejected Butt's thesis that reason could persuade Brit-
ish politicians to render justice to Ireland. He said that Liberal and 
Conservative MPs seldom took the time to evaluate Irish claims, no 
matter how well presented. According to Parnell, all that really 
counted in the Commons was party strength, and the Irish party was 
weak in numbers and morale. He insisted that Ireland could achieve 
Home Rule only with the support of one of the British parties. To 
win this support he suggested intimidation rather than reason. 
Parnell advised his party colleagues to present Parliament with a clear 
choice: Home Rule for Ireland or persistent Irish interference in 
British and imperial affairs. He said that if this active parliamentary 
policy failed to achieve self-government, then the Irish might as well 
abandon all confidence in constitutional methods. 
Obstruction or conciliation? That was the issue debated by 
Butt, Parnell, and their partisans in newspapers, nationalist organiza-
tions, meetings of the Irish party, tenant right societies, and on 
political platforms in Ireland and Britain. Butt fought with unusual 
energy but with little effect. Slowly but surely Parnell gathered the 
support of national opinion. Newspapers praised the man who dared 
to defy the House of Commons and recommended his parliamentary 
policy to other Home Rule MPs. A growing number of Butt's friends 
in the party advised him to compromise his quarrel with Parnell by 
adopting a more vigorous parliamentary strategy. For the most part, 
it was the despised absentee and Whig elements of the Home Rule 
parliamentary party that remained loyal to Butt. 
Parnell's strongest support came from the Irish in Britain. In 
1877 the Home Rule Confederation elected him instead of Butt as 
its president. In Ireland, Parnell's supporters successfully pressured 
the Home Rule League to call another national conference to decide 
the question of obstruction or conciliation. When the conference 
assembled in January 1878, it decided to retain Butt as party leader, 
but instructed him to unify and energize Home Rule MPs. 
In appreciation of Butt's courtroom efforts on behalf of Feni-
ans and his work with the Amnesty Association, quite a few IRB 
members joined the Home Government Association, the Home Rule 
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League, and the Home Rule Confederation of Great Britain. In the 
United States, the Clan na Gael, founded by Jerome J. Collins in 
1867, superceded a faction-ridden Fenian Brotherhood humiliated 
by a series of failed Canadian invasions. After his release from a 
British prison in 1871, John Devoy came to the United States and 
became a journalist, finally settling in New York. He joined the Clan 
na Gael and became its dominant personality. In 1877 the Clan 
formed an alliance with the IRB, establishing a joint Revolutionary 
Directory. The Clan was better organized and more secret than the 
Fenian Brotherhood. Its membership also was more middle class and 
socially and politically prominent. In many ways the Clan repre-
sented an Irish-American nationalism moving away from the bitter-
ness of alienation toward a search for respectability. Experiencing 
economic mobility, many of the Irish in the United States were 
puzzled when other Americans continued to reject them socially. 
They concluded that their low status reflected Ireland's colonial 
bondage and decided that they would elevate Irish America by 
liberating Ireland. 
At first the Clan rejected Home Rule because of its trust in 
constitutional and parliamentary methods and its refusal to com-
pletely reject the British connection in favor of a democratic republic. 
Since Irish America financed republicanism in Ireland it was able to 
influence IRB policy. Clan leaders notified Charles Kickham, presi-
dent of the IRB Supreme Council, that his organization must stop its 
federalist collaboration. He complied and expelled Home Rulers 
from the IRB. 
In the late 1870s some Clan leaders took another look at Home 
Rule. Parnell's and Biggar's activities at Westminster suggested to 
them that a parliamentary party led by a man of Parnell's determina-
tion using obstruction as a weapon might achieve significant results. 
Devoy, John Boyle O'Reilly, another IRB exile and editor of the 
Boston Pilot, and others in the Clan were convinced that Britain would 
become involved in the Russo-Turkish war on the side of the Turks. 
They believed that perhaps Parnell and his friends, backed by Irish 
America, could exploit Britain's preoccupation with a Balkan war to 
extort concessions for Irish nationalism. They hoped to repeat the 
victory of 1782 when Britain, frightened of a French invasion, sub-
mitted to armed Ireland's demand for an extension of Irish parlia-
mentary sovereignty. 
While Clan leadership was pondering the possibilities of a 
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working arrangement with Parnell, Patrick Ford, editor of the New 
York-based Irish World, Irish America's most influential newspaper, 
argued (like James Fintan Lalor before him) that the way to energize 
Irish nationalism was by emphasizing economic issues. Ford's popu-
lism described the Irish in Ireland and the Irish in America as victims 
of vicious economic systems. Agrarian capitalism exploited Irish 
tenant farmers; industrial capitalism enslaved the Irish-American 
working class. Ford urged Clan leaders to stop theorizing about 
revolutionary strategy and to mobilize the Irish masses by emphasiz-
ing a war on landlordism in Ireland and the exploitation of labor in 
the United States. 
Ford's tactics fit the times. A severe agricultural depression in 
Ireland, the result of foul weather and the importation of cheap 
American grains into the United Kingdom, had brought about the 
worst misery since the Great Famine. The situation was particularly 
bad in the underdeveloped west, but suffering existed in all parts of 
the country. Emigration and eviction figures rapidly increased. 
Devoy's willingness to collaborate with Parnell, combined 
with Ford's strategy to mobilize Irish opinion behind a struggle to 
exterminate landlordism, created the "New Departure." This was a 
two-point program for bridging the gap separating the Irish masses 
from republicanism. Devoy and his colleagues decided to support an 
agitation for peasant proprietorship as a stratagem to instill and 
mobilize nationalist passion among tenant farmers suffering from the 
agricultural depression. They hoped that a republican commitment 
to tenant-farmer interests would not only attract their loyalty, but 
might also lead to an alliance with those Home Rule MPs still 
enjoying public favor. According to the New Departure blueprint, 
when tenant farmers became fervent nationalists, and when a signifi-
cant portion of the Irish party committed to complete separation from 
Britain, the stage would be set for action. MPs would initiate the 
struggle for independence by insisting on immediate Home Rule. 
When the British Parliament rejected their demand, they would 
withdraw from the House of Commons and establish a provisional 
government in Dublin. All Ireland would stand ready to support it 
·with arms supplied by the Clan na Gael. Wedded to the original IRB 
strategy of avoiding religious and class conflict, Kickham, O'Leary, 
and some other Irish Fenians did not warm to the New Departure. 
In October 1878 the Clan offered Parnell specific terms for an 
alliance, including "abandonment of the federal demand and substi-
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tution of a general declaration in favor of self-government"; vigorous 
agitation of the land question on the basis of peasant proprietorship, 
while accepting concessions to abolish arbitrary eviction; an Irish 
party united on all Irish and imperial questions pursuing an aggres-
sive parliamentary policy; and "advocacy of all struggling nationali-
ties in the British Empire and elsewhere." 
While not as interested in or as sympathetic to tenant farmer 
problems as Butt, Parnell recognized the value of combining agrarian 
and Home Rule agitations. He also understood the importance of 
Irish-American financial support, but he was reluctant to conclude a 
compact with the Clan on its terms because such an arrangement 
might persuade the Catholic hierarchy to oppose his bid to control the 
Home Rule movement. While waiting for a more appropriate and 
favorable opportunity to reach a mutual relationship with American 
republicans, Parnell and his colleagues in the active wing of the Irish 
party joined forces with agrarian radicals. During the fall of 1878 they 
spoke at a number of tenant right meetings. At one, John O'Connor 
Power, MP for Mayo, repeated Lalor's words, "the land oflreland for 
the people of Ireland," which became the cry of the National Land 
League. 
Although Parnell and the Clan did not complete a formal pact 
until 1879, Butt was convinced that one already existed, and that it 
was intended to destroy Home Rule. In the autumn of 1878 he made 
a final effort to preserve conservative nationalism in a manifesto to 
the Irish people. Butt's treatise warned that obstruction would lead 
to the expulsion of Home Rule MPs from the House of Commons, 
the disfranchisement of nationalist voters, the resurgence of physical 
force nationalism, and, inevitably, bloody defeat on the battlefield. 
Because his parliamentary conduct in 1878 alienated Irish 
nationalists, few heeded Butt's warning. In exchange for the Inter-
mediate Education Bill providing government scholarships for stu-
dents in Catholic secondary schools, Butt promised to support the 
Conservative government's foreign and imperial policy. True to his 
bargain, and consistent with his pro-empire personal convictions, 
Butt defended Disraeli's actions at the Congress of Berlin against 
Liberal criticism. When Parliament convened in December 1878 to 
deal with the crisis in Afghanistan, he blocked the efforts of other 
Home Rule MPs to submit an amendment to the Queen's Speech 
that asked for a redress of Irish grievances. Butt said that it would 
embarrass the government during a period of international tension. 
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He insisted that Home Rulers should be patriotic supporters of 
Crown and empire. 
Nationalist newspapers were dumbfounded that a parliamen-
tary champion of Irish nationalism would defend and support Tory 
imperialism. Even Butt's warmest friends in the press, those who 
took his side against Parnell, disowned him for encouraging "a 
government avowedly hostile to the claims of Ireland." 
On February 4, 1879, in an atmosphere of suspicion, disillu-
sionment, and controversy, the annual meeting of the Home Rule 
League took place. TO. Sullivan gave notice of two resolutions he 
intended to submit for approval. The first censured Butt for person-
ally negotiating with the government on the Intermediate Education 
Bill, a violation of the party pledge of 1874; the second demanded 
increased activity and consistent attendance in the House of Com-
mons from Home Rule MPs. Butt persuaded Sullivan to withdraw 
his censure motion, but he suffered a defeat when the second 
resolution passed by a margin of eight votes. A depressed and weary 
Butt left the meeting on the arm of his son, Robert. Death spared 
him further humiliation. A few weeks after the League meeting, he 
became ill, never recovered, and died of a stroke on May 5, 1879. 
A majority of Home Rule MPs elected William Shaw, a suc-
cessful Cork banker and Nonconformist clergyman, as Butt's succes-
sor as chair. Under his direction the party failed to improve its 
parliamentary performance. Meanwhile, Parnell was preparing to 
test his strength at the next general election. In October 1879 he 
assisted Michael Davitt in launching the National Land League. 
Davitt, a released Fenian prisoner, had gone to the United States in 
1877 on a Clan-sponsored speaking tour. While there he converted 
to the New Departure, returning to Ireland to head its agrarian phase. 
In August 1879 he founded the Land League of Mayo, dedicated to 
peasant proprietorship. Three months later it evolved into the Na-
tional Land League. Realizing that a Protestant landlord and leader 
of the active wing of the Irish party would make a better front man 
than himself, Davitt generously and shrewdly stepped aside and 
invited Parnell to become Land League president. The offer was 
accepted and worked out well for Parnell and the League. 
From January to March 1880, while in the United States 
soliciting funds for the war on landlordism, Parnell completed an 
alliance with the Clan na Gael on his own rather than their terms. For 
the next ten years the vast majority of Irish-American nationalists 
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would serve Parnell and Home Rule rather than revolutionary repub-
licanism. He returned from his triumphant tour just in time for the 
March general election. Parnell personally contested and won three 
seats, deciding to represent Cork. When all the returns were in, Irish 
voters had elected sixty-one Home Rule MPs, most supporting 
Parnell. On April26, 1880, in an election for chair, he defeated Shaw 
by twenty-three votes to eighteen. Shaw and his supporters refused 
to accept Parnell's leadership. They sat as independent nationalists 
working with Liberals. Parnellites replaced most of them in the 1885 
general election. 
Although the Butt-led Home Rule movement failed to achieve 
significant victories, the period 1870-80 was more than just a false 
start or a prelude to a more glorious era of nationalism. Despite his 
weakness of character, his gentleness, his limited view of inde-
pendent opposition, and his naive respect for the British political 
tradition, Butt made a major contribution to the development oflrish 
nationalism. He articulated the Home Rule demand, created public 
opinion to support it, and organized an Irish party to achieve it. For 
all of its many weaknesses and failures, in quality and quantity of 
membership the 1870s Irish party was the best representation that 
Irish nationalism had yet had at Westminster. Home Rule MPs 
publicized Irish grievances, introduced reform measures, and, in 
some instances, interested British Liberals in Irish causes. 
Had it been successful, Butt's brand of federalism would have 
put an end to those class and religious hatreds dividing Ireland; it 
would also have eased the centuries-old tensions that warped Anglo-
Irish relations. Unfortunately, Butt's political realism did not match 
his good intentions. Psychologically, Anglo-Irish Protestants and 
Ulster Presbyterians could not cooperate in a nationalist movement 
with Catholics. They could not overcome hysterical fears that a 
Catholic peasant democracy, lusting after Protestant property and 
political influence, would dominate an Irish Parliament and impose 
dreaded popery on the land. Distrust of Catholics and class and 
property self-interests firmly committed non-Catholics in Ireland to 
a British rather than an Irish identity. On the other hand, after 
experiencing centuries of exploitation, Catholic tenant farmers could 
not have had much confidence in a Protestant landlord-sponsored 
nationalism. 
British politicians rejected Butt's arguments for Home Rule 
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for the same reason they had O'Connell's demands for Repeal. To 
British parliamentary and public opinion, Irish independence, no 
matter how restricted, was a knife pointed at the heart of the British 
empire, a repudiation of traditional property interests, and a Catholic 
tactic to establish religious ascendancy in Ireland. Home Rule 
bucked a tide of imperialism that Conservatives successfully em-
ployed to attract British voters. 
While less intellectual and experienced than Butt, Parnell had 
clearer insight into the true nature of British politics and the real, not 
mythological, possibilities of Irish nationalism. He was aware that 
Irish Protestants and Nonconformists would not easily embrace 
Home Rule, and that nationalism must be grounded on Catholic 
enthusiasm and Irish-American dollars. Parnell observed that British 
MPs voted in conformity with British needs and party discipline, and 
that they were not swayed by logical and reasonable arguments. 
Before making concessions to Irish nationalism, they had to be 
convinced that it would serve British and party interests. In order to 
impress British politicians with its determination and to compensate 
for its lack of numbers, Parnell decided that the Irish party needed 
inflexible discipline, and that it must retaliate for British indifference 
to Ireland. His strategy was based on a simple but effective formula: 
if the British Parliament denied freedom and reform to the Irish 
people, the Irish party would deny the British people effective 
government. Discipline and a determination, if necessary, to sabo-
tage vital British and imperial legislation would compel British lead-
ers to see the potential danger of Irish discontent and force them to 
negotiate with Irish nationalism. 
Obstruction, however, proved even more important as an 
effective tactic to capture the confidence of Irish nationalism. To 
sustain popular enthusiasm and obtain funding for Home Rule, 
Parnell endorsed agrarian radicalism and negotiated an alliance with 
the Clan na Gael. Eventually this compact between the parliamen-
tary party, agrarian agitators, and Irish Americans achieved security 
of tenures at fair rents and finally peasant proprietorship for Irish 
farmers. And it won Irish nationalists a broader suffrage, increased 
authority in local government, and expanded educational opportuni-
ties. It also extracted a Home Rule commitment from the Liberal 
party. Parnell and the Home Rule movement he revived and modi-
fied from 1910 to 1914 would come as close to achieving the Irish 
hope of self-government as constitutional methods permitted. 
5 
Home Rule 
1880-1906 
When Parnell took command of the Irish party he was, as president 
of the National Land League, directing an agrarian agitation that 
bordered on insurrection. The League's ultimate goal was peasant 
proprietorship, but it was prepared to accept secure tenures at fair 
rents as an intermediate step. Generously endowed by Irish America, 
in March 1880 the League had over £20,000 available to aid victims 
of evictions. 
In a September 19, 1880, speech at Ennis, County Clare, 
Parnell told tenants to hang on to their farms and not to pay unjust 
rents. And he advised against physically punishing the land-grabbers 
who occupied the farms of evictees: "I wish to point out to you a very 
much better way-a more Christian and charitable way, which will 
give the lost man an opportunity of repenting. When a man takes a 
farm from which another has been evicted, you must shun him on 
the roadside when you meet him-you must shun him in the streets 
of the town-you must shun him in the shop-you must shun him 
on the fair-green and in the market place, and even in the place of 
worship, by leaving him alone, by putting him in a moral Coventry, 
by isolating him from the rest of the country, as if he were the leper 
of old-you must show him your detestation of the crime he has 
committed." 
Land Leaguers followed Parnell's advice. All over Ireland they 
refused to pay what they considered excessive rents and first applied 
his suggestion of socially isolating the agents of landlordism on a 
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Mayo estate under the management of Captain Charles Cunningham 
. Boycott. Boycotting became an effective weapon during the land war, 
and Irish-American workers borrowed and varied it in their struggle 
against industrial capitalism. 
Relatively prosperous times in the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s had 
multiplied the numbers and increased the income of shopkeepers in 
Irish towns. This group had close kinship and economic ties with 
tenant farmers, and some rented land themselves. The agricultural 
depression of the late 1870s threatened to destroy this marginal rural ( 
bourgeoisie, motivating many of its members to become local Land 
League officials. Fenians also played important mobilizing and lead-
ership roles in the land war. 
Irish landlords, British politicians, and conservative journalists 
described Land League activities as a revolutionary class war against 
the rights of property and saw Ireland as a country in a state of 
anarchy. During the agrarian struggle, militants burned the hayricks 
of unpopular landlords and maimed their cattle. They also boycotted 
and inflicted physical punishment on landlord agents and farmers 
who dared to occupy farms of evicted tenants. In response, the 
government used the Royal Irish Constabulary, and sometimes sol-
diers, to evict stubborn tenants from their holdings. 
Following the Liberal victory in the general election of 1880, 
Gladstone returned as prime minister. Ireland's agrarian situation 
convinced him that Parliament had to alter landlord-tenant relations 
in that country. He introduced a bill to compensate evicted tenants, 
but the House of Lords rejected it. Gladstone then responded with 
a carrot-and-stick approach to the Irish land crisis. Liberals passed a 
coercive Peace Preservation Bill in an attempt to halt violence, and 
introduced a Land Act providing for fixity of tenure at fair rents and 
for a tenant's right to sell his investment in the farm. With the queen's 
influence, the House of Lords approved the Land Act in late August 
1881. In addition to establishing de facto dual ownership oflrish land 
and clearing the way for peasant proprietorship, it was a devastating 
blow to the remnants of laissez-faire economic dogma. Conservative 
foes pointed out that Gladstone's emergency legislation for Ireland 
established dangerous precedents for Britain. 
Instead of receiving the Land Act with expressions of grati-
tude, Parnell complained that it did not cover tenants in arrears. But 
the main reason Parnell did not support the Liberal measure on its 
second reading involved tactics. He did not want to be responsible 
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for legislation that might prove to be flawed in execution, and he 
wanted to be free to press for amendments and further land reform. 
To Parnell, mobilizing tenant farmers for the land war was the first 
step in a long march toward Home Rule. Therefore, he could never 
accept any British concession as completely satisfactory. He always 
had to push for more until Irish nationalism reached its final desti-
nation. 
After the Land Act became law, Parnell urged the Land 
League to pursue the case for tenants in arrears, and to demand that 
rent-establishing tribunals respect tenant interests. Gladstone lost 
patience with the continuation of agrarian agitation and applied 
provisions of the coercion bill to Parnell and a few of his lieutenants. 
When the government imprisoned them in Dublin's Kilmainham 
jail, Parnell retaliated with a no-rent manifesto. Since influential 
members of the Catholic hierarchy and clergy opposed it as a viola-
tion of legitimate property rights, the manifesto had little effect. 
Imprisonment, however, increased Parnell's stature as a national 
leader, and encouraged rather than retarded violence in rural Ireland. 
In April1882 Gladstone decided that for the sake oflrish tranquility 
and the best interests of the United Kingdom as a whole, the 
government must negotiate with Parnell. In the unofficial "Kilmain-
ham Treaty" Gladstone promised to settle the arrears question and 
to suspend coercion; Parnell agreed to issue a public statement 
accepting the Land Act as "a practical settlement of the land ques-
tion," and to collaborate with the Liberals in efforts to forward Irish 
reform. The government released the Irish leader and his lieutenants 
on May 2, 1882. 
Brutal Dublin murders four days later prevented Gladstone 
from fulfilling his part of the Kilmainham bargain. The Invincibles, 
republican extremists with Irish-American connections, stabbed to 
death Lord Frederick Cavendish, chief secretary for Ireland and the 
husband of Gladstone's niece, and T.H. Burke, the undersecretary, 
as they strolled in Phoenix Park. When Parnell heard the horrible 
news he believed that the assassinations were an attempt to discredit 
him and Home Rule. He seriously considered leaving politics, but 
on the advice of Gladstone changed his mind. But the Phoenix Park 
murders provoked such an anti-Irish backlash in Britain that Glad-
stone had to back away from further Irish reforms, and Parnell 
understood his predicament. 
Since the land war had enlisted mass support and enthusiasm 
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for Irish nationalism, Parnell decided that it was time to consolidate 
and discipline the unruly forces he led and direct their attention to 
Home Rule. In 1882 he substituted the Irish National League and 
the Irish National League of Great Britain for the Home Rule League 
and Home Rule Confederation. Delegates from local branches of the 
INL joined with representatives of the Catholic clergy in county and 
city conventions to select Home Rule general and by-election can-
didates. The branches and the conventions gave the Home Rule 
movement a democratic image and spirit, but in reality the Irish party 
determined candidate selection. Its MPs chaired and usually per-
suaded conventions to select party-preferred candidates. Home Rule 
MPs residing in England dominated the Irish National League of 
Great Britain, using it to mobilize the Irish vote in British cities to 
serve the interests of Home Rule. 
Since the Land League contained many Fenians antagonistic 
to parliamentary methods and Home Rule, Parnell was not unhappy 
when the government outlawed it in 1881. But agrarian agitation 
continued under the auspices of Anna Parnell's Ladies Land League 
until1882 when her brother abolished it as an obstacle to nationalist 
unity. With the land war concluded, Parnell applied leftover funds in 
the Land League treasury to Home Rule purposes. A continuing flow 
of money from the Irish National League of the United States and 
from Irish nationalists in Britain and Ireland also assisted Parnell's 
work. With considerable financial resources at its disposal, the Irish 
party, unlike its predecessors, did not have to depend on opportun-
ists. It could select dedicated and talented young men from all classes 
of society, pay their election expenses, and, if necessary, provide 
them with a stipend for serving their country at Westminister. An 
efficient election machine, a substantial treasury, the secret ballot, 
and household suffrage (the product of the 1884 Reform Bill) re-
sulted in the return of eighty-six Home Rule MPs in the 1885 general 
election. 
Home Rule successes, like Catholic Emancipation's victory, 
further polarized Catholics, Protestants, and Nonconformists in Ire-
land. Some Ulster Protestant and Presbyterian tenant farmers had 
joined the Land League, but when the agrarian movement headed 
down the path of Home Rule, they withdrew, placing their loyalty to 
the British connection before class solidarity. As the Irish party grew 
stronger, the Liberal party, which had once had a respectable follow-
ing among Catholic and non-Catholic farmers, virtually disappeared 
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in Ulster. Catholics voted Home Rule; Protestants and Presbyterians 
supported the Conservative party, the champion of Protestantism, 
the Union, and the empire. 
Under Parnell's direction, Home Rule MPs became a tightly 
knit unit. Before their acceptance as candidates, they had to promise 
to vote together on all issues. Under the supervision of Parnell and 
his chief lieutenants, a parliamentary committee of sixteen formed 
party policy. During the 1880s the Irish party was the most disci-
plined in the House of Commons, and its front benches probably 
contained as much talent as those of the Liberals and Conservatives. 
Irish party discipline and funding were instrumental in shaping 
Britain's modern party system. 
With a cohesive, well-financed, relatively large Westminster 
representation, Parnell could abandon obstruction, a tactic rendered 
almost useless by changes in House of Commons rules. His new 
strategy was based on a balance of power. Home Rule votes in 1885 
dismissed the Liberals from office. After Conservatives pledged not 
to reapply coercion, to introduce a land purchase scheme, to investi-
gate the possibility of extending local self-government, and to ap-
point a viceroy sympathetic to Irish issues, Parnell agreed to support 
a minority administration headed by the Marquess of Salisbury, 
before and after the general election of 1885. Because he had more 
confidence in Randolph Churchill, the bright young champion of 
Tory democracy, than in the cold personality ofJoseph Chamberlain, 
a possible heir apparent to Liberal leadership, Parnell had another 
reason for selecting a Salisbury over a Gladstone government. To a 
considerable extent, Conservatives fulfilled their bargain. Salisbury 
appointed Lord Carnarvon, a believer in a mild form of Home Rule, 
as lord lieutenant, and Conservatives enacted the Ashbourne Act, 
which appropriated £5,000,000 for land purchase at4 percent interest 
with a forty-nine-year repayment period. 
Although Parnell gained much for Ireland from his arrange-
ment with Conservatives, Gladstone was prepared to offer more. In 
December 1885, through his son Herbert, he announced his conver-
sion to Home Rule as the best possible solution to the Irish Question. 
Perhaps this was an honest conviction, but Gladstone had practical 
reasons for seeing merit in Irish self-government. He needed the 
votes of Irish party MPs in the Commons because of Conservative 
imperialism's appeal to a large portion of the British electorate. After 
Gladstone announced his adherence to Home Rule, Conservatives 
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retreated from their effort to conciliate Ireland, made preserving the 
Union the main plank in their party platform, and introduced an Irish 
coercion bill. Parnell responded by replacing a Conservative with a 
Liberal government. 
Gladstone began his third administration supported by an 
Irish nationalist-British Liberal alliance in the House of Commons 
that transformed both British politics and Irish nationalism. The 
alliance limited the independence of the Irish party by wedding the 
fate of Home Rule to Liberal fortunes, and it ideologically defined 
and clarified British party politics. Before the Parnell-Gladstone 
connection the Whig landed aristocracy element in the Liberal 
coalition prevented an uncompromising commitment to political, 
social, and economic reform, tarnishing the party's image as a vehicle 
of progress and retarding its efforts to capture the loyalty of the 
recently enfranchised working class. This problem was solved when 
Whigs rejected Gladstone's commitment to Home Rule, seceded 
from the Liberal party, defined themselves as Liberal Unionists, and 
eventually found their way to the Conservative benches. There they 
were at home with people who shared similar views concerning class 
distinctions, property rights, and the integrity of the empire. By 
pruning Whigs from the Liberal fold, Home Rule emphasized social, 
economic, and imperial issues rather than hereditary allegiances as 
the focus of British party differences. Their association with Irish 
nationalism made it easier for Liberals to commit to democracy and 
social change in other areas. Since the vast majority of Home Rule 
MPs were sympathetic to extensive social reforms and the triumph 
of democracy, their alliance with British Liberalism served mutual 
interests. 
The Irish party did not necessarily embrace British Liberal-
ism's total package. Representing a predominantly Catholic country, 
it could not accept secular views of education. As spokesmen for an 
agrarian country, Home Rule MPs were more interested in the 
problems of Irish tenant farmers than in those of British or Irish 
industrial workers, and, unlike most British Liberals, they were not 
passionate free-traders. Home Rulers did not share the Liberals' 
evangelical conscience or zeal. They did not consider alcohol a vice, 
and criticized Liberal sin taxes. Since brewing and distilling were 
important Irish industries, they naturally influenced Irish-party 
views on the subject of drink. When it came to the support of causes 
associated with human freedom and dignity, Home Rule MPs often 
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were in advance of a majority of Liberals. The destruction of the 
House of Lords and the creation of a democratic suffrage had been 
goals of Irish nationalism since O'Connell's time. Irish nationalist 
MPs spoke up for the rights of people who lived in underdeveloped 
parts of the empire, and some sympathized with the women's suf-
frage movement. In general, the Irish party was friendly to the 
communally and democratically conscious New Liberalism that was 
replacing the old individualistic version. 
The Irish-Liberal alliance was a bonanza for Conservatives, 
giving them Whig defectors from the Liberal party, and providing 
them with another opportunity to exploit anti-Catholic British nativ-
ism. Instead of competing with Liberals on social issues, they could 
play on public anxieties with such slogans as "Home Rule is Rome 
Rule," and by implying that Irish self-government would eventually 
destroy the empire as well as the United Kingdom. 
When the British economy began a post-1870 decline, factory 
workers and miners in Scotland and Wales were more interested in 
bread-and-butter issues than in Ireland or the empire. Therefore, 
until the advent of the Labour party, the Celtic fringes of Britain 
remained loyal to the Liberals, but the growing strength of Irish 
nationalism persuaded Protestants and Presbyterians in Ireland and 
members of the established church in rural England to identify with 
the Conservatives. In order to emphasize the issue of Home Rule, 
exploit no-popery, demonstrate a commitment to the empire, and 
attract the allegiance of Liberal party secessionists, Conservative 
leaders rechristened their party "Unionist." 
In many ways, Parnell's Irish party fulfilled Charles Gavan 
Duffy's independent Irish party strategy. Parnell had exploited ten-
ant grievances in order to revive Irish nationalism and create an Irish 
influence in the Commons. From another perspective, the Home 
Rule effort was something less than what Duffy projected. It did not 
persuade Protestants and Presbyterians to make common cause with 
Catholics, and the ramifications of the Liberal alliance restricted the 
independence of the Irish party. After 1886 the success of Irish 
nationalism depended on British Liberalism, and Parnell and the 
Irish party were in somewhat the same relationship to it as O'Connell 
and his Repeal party were to Whiggery in the 1830s. 
On April 8, 1886, Gladstone introduced the first Home Rule 
(Government of Ireland) bill. It provided for an Irish executive and 
Parliament with control over local affairs, but Westminster remained 
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in charge of matters concerning foreign and imperial policy, the 
Crown, peace and war, customs and excise, the post office, coinage 
and legal tender, and trade and navigation. Technically, the Irish 
parliament was to have only one house divided into two orders; the 
smaller was designed to represent property and was partly elective, 
the larger was wholly representative. Each order had a suspensory 
veto over legislation. Gladstone intended the smaller, more conser-
vative order to protect the various interests of the non-Catholic 
minority. Irish MPs would not sit at Westminister unless it became 
necessary to revise the provisions of the Home Rule bill. The Dublin 
government would appoint Irish judges and the Irish Exchequer 
would pay their salaries. Ireland also was obliged to contribute to the 
costs of empire. Decisions from Irish courts were subject to appeal 
to the Privy Council in London, which could also decide on the 
constitutionality of bills passed by the Irish parliament. 
Irish party MPs opposed certain provisions of the bill: British 
control over customs, the imperial contribution, the temporary West-
minster jurisdiction over the Royal Irish Constabulary, and voting by 
orders in the Irish Parliament. They expressed their criticisms, but 
voted for and praised the bill during its first and second readings 
because they knew that Whig opposition threatened its passage and, 
therefore, Gladstone needed their support. 
A number of British MPs argued that since the British govern-
ment would collect and spend 40 percent of Irish taxes, it would be 
unfair to deny Ireland representation in the Imperial Parliament. 
Conservatives attacked the bill as a concession to Irish extremism 
and a danger to British security. They also insisted that the Union 
was necessary to the empire's survival. But division within Liberal 
ranks delivered the fatal blow to the Home Rule bill. Lord Hart-
ington led the Whig opposition, and Joseph Chamberlain, leader of 
the Radical contingent in the party, convinced that Home Rule 
threatened the empire and bitter because Gladstone had given him 
a minor position in the Cabinet, also rejected the bill. On June 8, 
1886, at the close of the second reading debate, ninety-three Liber-
als, most of them Whigs, voted against Gladstone and put him and 
his Irish allies in the minority, 343 votes to 313. 
Gladstone dissolved Parliament and took the Home Rule 
issue to the British electorate. Conservatives used no-popery, anti-
Irish opinion against Liberals. Cynically playing the "Orange Card," 
Lord Randolph Churchill exploited Irish Protestant hatred ofCatho-
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lies. Visiting Belfast, he coined the slogan "Ulster will fight and 
Ulster will be right" to encourage armed resistance to any Home Rule 
bill that Parliament might pass. Election results gave Conservatives 
316 seats, Liberal Unionists 78, Home Rule Liberals 191, and Irish 
nationalists 85. With the support of Liberal Unionists, the Conserva-
tives formed a government with Salisbury as prime minister. 
In 1893, in his fourth and final administration, Gladstone 
introduced a second Home Rule bill. This time he attempted to 
eliminate one of the criticisms of the first: Ireland would have 
representation at Westminster during discussion oflrish and imperial 
questions. The second Home Rule bill passed through the Com-
mons, but the Lords crushed it. Gladstone wanted to dissolve Parlia-
ment and fight an election on the issue of the Lords' veto power, but 
other Liberal leaders disagreed. This and other conflicts with his 
colleagues convinced the old man to resign as prime minister and 
party leader. Lord Rosebery, lukewarm on Home Rule and hot on 
empire, replaced him. During the crisis in Parliament, and in the 
Liberal party over the second Home Rule bill and the Lords' veto, 
the Irish party's influence was considerably weaker than in the 1880s. 
In December 1890 Home Rule MPs and Irish national opinion had 
split into Parnellite and anti-Parnellite factions. 
In late 1889 Parnell was at the height of his popularity in 
Ireland; he had even won the respect of a considerable portion of 
British opinion, the result of a confrontation with the Times of Lon-
don. In 1887 the traditionally anti-Irish newspaper published a series 
on Parnellism and crime, asserting that the Irish leader and other 
members of his party were responsible for violence and agrarian 
outrage in Ireland. In one article the Times reproduced a letter with 
Parnell's signature condoning the 1882 Phoenix Park murders of 
Cavendish and Burke. 
The Times' attack on Parnell's integrity intensified British 
antagonism to him and Home Rule. Seemingly indifferent to British 
opinion, Parnell ignored the charges, but a former colleague turned 
opponent, F. Hugh O'Donnell, who was also mentioned in the 
articles, sued the newspaper for libel. During the trial, the Times' 
attorney produced more incriminating letters allegedly authored by 
the Home Rule leader. Parnell decided to move against the newspa-
per, though he had no confidence in the justice of British courts and 
juries in regard to matters Irish. He asked the government to create 
a parliamentary committee of inquiry to investigate the authenticity 
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of the letters. Salisbury denied his request but did appoint a commit-
tee of three judges to investigate all of the charges against Irish 
nationalism. The hearing revealed that the Times, in goQd faith, had 
bought the letters from Richard Pigott, a Dublin journalist with a 
shady reputation. In February 1889, Parnell's counsel, Charles 
Russell, demonstrated that the Times' letters were counterfeit. After 
the brilliant cross-examination that revealed the truth, Pigott, the 
forger, left for Spain and committed suicide in a Madrid hotel room. 
The Times, that most respectable newspaper, was in disgrace. Irish 
opinion rejoiced that its leader had evaded and exposed a vile 
Unionist plot, and many Britons, with their notions of justice and fair 
play, also believed that a foul conspiracy involving the Times, the 
Conservatives, and the Liberal Unionists had victimized Parnell. 
Following the exposure of Pigott's duplicity, Home Rule and Liberal 
MPs gave Parnell a standing ovation when he entered the House of 
Commons. 
On December 24, 1889, about ten months after the Parnellism 
and Crime Committee inquiry, Captain William O'Shea, one-time 
friend of Parnell and former Irish party member, sued his wife 
Katherine for divorce on grounds of adultery and named the Home 
Rule leader as co-respondent. Mrs. O'Shea had been Parnell's para-
mour since 1880, and Liberal leaders were aware of the relationship; 
she had been their go-between in negotiating the Kilmainham 
Treaty. A number of Home Rule MPs also knew that Katherine 
O'Shea was Parnell's lover. This had been made clear in 1886 when 
Parnell backed O'Shea for a Galway seat even though he refused to 
take the Irish party pledge. But in the Victorian period there was a 
great deal of difference between a quiet relationship and a public 
scandal. A messy divorce case had destroyed the promising career of 
Sir Charles Dilke, Gladstone's likely successor as Liberal leader. 
When O'Shea first announced his intention to divorce his wife 
because of her physical intimacy with Parnell, the Irish party chair 
told his colleagues that the trial would prove that his long romance 
was honorable. Many Irish nationalists believed that the divorce case, 
like the Times' accusation, was a Unionist plot to discredit Home Rule 
and its leader. A number of Irish public bodies passed resolutions 
endorsing Parnell, and the divorce matter dropped from general 
discussion for ten months. 
During the November 1890 divorce hearing, O'Shea testified 
that Parnell had come into his home as a guest and had taken 
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advantage of his hospitality by seducing his wife. He said that for ten 
years Katherine and his so-called friend had continued to deceive 
him, resorting to all sorts of subterfuges to carry on their adulterous 
association. Historical evidence indicates that O'Shea and his wife 
were on bad terms before she met Parnell, that the captain was aware 
of their relationship, and that he had received an allowance from her 
and a seat in Parliament from Parnell for his compliance. For some 
time Katherine had intended to divorce William and marry Parnell 
but had hesitated to do so while her aunt, Mrs. Benjamin Wood, was 
alive. Wealthy Mrs. Wood provided the O'Sheas with a considerable 
income; had she known about her niece's relationship with Parnell, 
she might have cut off the allowance and disinherited her. O'Shea 
had kept quiet to protect his income. When Mrs. Wood died in 1889, 
Katherine planned to use £20,000 of her inheritance to purchase a 
divorce from her husband. Legal obstacles temporarily tied up the 
estate, causing O'Shea to suspect that his wife was reneging on their 
bargain. In vengeance, he sued for divorce. Since it was the only way 
to get rid of O'Shea and to become man and wife, Parnell and 
Katherine finally decided not to contest the case. As a result, the 
judge granted O'Shea his divorce and awarded him Katherine's 
children, two ofwhom were Parnell's. O'Shea's uncontradicted tes-
timony left British opinion with a sordid portrait of the Irish party 
chair. 
Early Irish nationalist reactions to the trial and judgment 
favored Parnell. The Irish National League confirmed his leader-
ship, but Michael Davitt, in the Labour World, asked him to resign as 
party chair, and Cardinal Manning of Westminster advised Gladstone 
to repudiate the Home Rule leader. Manning, who viewed the Irish 
party as an advocate of Catholic causes throughout the United King-
dom, often acted as an intermediary in negotiations between Glad-
stone and Irish bishops. He disliked Parnell, and told members of 
the Irish hierarchy that they should not tolerate a Protestant in charge 
of Irish nationalism. Manning saw the divorce scandal as an oppor-
tunity to destroy Parnell and increase the Catholic bishops' influence 
over the Home Rule movement. . 
British Liberals were dependent on votes from Noncon-
formists, who issued an ultimatum to Gladstone: disassociate your 
party from the Irish adulterer and home-wrecker or suffer the conse-
quences at the next election. The Irish party had scheduled a 
November 25 meeting to elect its chair for the coming parliamentary 
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session. The day before, Gladstone informed John Morley, his closest 
friend and advisor on Irish policy and intended chief secretary for 
Ireland in the next Liberal government, and Justin McCarthy, Irish 
party vice-chair, that Parnell would have to step down for the sake of 
the Irish-Liberal alliance and for the good of Home Rule. Morley 
failed to see Parnell before the meeting, but McCarthy delivered the 
message. Parnell ignored it, McCarthy didn't mention his Gladstone 
conversation to other Home Rule MPs, and they, in ignorance of the 
issue at stake, unanimously reelected "the Chief' as chair. When on 
the following day Gladstone made public his position, many in the 
Irish party forced Parnell to summon a second meeting to reconsider 
his leadership. From December 1 through December 6, in commit-
tee room 15 of the House of Commons, the Irish party debated 
whether they should retain or depose the man who had raised Irish 
constitutional nationalism from the ashes, achieved considerable 
reform legislation for Ireland, and maneuvered the Liberals into a 
Home Rule commitment. 
If Parnell had been a farsighted, selfless, dedicated patriot, 
logic would have demanded a gracious abdication as party chair to 
save the Liberal alliance and Home Rule. He still would have been 
a powerful Irish party voice, and, after a few years of public penance, 
he might have been able to resume its leadership. But Parnell's 
intense pride and lust for power did not groom him for self-sacrifice. 
Ruthlessness and ego had made his political fortune as they had 
shaped the Home Rule movement. Parnell believed that he was the 
leader of the Irish nation not through election but by right of con-
quest over Butt and apathy, and he was not going to abandon his 
position at the dictate of the British puritan Nonconformist con-
science or its public spokesman, William Ewart Gladstone. 
In committee room 15, Parnell's most articulate supporter, 
John Redmond, argued that if Home Rule MPs deposed their leader 
at Gladstone's command, the Irish party would publicly surrender its 
independence and exist as a Liberal satellite. Parnell told his col-
leagues that if they were going to sell him out, they had better make 
sure that Gladstone offered them a generous Home Rule measure as 
the price. Parnell's opponents replied that when Parnell consum-
mated the alliance with Gladstone, the fortunes of the Liberal and 
Irish parties became indistinguishable, and that Home Rule's fate 
rested on the former's appeal to British voters. British liberal opinion 
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had spoken, Gladstone had no choice but to listen and obey, and the 
Irish party had no option but to depose Parnell and elect a new leader. 
On December 6 Justin McCarthy, followed by forty-four of his 
colleagues, left committee room 15. They assembled in another place 
and elected McCarthy party chair. Parnell was left with twenty-seven 
followers. During the debate over Parnell's leadership, some promi-
nent Irish party members were soliciting funds in the United States. 
Among them, William O'Brien and John Dillon could not return 
home. If they did, the government would arrest them for their roles 
in the Plan of Campaign, an 1886-90 agrarian agitation attempting to 
settle rents through collective bargaining. Although they were two 
of Parnell's chief lieutenants, O'Brien and Dillon, along with most of 
the American delegation, agreed that political necessity dictated his 
resignation. 
Refusing to abandon his leadership without a struggle, Parnell 
appealed over the head of the party to the people, thus inviting Irish 
Catholic bishops and priests to play a decisive role in his retention or 
rejection. Since British Nonconformists and other Protestants had 
denounced Parnell as a public sinner, an enemy of the sanctity of 
marriage, and thus unworthy of political influence, the Catholic 
hierarchy and clergy, which had always placed a high premium on 
sexual morality, could hardly appear to be less principled than "here-
tics" on the other side of the Irish Sea. On December 4, during the 
committee room 15 discussions, the bishops, emphasizing the moral 
equation rather than the Liberal alliance, issued a manifesto asking 
Irish Catholics to reject Parnell. Their position did not influence 
Home Rule MPs, who made a political rather than a moral decision, 
but it did have an impact on the minds of Catholic Ireland. 
In 1891 Parnell put his prestige on the line in three by-elec-
tions. He had never exerted himself more vigorously or courageously 
than he did while campaigning for his candidates. In addressing 
friendly and hostile audiences, Parnell projected an inclusive Irish 
nationalism uniting Catholics and non-Catholics, tenant farmers and 
landlords, employers and employees under the umbrella of a secular, 
liberal, democratic Irish state. He also appealed to Fenians by saying 
that if parliamentary efforts failed physical force might be necessary 
to emancipate Ireland from British rule. 
Representing affluent large farmers and members of the 
middle class, Timothy Healy, MP, Parnell's most prominent and 
vicious opponent, proposed a much more conservative and Catholic 
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version of a self-governing Ireland. Despite his liberal, tolerant, and 
progressive nationalist appeal, and his overture to republicans, 
Parnell was defeated by a combination of the political realities of the 
Liberal alliance, the opposition of the Catholic hierarchy and clergy, 
and the influence of the Irish party majority. His candidates lost all 
three elections, and he ruined his health campaigning in the cold and 
damp of Ireland. On October 6, 1891, Parnell died in Brighton of 
rheumatic fever with his wife Katherine at his bedside. Following a 
large and emotional Dublin funeral procession, his friends buried 
him close to O'Connell in Glasnevin cemetery. The dead "Un-
crowned King of Ireland" left behind a shattered Irish party, a 
disillusioned and divided Irish national opinion, and the powerful 
myth of a martyred messiah-one that would inspire future genera-
tions of young people, particularly writers and poets. 
From the defeat of the first Home Rule bill in the summer of 
1886 until December 1905, Liberals were in power less than three 
years (August 1892-February 1895). Lord Salisbury was the Unionist 
prime minister from 1886 to 1892, and then again from 1895 to 1902. 
His nephew, Arthur J. Balfour, succeeded him. As chief secretary for 
Ireland from 1887 to 1891, Balfour designed Unionist Irish policy. 
For a time while he was prime minister, his brother, Gerald, served 
as chief secretary. 
Salisbury and the Balfours agreed that primitive and volatile 
Irish Catholics were too irresponsible to completely manage their 
own affairs and that Home Rule would result in an anti-Protestant 
Dublin parliament, threaten Britain's security, and lead to the disso-
lution of the empire. Dominant in the Unionist party coalition, 
Conservatives continued to encourage British and Irish Protestant 
anti-Catholicism as a weapon against Home Rule and its Liberal 
supporters. They also rallied property interests behind the Unionist 
standard by identifying the Irish-Liberal alliance with radical democ-
racy and socialism. 
But the Unionist government's Irish policy was not solely 
based on repression oflrish nationalism and preservation of the status 
quo. Balfour, a tough chief secretary, believed that Ireland had to be 
cowed into subservience by a long period of resolute government. 
Because of his extensive use of a severe 1887 Crimes Act to suppress 
agrarian agitation and outrage, Irish nationalists referred to him as 
"Bloody Balfour." That name, however, was an unfair estimate of his 
approach to the Irish Question. In the twenty-year period dominated 
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by the Unionist party, Balfour balanced coercion with conciliation. 
He believed Irish nationalism was a synthetic movement that would 
collapse if British legislation improved the economic well-being of 
its constituency. 
Balfour's Irish program was more than what his brother, Ger-
ald, described as an effort "to kill home rule with kindness." He and 
Salisbury wanted to pacify Ireland so that British attention and 
resources could focus on United Kingdom and imperial imperatives 
without the continual distraction of the Irish Question. They also 
needed to reassure Liberal Unionist coalition colleagues who were 
sympathetic to reform in Ireland that, short of Home Rule, the 
government would address Irish discontent. And they wanted to 
make sure that, though divided by religion (Anglican and Noncon-
formist) and by class (tenant farmer and landlord, industrial capitalist 
and worker), Ulster non-Catholics would remain under the inclusive 
banner of Unionism. 
As both chief secretary and prime minister, Balfour introduced 
or encouraged legislation dealing with land, poverty, economic de-
velopment, and local government in Ireland. Unionist land bills dealt 
with tenant security and with peasant proprietorship culminating in 
the 1903 Wyndham Land Act, which provided landlords with a 12 
percent cash bonus to encourage them to sell off their estates. The 
government offered tenants low-interest rates on loans and a sixty-
eight-and-one-half-year repayment period. In 1909, a Liberal ad-
ministration amended the Wyndham Act to compel sales in certain 
instances. Land purchase proved to be the final solution to the 
agrarian dimension of the Irish Question: it created close to two 
hundred thousand peasant proprietors who possessed about half of 
the country's arable land. 
To cope with Ireland's poverty and low standard of living, 
Unionists, under Balfour's guidance, established a number of impor-
tant agencies and introduced many productive programs. The Con-
gested Districts Board (1891) functioned in the most depressed parts 
of the country, mostly in the west, employing government subsidies 
to develop cottage industries (spinning and weaving), fishing, and 
agriculture, and inaugurate extensive programs of technical and 
agricultural education. The Board consolidated many small farms 
into efficient agricultural units, placed poor farmers on these plots, 
and taught them to work the land with competence. In addition to 
the Congested Districts Board, Balfour attempted to energize Ire-
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land's economy with public works projects that constructed railway 
lines and roads, built bridges, and drained water-saturated bog land. 
These activities provided considerable employment as well as eco-
nomic development in the country. In 1899 Chief Secretary Gerald 
Balfour created the Department of Agricultural and Technical In-
struction for Ireland to supervise agricultural and technical educa-
tion, fisheries, prevention of animal and plant disease, the National 
Library, and the National Museum, and after 1905 the geological 
survey. 
A Unionist government, constantly warning against Liberal 
socialist tendencies, was operating welfare state projects in Ireland 
far in advance of anything yet attempted in Britain. Perhaps peasant 
proprietorship, the Congested Districts Board, and the Department 
of Agriculture and Technical Instruction delayed modernization by 
perpetuating agrarianism and discouraging industrialism, but most 
experts agree that they did raise the Irish standard of living and 
provide new economic opportunities. Balfour's effort was probably 
the most intelligent, successful, and humane product of British rule 
in Ireland during the nineteenth century. 
While unrelenting in their opposition to Home Rule, Union-
ists did make a major concession to the Irish demand for self-govern-
ment. Stripping the Protestant gentry-dominated grand juries of all 
fiscal and administrative powers and responsibilities, the 1898 Local 
Government Act transferred these duties to popularly elected urban, 
rural, and county councils that women as well as men could vote for 
and serve on. These new instruments of government gave the Irish 
as much local authority as enjoyed by the British. Unionists intended 
the various councils to substitute for an Irish parliament. Instead, the 
experience of managing local affairs provided a training ground for 
Home Rule and raised nationalist expectations. 
Balfour's Irish policy encouraged contacts between some pro-
gressive Protestant Unionists such as Lord Dunraven and consensus 
building nationalists such as William O'Brien. Dunraven believed 
that the process of planning and passing the Wyndham Land Act 
established a precedent for solving all Irish problems in a conciliatory 
and cooperative manner. His 1904 Irish Reform Association proposed 
the creation in Ireland of financial and legislative councils with 
extensive powers as an alternative to Home Rule. Dunraven invited 
Sir Anthony MacDonnell, the undersecretary for Ireland, to assist 
him in drafting a devolution proposal. MacDonnell, formerly of the 
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Indian civil service, a Catholic liberal with an Irish party MP brother, 
did not enjoy the complete trust of ultra-Unionists. When they 
learned that he had helped author Dunraven's devolution scheme, 
they raised cries of outrage, forcing George Wyndham, the chief 
secretary, to resign. 
Ulster Unionists were not satisfied by Wyndham's downfall or 
by the government's denial that it was entertaining passage of Dun-
raven's scheme. They feared that the Dunraven-MacDonnell pro-
posal indicated that, despite its denials, the government might be 
softening in its opposition to Home Rule. Their response was to form 
the Ulster Unionist Council, established in 1905 with Walter Long, 
MP, as chair. This group became the staunchest champion of union-
ism and a constant pressure on British Conservatives to maintain a 
steadfast hostility to Irish nationalism. Irish Protestant and British 
ultra-Unionism's intimidation pressured the government to put the 
brakes on progressive unionism in Ireland. 
When Unionists left office in December 1905, only the uni-
versity education question remained of the economic, social, and 
religious issues that conceived, birthed, and nourished Irish nation-
alism. Nevertheless, Unionist reform measures did not silence the 
Home Rule demand. The Balfour-Salisbury view oflrish nationalism 
as a mere reflection of economic and social discontent was a superfi-
cial assessment of the situation. In contrast, Gladstone understood 
that Irish nationalism had assumed an identity independent of its 
originating and sustaining grievances, and that it could only be 
satisfied by some concession of legislative independence. Conserva-
tive refusals to consider an Irish parliament and exploitation of 
religious and property prejudices to strengthen unionism made a 
final settlement of the Irish Question more difficult for both Britain 
and Ireland. 
6 
The Crises of 
Home Rule Nationalism 
1906-1914 
Arter a long period of negotiations, in 1900, John Dillon, Justin 
McCarthy's successor as anti-Parnellite leader of the Irish party in 
the Commons, graciously stepped aside, and John Redmond, com-
mander of the small Parnellite minority, became chair of a reunited 
party. As part of the arrangement, William O'Brien's United Irish 
League replaced the Irish National League as the Home Rule 
organization. The UIL was conceived in 1898 as a movement iri the 
west to buy out wealthy graziers and distribute their land among 
farmers. By 1901 it had almost a thousand branches. Irish party unity 
increased its influence at Westminster, lifted nationalist morale, and 
made it easier to solicit funds for Home Rule activities at home and 
from the diaspora. But the Irish party never again attained the 
prestige and popular favor that it had enjoyed in Parnell's time. 
The divorce scandal, followed by the party split, disillusioned 
some nationalists and made others cynical about politics. They could 
not transfer to Redmond the same kind of affection or commitment 
they had given to Parnell. And by 1900 the bloom of youth had left 
the Irish party: energetic and militant young men who followed 
Parnell in the early 1880s had become middle-aged, respected poli-
ticians. While their devotion to Home Rule remained, the compro-
mise, give-and-take character of parliamentary politics had tempered 
their enthusiasm and passion. Irish party MPs had served their 
constituents well, forcing Liberals to endorse Home Rule, and Con-
servative as well as Liberal governments to pass significant legisla-
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tion improving and reforming the Irish situation. Nationalist voters 
appreciated these successes, and if the party was not the bright 
political light that it had once been, it still enjoyed their overwhelm-
ing support. Home Rule MPs, however, had become so involved with 
parliamentary routine that they began to lose touch with the people 
they represented. When they started to think like British politicians, 
they became insensitive to undercurrents in Irish life. 
In many ways Redmond was an excellent party chair. His 
colleagues admired him and he graciously listened to and considered 
their suggestions. At Westminster, his intelligence and effective 
debating skills earned him the respect of British politicians. With few 
exceptions, such as his opposition to women's suffrage, Redmond 
had a liberal disposition. He also was a man of courage and integrity; 
both qualities had been tested and proven in the 1890s when he 
defended Parnell and, at great personal sacrifice and risk, remained 
loyal to his memory. On the negative side, Redmond had a serious 
flaw for a leader oflrish nationalism: like Isaac Butt, he had too much 
respect for things British-their Parliament, constitution, institu-
tions, and code of conduct. Redmond also shared Butt's admiration 
for and pride in Ireland's contributions to the empire. When not in 
the House of Commons, whether in London or at his home in 
Wicklow, Redmond was a shy introvert who enjoyed his privacy and 
the companionship of a few close friends. He relished parliamentary 
activity but not public meetings or the demagoguery essential to the 
leader of a popular cause, one that depended on the enthusiasm and 
financial generosity of nationalists at home and abroad. 
Home Rule's emphasis on political and economic issues did 
not prove emotionally or psychologically satisfying to all Irish nation-
alists. In the 1880s and 1890s cultural nationalism was reactivated by 
more than the Parnell divorce scandal, the cynicism and disillusion-
ment caused by the split in the party, or the stodginess of the Home 
Rule agenda. The Gaelic scholarship of Sir Samuel Ferguson and 
Standish O'Grady, two Protestant unionists, stimulated considerable 
interest in Ireland's culture and history. Revived cultural nationalism 
also responded to the social- Darwinist, Anglo-Saxon racism that had 
joined anti-Catholicism as part of British nativism. In Britain, aca-
demics, journalists, newspaper and periodical cartoonists, and Un-
ionist politicians depicted Irish Catholics as an inferior, 
simian-featured, irresponsible, irrational, and emotional subspecies 
incapable of managing their own affairs. Replying to these insults, 
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Irish cultural nationalists claimed the inheritance of an ancient high 
culture that made them spiritually superior to materialistic Anglo-
Saxons. They said that Gaelic virtue survived in the lifestyle of the 
peasantry and in the Irish language. 
Following in the tradition of Young lrelanders, a new genera-
tion of cultural nationalists insisted that political independence was 
not their country's most pressing need. They wondered what would 
be accomplished if Ireland had her own legislature but its people 
remained British in mind and spirit. They said that de-Anglicization 
was essential for true sovereignty, insisting that Ireland must develop 
a historical self-consciousness, an awareness of its own language and 
traditions-it had to recover its own soul. Cultural nationalism in-
spired three significant movements: the Gaelic League, the Gaelic 
Athletic Association, and the Literary Revival. 
Since Young Ireland's time there had been efforts to preserve 
the Irish language where it existed, resuscitate it where it was dying, 
and restore it where it had perished. In 1893 Eoin MacNeill, an Ulster 
Catholic scholar, and Douglas Hyde, the son of a Roscommon Prot-
estant clergyman and a graduate of Trinity College, founded the 
Gaelic League. Hyde, its president, was raised in an Irish-speaking 
district. He learned the language and cultivated the literature and 
traditions of the people. He devoted his life to restoring Irish as the 
voice of the people, and in 1889 published the first in a number of 
volumes of translations of Gaelic stories and poems. After 1908 both 
MacNeill and Hyde held chairs in University College, Dublin, a 
branch of the new National University of Ireland. In pressing for the 
de-Anglicization of their country, they demanded that Irish be hon-
ored as the national language. The Gaelic League was dedicated to 
this objective and to the study and publication of Gaelic literature. 
It also encouraged and promoted the development of contemporary 
writing in Irish. 
Some of the most militant Gaelic lrelanders, such as D.P. 
Moran and W.P. Ryan, were journalists who had learned their profes-
sion in London. They were lonely in an alien, anti-Irish environment 
and became contemptuous of English culture and manners. Gaelic 
organizations in the British capital became their refuge. They re-
turned to Ireland determined to advance the theory and the reality 
of an Irish Ireland, but their British experiences made them friendly 
to an economically modernized as well as a Gaelic Ireland. 
By 1903 there were over five hundred branches of the Gaelic 
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League. Members learned the language, read Irish literature, played 
Irish music, sang Irish songs, and danced Irish dances. On their 
annual holidays they traveled to Irish-speaking districts in Waterford, 
Donegal, West Cork, Kerry, Connacht, and the Aran Islands to polish 
their language skills in conversations with native speakers, and to 
absorb Gaelic traditions at their peasant roots. Like Miss Ivors in 
James Joyce's "The Dead," Gaelic Leaguers often were intolerant of 
people indifferent to the language, reviling them as "West Britons." 
While sympathetic to Home Rule, Hyde attempted to keep 
the Gaelic League independent of politics. To him legislative inde-
pendence was of secondary importance to cultural sovereignty. Dis-
tressed that sectarianism and political factionalism stood in the way 
of cultural cohesion, Hyde wanted the League to unite all shades of 
religious and political opinion in an Irish-Ireland commitment. Some 
Home Rule MPs saw the League as competition for the affections-
and thus the financial contributions-of nationalists, but practical 
considerations forced an Irish party endorsement of its work and 
objectives. 
The Gaelic League appealed to the middle class in cities and 
large towns. Cultural nationalism came to small towns, villages, and 
rural parishes in the form of the Gaelic Athletic Association. In 1884 
Michael Cusack, the model for the Citizen in Joyce's Ulysses, founded 
the Association at Thurles, County Tipperary. Archbishop Thomas 
William Croke of Cashel, in giving it an episcopal blessing, ridiculed 
such English sports as lawn tennis, polo, croquet, and cricket as alien 
and not "racy of the soil." He urged Irish lads to participate in the 
games of their ancestors: hurling, football, running, leaping, hammer 
throwing, and wrestling, and lassies to play camogie, a version of field 
hockey. 
The GAA spread through Leinster, Munster, Connacht, and 
Catholic areas of Ulster with parishes and counties organizing hurling 
or football teams and sometimes both. Like the Gaelic League, the 
GAA fostered intolerance to things British. In order to maintain 
control over the young and to isolate them from foreign influences, 
it banned those who played English games from the Association. 
Gaelic League and GAA versions of cultural nationalism even-
tually spread to the diaspora, but they did little to interest the rest of 
the Western world in the Irish Question. Most people outside the 
United Kingdom thought of Ireland as a country with an unfortunate 
history and legitimate grievances against British rule, but it was too 
•' 
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insignificant to merit serious attention or concern. Its economic 
development was retarded, its culture was primitive, and its citizens 
failed to make significant contributions to art or literature. Ireland's 
chief city, Dublin, once a flourishing eighteenth-century capital, was 
now a seedy, dull, provincial town. 
Then, suddenly, in the late nineteenth century, dreary little 
Dublin became a major center of literary and theatrical activity. The 
Literary Revival took inspiration from the language movement and 
scholarly investigations into pre- and early-Christian Irish history and 
culture; Most of the prominent figures in the Revival were Anglo-
Irish Protestants such as William Butler Yeats, John Millington 
Synge, George Russell, and Lady Gregory. Rejecting the class, relig-
ious, and political prejudices of their background, they embraced 
cultural nationalism, condemning British rule as an obstacle to the 
appreciation of distinct, creative, and significant native traditions. 
Like Gaelic Leaguers and members of the Gaelic Athletic Associa-
tion, Anglo-Irish writers attempted to restore ancient cultural values 
by recalling their virtues to the youth of their time. 
Parnell fascinated Yeats and his friends. For young writers 
combating various forms of "tyranny" -British political and cultural 
influences, and a provincial, puritanical society-Parnell symbolized 
resistance to colonialism and the popular conventions that destroyed 
him. To many of the literati, Parnell was a classic tragic hero brought 
down at the height of his power, and an Irish messiah "crucified" by 
those he came to liberate. In using and expanding the Parnell legend, 
writers attempted to prepare the way for another savior-perhaps 
one of themselves-who would rescue Ireland and, through the 
Celtic genius, the rest of Western civilization from Anglo-Saxon 
materialism. In glorifying the simple, unsophisticated Irish peasant 
and attacking British urban industrialism, the writers adhered to the 
message of Thomas Davis and the Nation. They believed that rural 
Ireland contained the necessary spiritual energy to revive Irish civi-
lization. Tillers of the soil had not sold their "racial" souls to foreign 
materialistic influences. They preserved the folk tradition, the belief 
in supernatural forces-pagan as well as Christian-and the lan-
guage. 
Not all Irish writers were romantic or sentimental. Synge, a 
Yeats protege friendly to Home Rule, refused to subordinate his 
talents or his view of truth to the myths of cultural nationalism. His 
earthy peasant characters, in contrast to the ethereal creatures of 
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Yeats's early years, introduced realism and surrealism into the Irish 
theatre. James Joyce, a product of urban middle-class Catholic Ire-
land, stayed apart from the literary and language movements and, by 
embracing exile, also rejected the creed of cultural nationalism. He 
believed that Ireland could only achieve salvation by a candid exami-
nation of the national conscience. 
Although they both expressed cultural nationalism, there were 
considerable tensions between the Gaelic League and the Revival. 
The former had a narrow and more inclusive view of what was Irish. 
It insisted that a true national literature must be expressed in the 
native language. Many League members refused to see literature as 
the expression of free, artistic genius. Instead, they viewed it as an 
auxiliary of nationalism, and writers as agents of the cause. In con-
trast, Yeats and his friends believed that while writers must be 
knowledgeable about and sensitive to Gaelic culture and traditions, 
and draw on them for subject material, as artists they had an obliga-
tion to interpret Irish life in an independent and aesthetic way. They 
also asserted that they could express a native mood and cultural spirit 
in English, a more expansive and flexible literary language than Irish, 
and one with a wider reading audience. 
The conflict between the "provincial" views of the League 
and the more "cosmopolitan" attitudes of the Revival was evident in 
the Abbey Theatre riot over Synge's 1907 The Playboy of the Wt>stern 
World. The play offended the sensitivities of Irish-Ireland Gaelic 
Leaguers, who felt that Synge's earthy and rowdy West-of-Ireland 
peasants were not a true representation of Gaelic cultural values and 
that they cast Ireland in a bad light. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the 
influx of middle-class Catholics and the support of the Catholic 
Church, the non-Literary Revival dimensions of cultural nationalism 
became increasingly exclusive. Until that time, Catholic secondary 
schools, particularly the Jesuit variety, had little interest in Irish 
cultural nationalism. Curricula and athletic programs (rugby and 
cricket) imitated those in English public schools. Many Catholic 
secondary-school students and those attending universities looked 
forward to employment in the British civil service at home, in Britain, 
or in the empire. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a 
shortage of civil service appointment opportunities and anti-Catholic 
discrimination in the selection process blocked mobility for the sons 
of the Irish Catholic middle class. Disappointment and disillusion-
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ment led them into Irish cultural nationalism as an outlet for their 
ambition and talent and gave them hope for a better future. 
With the exception of D.P. Moran, editor and publisher of The 
Leader, who insisted that "Gaelic" and "Catholic" were pretty much 
synonymous terms, almost all early Gaelic Leaguers rejected sectari-
anism and, like Young Irelanders, wanted to include Irish Catholics, 
Anglo-Irish Protestants, and Ulster Presbyterians under a common 
national identity. There were .Catholic priests active in the Gaelic 
League, but at first most bishops and priests interpreted Irish-Ire-
land as a rival to Catholic Ireland. W.P. Ryan, editor of The Irish 
Peasant, agreeing with such Protestant critics of Catholic influence 
as Horace Plunkett and Filson Young, complained that authoritarian, 
conservative, fatalistic, other-worldly Catholicism impeded the lib-
eration and modernization of Ireland. He said that Catholic puritan-
ism encouraged emigration by making life in the country dull and 
monotonous. 
Despite the inclusive views of liberal Catholic Gaelic Leagu-
ers such as Ryan, it was almost inevitable that Irish-Ireland and 
Catholic Ireland would meld in a religious-cultural marriage. The 
overwhelming majority of Gaelic League and Gaelic Athletic Asso-
ciation members was Catholic; with few exceptions, Protestant and 
Nonconformist Ireland rejected the Gaelic tradition as Catholicism 
in disguise and clung to British identity. Despite early hostility, the 
hierarchy came to realize that Catholic Ireland and Irish-Ireland were 
not inherently contradictory and that they shared common goals. 
Both despised British urban industrial culture and wanted to prevent 
its spread into Ireland. Catholic leaders decided to exploit the An-
glophobia of cultural nationalism and to divert its original goal of a 
religiously pluralistic but culturally monolithic Ireland into an essen-
tially Catholic Ireland. 
With the exception of George Russell (A.E.), the leaders of 
the Revival were not involved with specific economic, social, or 
political issues. Though they played a significant role in the national 
awakening and deserve some credit for its triumphs, their contribu-
tion has often been exaggerated. In one of his poems, Yeats pondered 
whether his words had sent young men off to die in Easter Week 
1916, but those of Thomas Davis probably more directly captured 
their imaginations. And there were other inspirational ingredients 
contributing to Ireland's early twentieth-century wars of liberation: 
the Republican tradition of 1798, 1848, and 1867; the memory of 
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Robert Emmet; social injustices th< t produced syndicalism in the 
labor movement; tactical mistakes h, the Irish party; and the insen-
sitivity of British politicians. 
But the Revival did put its stamp on Irish cultural nationalism, 
and its writers, unlike Young Ireland propagandists, were great artists. 
The quality of their creative endeavors was unsurpassed in other 
countries. For the first time in centuries, Ireland made a significant 
literary contribution to Western civilization. Through the works of 
Revival writers, sophisticated and influential people in Britain, on 
the Continent, throughout the empire, and in the United States 
learned of Ireland's culture, traditions, grievances, and demand for 
freedom. During the 1919-21 Anglo-Irish War, world opinion finally 
convinced British politicians that they must extend a measure of 
independence to Ireland. 
Friction between the various expressions of cultural national-
ism probably stimulated rather than discouraged intellectual excite-
ment and energy in Dublin during the two decades preceding World 
War I. Sinn Fein, the brainchild of journalist Arthur Griffith, also 
contributed to the period's vitality. 
In 1898 Griffith began to express Sinn Fein ("we-ourselves") 
self-determination theories in The United Irishman. In doing so, he 
synthesized a variety of sources: his study and interpretation of 
Hungarian history; the writings of Jonathan Swift, Thomas Davis, 
and John Mitchel; a strategy that Charles Gavan Duffy proposed to 
the Irish Confederation; the protectionist economic theories ofF rie-
drich List; and some of O'Connell's ideas and experiments during 
the Repeal agitation of 1843. Griffith endorsed Gaelic League and 
GAA efforts to de-Anglicize Ireland. He was a republican, but he did 
not believe that Irish nationalist opinion shared that conviction, and 
he was certain that Ireland could not succeed in establishing a 
republic through revolution. Therefore, Griffith suggested a compro-
mise, a dual monarchy based on the example of Austria and Hungary. 
Griffith asked the Irish party to admit that its attempt to win 
Home Rule at Westminster had failed, and to follow the example of 
Francis Deak, the Hungarian nationalist who in 1867 refused to 
recognize the sovereignty of the Austrian legislature. As Duffy rec-
ommended in 1847, Griffith advised Irish nationalist MPs to leave 
Westminster and establish a Dublin parliament. He predicted that it 
would have the loyalty of local government boards and agencies, and 
could set up its own justice system modeled on O'Connell's success-
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ful experiment with arbitration courts. Faced with a de facto Irish 
government and a determined passive resistance to their continued 
rule and occupation, the British would retreat from Ireland, Griffith 
believed, and would recognize Irish independence. Then the two 
islands would be joined only in common allegiance to the same 
monarch. Griffith insisted that since sovereignty had to be economic 
as well as cultural and political, after independence the Irish govern-
ment would pass legislation protecting native industries. 
Griffith's Sinn Fein vision contained a provincialism and in-
tolerance that flourished in extreme forms of cultural nationalism. 
He praised the work and the goals of the Gaelic League and the 
Gaelic Athletic Association, but was suspicious of the Literary Re-
vival. Like John Mitchel before him, Griffith's Irish nationalism 
contained no empathy for other persecuted people. He was antisemi-
tic and unsympathetic to nonwhite victims of colonialism. Griffith 
was one of the most malicious attackers of Synge's Playboy, sharing 
the stance of Young Ireland and the Gaelic League that writers and 
intellectuals must subordinate their genius to the aims of Irish 
nationalism. He said that literature should help create a sound 
nationalist opinion, publicize Irish grievances, and justify self-gov-
ernment. In his opinion, when writers presented Irishmen or Irish 
life as less than ideal, they insulted their country and weakened the 
national effort. Not too many years later, cultural nationalists abused 
Sean O'Casey for his Abbey Theatre interpretation of life in Dublin 
tenements. 
Prior to World War I, Sinn Fein was not a serious rival to the 
parliamentary party. But its program attracted the interest of some 
intelligent and dynamic young people who had become disen-
chanted with the style of the party and filled with a desire to do 
something for Ireland. Sinn Fein also caught the attention of the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood. At the start of the twentieth century, IRB 
membership was small, but the quality of the organization exceeded 
the quantity of its followers. The IRB had active centers in Dublin 
and British-cities and close ties with the Clan na Gael in the United 
States, and it recruited intelligent and dependable talent. Appreci-
ating the possibilities of cultural nationalism, the IRB infiltrated the 
Gaelic League and the GAA. Republicans also joined Sinn Fein 
when it became an official organization in 1905, persuading Griffith 
to drop dual monarchy as the official objective and to substitute an 
open policy in regard to the form of government that would follow 
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the end of British rule. Few in numbers but strong in conviction, Irish 
Republicans were on the move, and by 1914 were in a good position 
to determine the direction oflrish nationalism if the Irish parliamen-
tary party faltered. 
Labor militancy was another example of a slowly changing 
Irish social, economic, political, and intellectual climate. Early twen-
tieth-century Dublin had more poverty-related problems than any 
other United Kingdom metropolis, problems that were typical of 
those in other Irish cities. One-third of the population lived in slum 
tenements, most unfit for human habitation. Surplus labor meant 
large-scale unemployment. Employers took advantage of the situ-
ation by paying wages far below British standards. Subhuman living 
conditions, inadequate diets, unemployment, and low wages encour-
aged alcoholism, prostitution, and other vices, and resulted in a high 
death rate, with tuberculosis and infant diseases as major killers. 
James Larkin, a Liverpool-born Catholic with an Ulster family 
background, and a socialist with syndicalist leanings, made a valiant 
effort to give dignity and financial security to the lives of the Irish 
urban poor. In 1908 he organized the Irish Transport and General 
Workers Union. Four years later the ITGWU had about ten thousand 
members representing a wide variety of skills and occupations. 
Through tough negotiations, an iron will, and the use of strikes, 
Larkin won a series of major victories, increasing wages and improv-
ing working conditions. 
In August 1913 the ITGWU struck William Martin Murphy's 
Dublin United Tramway Company. Murphy, owner of the Irish 
Independent newspaper, the wealthiest man in Ireland with extensive 
economic interests in Britain and the empire as well as family and 
ideological connections with the conservative Catholic Tim Healy 
Home Rule faction, decided to destroy Larkin's influence. He organ-
ized an Employers' Federation Limited against the IGTWU. By 
September 1913, it had locked twenty-five thousand workers out of 
their jobs. The strike and lockout lasted until January 1914, when 
finally the employers' combination, the hostility of the Catholic 
hierarchy, and the reluctance of British trade unions to continue 
financial support forced strikers back to work, often on stringent 
anti-union terms. During the strike, pro-capitalist, anti-organized 
labor Arthur Griffith constantly abused Larkin and the ITGWU in 
the United Irishman, as he had previously lambasted Synge. 
After workers were forced to submit to their bosses, Larkin 
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left for the United States to raise funds for his union's depleted 
treasury. While there he organized copper workers in Montana, 
helped found the American Communist party, and, during the Red 
Scare of the 1920s served three years in Sing Sing prison for his 
activities and convictions. 
The strike offered insights into the character of the Irish 
Question and added fuel to a growing revolutionary spirit in nation-
alist Ireland. The decision of the British Trades Union Congress to 
limit its support of Larkin indicated that national prejudices were 
stronger than class loyalties. The gulf that divided the British and 
Irish working classes exposed the lack of understanding that most of 
the British had for Ireland and the Irish. The failed strike and the 
indifference of British labor to economic and social injustices in 
Ireland influenced Irish workers to become more nationalistic and 
sympathetic to physical force. Many believed that only a revolution-
ary expulsion of the British would clear the way for a transformation 
of Irish society. 
Shifts in the British political situation fostered dissatisfaction 
in some Irish circles with the parliamentary party. Following the 
defeat of the second Home Rule bill, Liberals reconsidered their 
commitment to Irish nationalism. Many decided that it would be 
wise to de-emphasize Home Rule as a major or immediate objective. 
They believed that Joseph Chamberlain Radicals and Whig imperi-
alists who had left the Liberal party over the Irish-Liberal alliance 
could be persuaded to return by a platform combining social reform 
and commitment to empire. 
Irish attitudes as well as British political considerations alien-
ated post-Gladstone Liberal leaders from Home Rule. Considerable 
pro-Boer support in Ireland during the South African War (1899-
1902) offended chauvinist British public opinion and the imperialist 
wing of the Liberal party. And the Irish party's decision to take a more 
independent stance in the Commons also strained relations with 
Liberals, thus encouraging their retreat from Irish nationalism. 
In the 1906 general election Liberals won an overwhelming 
victory at the polls. Since they had a large majority in the Commons, 
they did not need Irish party support, and while they did not totally 
repudiate Home Rule, their policy fell far short of Irish self-govern-
ment. As a Home Rule substitute, the Liberals in 1907 offered the 
Irish party a bill that proposed to establish a council in Ireland 
composed of elected and appointed members, with the lord lieu ten-
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ant as an ex-officio member. With a generous government grant, the 
council would have had the power to coordinate and control the 
efforts of various agencies in Ireland. Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 
the Liberal prime minister, told Redmond that the Irish council bill 
would provide Irish nationalists with an opportunity to prove to the 
British that they were capable of governing themselves, setting the 
stage for Home Rule. The Irish party chair did not approve of the 
devolution scheme, but he presented it to an Irish convention that 
emphatically rejected it as an inadequate response to the self-gov-
ernment demand. 
Although the council bill was an affront, Liberals did make 
two significant concessions to the demands of Irish nationalism. 
Responding to the Catholic education lobby, in 1908 the government 
settled the longstanding university controversy by establishing the 
National University of Ireland, with constituent colleges in Cork, 
Dublin, and Galway. University College, Cork and University Col-
lege, Galway were the former Queen's Colleges; University College, 
Dublin originated in Cullen's Catholic University. Belfast's Queen's 
University remained as an independent institution. In 1909 the 
government improved the 1903 Wyndham Land Act, increasing 
funds for land purchase, sometimes requiring land sale and, in 
general, speeding the process of peasant proprietorship. 
In placing the Irish Question on a back burner, Liberals 
decided to appease British appeals for radical social reform that had 
been building since the post-1870 decline in Britain's industrial 
economy. In 1906 the massive Liberal victory and the election of 
twenty-nine members of the newly formed Labour party illustrated 
public anxiety and discontent. Reacting to public opinion and the 
challenge of socialism, Liberals legislated a program designed to 
alleviate many of the social security burdens of the working class. It 
provided old age pensions, health insurance, unemployment com-
pensation, employers' liability, and labor exchanges. This legislation 
necessitated large expenditures at a time when taxpayers were also 
financing the expansion and modernization of the British navy to 
meet the threat of German jingoism and militarism. 
Searching for new revenue sources, Lloyd George, chancellor 
of the Exchequer, borrowed ideas from Fabian socialism. He recom-
mended substantial duties on the unearned income of landed prop-
erty, higher income taxes for the wealthy, and, to please the 
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Nonconformist element in his party as well as to raise revenue, 
increased taxes on liquor and tobacco. 
Unionists lacked sufficient numbers in the Commons to halt 
the advance of the welfare state or to resist the Liberal attack on 
wealth and property, so they used their majority in the Lords to 
subvert the government's program. In violation of established tradi-
tion that the Commons decides financial matters, the peers capped 
off a series of vetoes by rejecting Lloyd George's budget, thus 
precipitating a grave constitutional crisis. Liberal leaders decided to 
use this rash defiance of election returns and constitutional prece-
dent to abolish the absolute veto of the upper house. Although the 
budget's heavy duties on liquor injured important brewing and distill-
ing interests in Ireland, the Irish party viewed the Lords as the major 
barrier to Home Rule, and was more than eager to help the Liberals 
limit its power. Labour MPs objected to the hereditary House of Lords 
as a citadel of property and a barrier to a planned and classless society. 
They joined the Irish in supporting the Liberals in a parliamentary 
battle for popular sovereignty rather than hereditary prerogatives. 
In January 1910 Herbert Asquith the late Campbell-Banner-
man's successor as prime minister, took the issues of the budget and 
the veto to the country. Election returns (275 Liberal, 273 Unionist, 
82 Home Rule, and 40 Labour MPs) shattered Liberal complacency. 
Why did the same electorate that had given Liberals a 224-seat 
advantage over the Unionists in 1906 reduce that lead to 2 only four 
years later, especially after the government had provided an exten-
sive program to relieve poverty, and had announced its intention of 
eliminating the most glaringly undemocratic feature of the constitu-
tion? Did many middle-class and rural Liberal voters object to the 
collectivist character of the government's welfare program and the 
means of financing it through taxes on property? Did members of the 
working class resent paying more pennies for their pints and smokes? 
Did the increased Labour vote and representation in Parliament 
mean that trade-union leaders considered the government's welfare 
legislation inadequate? Was the House of Lords more popular with 
the public than the government suspected? Were Britons apprehen-
sive concerning German naval and military power and the interna-
tional crises that seemed to push Europe closer to war? In such an 
emergency did they trust Unionists more than Liberals? There is 
evidence to indicate that all of the above questions figured in the 
minds of British voters, but it is also true that the Irish Question 
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played a significant role in the Unionist revival. Although Liberals 
played down the Home Rule issue in their election addresses, their 
opponents emphasized that a successful assault on the Lords would 
be followed by a Liberal effort to dissolve the Union. 
In November 1910, after the Lords attempted to avoid catas-
trophe by passing the budget, Asquith, consulted with the new king, 
George V, and decided to ask the electorate for a second opinion on 
the Lords' veto. This time voters returned 272 Unionists to match 
an equal number of Liberals, and the Asquith ministry found itself 
deeper in bondage to its Irish and Labour allies, who controlled 84 
and 42 seats respectively. More accurately, the Irish party had the 
allegiance of75 MPs; 9 others referred to themselves as independent 
nationalists and followed the leadership of either William O'Brien or 
Tim Healy. 
During the second 1910 election campaign, Home Rule re-
ceived as much attention as the House of Lords. Speaking in Dublin, 
Asquith promised that Home Rule would follow a diminished power 
of the peers. Unionists responded by describing him as Redmond's 
pawn. They warned British voters that the fate of the United King-
dom and the empire was tied to that of the Lords. 
In 1910 British voters unwittingly provided the Irish party 
with the balance of power. English, Scottish, and Welsh constituen-
cies, voting either Liberal or Labour (and in Liverpool for T.P. 
O'Connor of the Irish party), gave Home Rule a 315 to 254 majority 
(18 Unionist MPs came from Ireland, 16 from Ulster, 2 from Trinity 
College). Still, the Unionist surge in these elections indicates that a 
large number of Britons retained their fanatic opposition to even a 
minimal degree of Irish independence. 
After considerable prodding from the Irish and Labour 
benches, the government introduced a bill in February 1911limiting 
the power of the Lords to a three-session or two-year suspensive veto 
over legislation passed by the Commons. When the peers realized 
that the king, if need be, would honor his pledge to Asquith and pack 
the Lords with Liberals to secure passage of the Parliament Act, they 
bowed to the inevitable, clearing the way for Home Rule. In deliv-
ering a fatal blow to their old enemy, the Lords, Irish nationalist MPs 
helped remove a formidable obstacle to the evolution of social and 
political democracy in Britain. 
On April 14, 1912, Asquith introduced the third Home Rule 
bill. It was a mild federal proposal placing local affairs in the hands 
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of a Dublin parliament consisting of a popularly elected lower house, 
with a set number of representatives from each of the four Irish 
provinces, and a senate, nominated in the first instance by the Crown 
and subsequently by the Irish executive. To protect its imperial 
interests, Ireland would retain a small delegation at Westminster. 
The bill restricted the Irish parliament from legislating on questions 
involving finance, foreign affairs, religion, and police powers. It 
guaranteed Protestant rights in a number of ways: Ulster would be 
overrepresented in the lower house of the Irish parliament, the 
appointed senate would contain many Protestants, and the Dublin 
government could not endow or show favoritism to any religion. 
Redmond, with the clear support of Irish nationalist opinion, 
accepted Asquith's moderate Home Rule offer as a settlement of 
Irish claims to legislative independence. Even Sinn Fein moderated 
its criticism of the parliamentary party, and for a time a truce existed 
between various factions within Irish nationalism. Anglo-Irish Prot-
estants and Ulster Presbyterians, however, were opposed to Home 
Rule, and they would be the decisive factor in determining its 
Westminster fortunes. 
During the eighteenth century, Protestants and Presbyterians 
were the vanguard of Irish patriotism. Their volunteer army forced 
Britain in the 1780s to concede free trade and a significant extension 
of Irish parliamentary sovereignty. In the 1790s they created the 
Society of United Irishmen, which spearheaded the insurrections of 
1798. During the parliamentary and national debates over the Act of 
Union, many, probably most, Anglo-Irish Protestants and Ulster 
Presbyterians opposed the British connection. For quite a few the 
motive was more sectarian than patriotic. They feared that a United 
Kingdom parliament would be more responsive to Catholic claims of 
equality than the Protestant parliament in Dublin. But there were 
others, such as Henry Grattan, who sincerely believed that the Irish 
could solve their problems without British intervention, :;tnd that 
Catholics as well as Protestants should be part of an Irish nation-state. 
Fallowing the Act of Union, Anglo-Irish Protestant and Ulster 
Presbyterian patriotisms gradually faded into insignificance as a 
British replaced an Irish identity. When linen factories and shipyards 
began to flourish in northeast Ulster, that part of the province became 
an extension of the British industrial complex. Non-Catholics in the 
north treasured the economic advantages of the Union, and their 
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organization, the anti-Catholic Orange Order, once an opponent of 
the British connection, emerged as its staunchest defender. 
With the rise of Irish-Catholic nationalism, an outgrowth of 
the Emancipation agitation, Protestants and Nonconformists de-
cided that only the British tie could save their religious, political, and 
property rights from the ambitions of a Catholic peasant democracy. 
Throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, they 
functioned as the British garrison in Ireland. Tory governments 
rewarded them by guaranteeing their monopoly on economic, politi-
cal, and social power, and by protecting the privileged position of the 
established church. British Conservatives manipulated Irish Protes-
tants, Presbyterians (even more anti-Catholic than members of the 
Church of Ireland), and other Nonconformists as pawns in resisting 
concessions to Irish nationalism. Lord Randolph Churchill encour-
aged British Unionists to "play the Orange Card" in opposing Home 
Rule. 
Theoretically, Irish nationalism, both constitutional and 
physical force factions, rejected sectarianism and insisted on an 
inclusive Irish identity. Rejecting faith and fatherland notions, most 
Catholics had no hesitation in accepting Protestant nationalist lead-
ers such as Butt, Parnell, and Hyde. But since the seventeenth 
century, except for the relatively brief period of eighteenth-century 
Protestant patriotism, religious and national identities have been 
inseparable in the Irish historical experience. The association be-
tween the two was much more a Protestant and Nonconformist than 
a Catholic decision. But Irish and British Protestant and Noncon-
formist resistance to Emancipation and Peel's effort to reconcile 
Catholics to the Union through concessions increased Catholic 
awareness that their religion and nationality were linked in the eyes 
of their enemies. Cullen's "Devotional Revolution," with its strong 
anti-Protestant tone, and its insistence that Catholicism was the key 
to a true Irish identity, also widened the Irish sectarian gulf. 
Defensive no-popery unionism and Cullen's militant Catholi-
cism made it difficult, if not impossible, for Catholics and non-Catho-
lics to cooperate in efforts to promote the progress of their common 
country. Protestants and Nonconformists subordinated the general 
welfare of Ireland and, in the case of farmers and urban laborers, class 
interests to sectarian solidarity, leaving the landed aristocracy and big 
businessmen in charge oflrish unionist opinion. Of course there were 
exceptions. Thomas Davis, Sharman Crawford, Isaac Butt, Charles 
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Stewart Parnell, William Butler Yeats, and Douglas Hyde demon-
strate that not all Protestants were motivated by narrow religious and 
economic interests. 
Despite Protestant and Presbyterian efforts to resist the pres-
sures oflrish-Catholic nationalism, Whig, Liberal, and even Unionist 
attempts to pacify Ireland gradually undermined Protestant Ascen-
dancy, and transferred ownership ofland to the peasantry and control 
of local government in Leinster, Munster, Connacht, and parts of 
Ulster to Catholics. Each government concession to Irish nationalism 
strengthened the Irish Protestant and Nonconformist conviction that 
only the Union could protect their minority rights. 
Irish nationalist orthodoxy rejected the idea that Ulster non-
Catholics constituted a separate cultural nation. They argued that 
divisions between north and south, Catholics, Protestants, and Pres-
byterians, unionists and nationalists were products of British engi-
neering to prevent an independent, united Ireland. Only a few men 
such as Arthur Clery, professor of property law at the National 
University, and Walter McDonald, professor of theology at 
Maynooth, argued that the same logic that justified Home Rule for 
Catholic Ireland also applied to Protestant and Nonconformist Ul-
ster. Clery suggested a partition strictly in conformity to religious 
cultures that would have resulted in less than a four-county unionist 
north. 
After John Redmond announced Irish nationalist acceptance 
of Asquith's offer, Irish Unionist leaders Sir Edward Carson and Sir 
James Craig made it clear that since the Lords' veto no longer stood 
in the way of Home Rule, they were prepared to preserve the Union 
with physical force. They rejected the Home Rule bill as detrimental 
to the interests of Irish non-Catholics, and said that they would not 
consent to any legislation that severed the religious, economic, cul-
tural, and patriotic ties that bound them to Britain or forced their 
submission to a Dublin parliament dominated by Anglophobe pa-
pists determined to discriminate against a helpless religious minority. 
Carson and Craig demonstrated that they were not bluffing. 
In September 1912 they led Ulster Protestants and Nonconformists 
in signing a Solemn League and Covenant binding Irish unionists to 
resist Home Rule with every means at their disposal. Soon an Ulster 
Volunteer Army began drilling under the command of Lieutenant 
General George Richardson, KCB, and on September 23, 1913, 
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Ulster unionists announced plans for a Carson-headed provisional 
government to go into effect the day the Home Rule bill became law. 
Instead of repudiating this threat of armed resistance to an act 
of Parliament, Andrew Bonar Law, leader of the opposition, and other 
British Conservatives MPs gave an unqualified endorsement to Car-
son's attack on constitutional government. They promised consider-
able British support for any Irish loyalist effort to defeat Home Rule 
and Irish nationalism. In British conservative circles, treason became 
fashionable. Conservative newspapers and periodicals, especially 
Irish nationalism's old nemesis, the Times of London, fervently en-
dorsed Ulster's defiance of the constitution; so did the popular poet, 
Rudyard Kipling. A.V. Dicey, Oxford's distinguished professor of 
constitutional law, provided an academic apologia for Ulster unionist 
threats of civil war. Waldorf Astor and Lord Rothschild contributed 
large sums of money to the Ulster Volunteers. Bonar Law and many 
other British Conservatives in the Unionist fold hoped that they 
could manipulate the Ulster crisis into another general election. 
Balfour, the former prime minister, represented a Conservative fac-
tion not emotionally attached to Ulster loyalists but prepared to "play 
the Orange card" to preserve the Union by defeating the Irish-Lib-
eral alliance. 
From 1912 through 1914, as Home Rule made its stormy way 
through Parliament, events in Britain and Ireland confirmed fears 
that the government could not enforce Home Rule in northeast 
Ulster without risking civil disorder. Ulster Volunteers continued to 
increase in numbers and improve in warlike efficiency. A successful 
April 1914 gunrunning operation supplied them with rifles and 
ammunition. Asquith's administration feared the possibility that 
army officers would refuse to move against Ulster rebels. 
Under the existing military system, most officers came from 
the same social background that provided Unionist party leadership 
and shared the opinions and prejudices of their class. Under the 
British system of government, however, the army is theoretically 
nonpolitical, and is expected to carry out government orders without 
questioning their validity. In designating suppression of rebellion in 
Ulster as an exception to this obligation, British military officers 
permitted themselves a luxury denied enlisted personnel. Labour 
MPs and Irish and British labor leaders complained th~t if the 
government used enlisted men from the working class as strike 
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breakers, officers should not be exempted from enforcing laws offen-
sive to their class sympathies. 
During this period many in the upper echelons of the military 
establishment conspired to defeat the parliamentary process. Lord 
Roberts, chief of staff, recommended Richardson to Carson as com-
mander-in-chief of the Ulster Volunteers and later congratulated the 
Irish unionist leader on the success of the gunrunning operation. Sir 
Henry Wilson, Ulster Protestant director of military operations, ad-
vised Carson and Craig to persist in their opposition to Home Rule. 
And he consulted with Bonar Law on ways in which Unionist MPs 
could amend the Army Appropriation Bill to prevent the use of 
military force against the Ulster Volunteers. Prominent Conservative 
politicians and army leaders were encouraging rebellion in the army 
at a time when it appeared that a major war might break out on the 
Continent, a war that would probably involve Britain since it was 
heavily committed to France. The unreliable state of the army was 
made clear to all in March 1914, when officers stationed at the 
Curragh, County Kildare, announced that they would resign their 
commissions rather than lead troops against the Ulster Volunteers. 
Because Asquith was reluctant to weaken Britain's military strength 
in a period of international tensions, the officers escaped punish-
ment. 
While pro-Home Rule British opinion was lukewarm, anti-
Catholic, anti-Home Rule British opinion was fanatic. Public meet-
ings, newspaper and periodical editorials, sermons from Church of 
England and Ireland and Nonconformist pulpits, petitions to Parlia-
ment, and a pattern of Unionist by-election victories indicated that 
many Britons were willing to support Ulster resistance, even to the 
point of civil war. 
Confronted by potential armed rebellion in Ulster, "treason" 
in the army, pro-Unionist, anti-Catholic opinion in Britain, and wan-
ing Liberal strength in the Commons, Cabinet members such as 
Winston Churchill and Lloyd George recommended concessions to 
Ulster. As early as 1913, they suggested that non-Catholic sections of 
the province be excluded from the Home Rule settlement. And by 
1914, Asquith openly admitted that partition was the only feasible 
alternative to civil war. Churchill commented: "Orange bitters and 
Irish whiskey will not mix." Two questions remained: how much of 
Ulster would remain outside the jurisdiction of the Irish Parliament, 
and for how long? 
Crisis of Home Rule Nationalism 129 
Asquith obtained Redmond's consent to a six-year, post-pleb-
iscite exclusion for any Ulster county (presumably Armagh, Antrim, 
Derry, and Down) indicating a preference to maintain the British 
connection. In theory, this amounted to a temporary compromise 
between the nationalist and unionist positions. In reality, most likely 
it would mean permanent partition and a major concession, if not a 
surrender, by Redmond. Before six years passed there would be at 
least two general elections, and political trends indicated a Unionist 
victory at the polls in 1915. A Unionist majority in the Commons 
could and no doubt would then permanently exclude the four Ulster 
counties from the jurisdiction of the Irish parliament. 
Hoping to kill Home Rule for any part of Ireland, Carson, a 
Dubliner, stubbornly demanded permanent exclusion from the be-
ginning for all nine Ulster counties, an outrageous claim since at the 
last election the province had sent a seventeen-to-sixteen nationalist 
majority to Westminster, and Catholics outnumbered Protestants in 
five of the nine counties as well as the cities of Derry and Newry. At 
the king's request, negotiations on the principle of exclusion of at 
least part of Ulster took place at Buckingham palace in July 1914. 
Since Carson and Redmond could not agree on time limits and 
boundaries, the conference concluded without a settlement. Asquith 
could go no further in his effort to appease Ulster without encourag-
ing a dangerous reaction in nationalist Ireland. 
By late 1913, as they observed Ulster loyalist defiance and 
military preparations, the pro-unionist stance of prominent military 
figures, anti-Irish Catholic rallies in Britain, a series of Liberal by-
election defeats, and Asquith's willingness to partition their country, 
Irish nationalists became apprehensive and restless. They worried 
that although Home Rulers had played and won the parliamentary 
game, the British were going to change the rules and deny victory to 
the Irish party. Perhaps, some decided, nationalist Ireland should 
imitate unionist Ulster by physically demonstrating to Britain that it 
would not be denied self-government. 
During the 1913 ITGWU strike and subsequent lock-out, 
James Connolly, Larkin's colleague, created a small Citizen Army to 
protect workers from police brutality. In the autumn of 1913, a 
committee representing Home Rule, Sinn Fein, and republicanism 
formed an Irish Volunteer Army in Dublin. The IRB played an 
important role in creating and administering the organization, but 
130 The Irish Question 
Eoin MacNeill, chair of the Volunteer council, never really under-
stood the importance of its minority IRB faction. 
MacNeill and most of his colleagues had no intention of 
initiating a war of independence, but they were determined to 
defend Ireland's right to Home Rule against the unconstitutional 
intimidation of Ulster and British unionists. While most Irish Volun-
teers hoped that they would win legislative independence without 
disturbing the peace by strengthening Liberal resolve, the IRB 
element wanted more than Home Rule and an opportunity to prove 
their love of country in battle. 
Initially, Redmond considered the Volunteers a nuisance and 
a threat to constitutional nationalism, but when he finally realized 
that Asquith might compromise Home Rule to appease Carson and 
anti-Irish British opinion, he changed his mind. In July 1913, by 
threatening to form a rival organization, Redmond persuaded Volun-
teer leaders to permit the Irish party to nominate half of their 
executive committee. In January 1914 the Irish Volunteers had only 
ten thousand or so recruits, but Redmond's patronage increased 
enlistments to over fifteen thousand a week and multiplied Irish-
American donations. The United Irish League of America promised 
him that the Volunteers would have all the money they needed to 
defend Home Rule. 
In the early summer of 1914 Asquith faced an inescapable 
dilemma. Home Rule had to be carried in some form or the Liberals 
would forfeit the Irish alliance and control of government. A Home 
Rule settlement that did not guarantee a permanent partition of 
Ireland would provoke insurrection in Ulster; one that did would 
encourage rebellion in nationalist Ireland. In either case, civil war 
would engulf Britain and Ireland. Asquith did have two other alter-
natives: he could call another general election (though all the signs 
indicated that the results would still keep him a prisoner of the Irish 
and Labour parties), or he could resign and surrender office to the 
Unionists. Since Bonar Law could not command a Commons major-
ity, he would not be able to govern without the cooperation of Asquith 
and other moderate Liberals. A national coalition might have been 
able to steer Britain through the Home Rule crisis, but it would have 
alienated not only Irish but also Labour MPs and some of their own 
party from the Liberals. By the summer of 1914 parliamentary 
government was not functioning, and politicians found themselves 
at the mercy of forces not responsible to the House of Commons. 
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Since nationalists and unionists could not agree on partition, 
Asquith decided to proceed with the original plan for a six-year 
exclusion of the four northeast counties. He reasoned that six years 
would demonstrate the success or failure of Home Rule for the rest 
of Ireland and, in the meantime, voters would have at least one and 
probably two opportunities to express their wishes on an all-Ireland 
parliament. Liberal peers presented Asquith's proposal as an amend-
ing bill in the Lords, but the Unionist majority modified it to include 
all of Ulster on a permanent basis, and sent it to the Commons. 
Asquith scheduled a debate for July 27 on the amending bill. 
With Redmond's approval, he attempted to please Carson and British 
Unionists by eliminating the six-year time limit. Bloodshed in Dub-
lin postponed the debate. On Sunday, July 26, a company of Irish 
Volunteers unloaded a cargo of arms from a yacht near Howth, north 
of Dublin. The anti-Redmond faction in the Volunteers had pur-
chased the guns in Hamburg without his knowledge. The assistant 
commissioner of police and a battalion of the King's Own Scottish 
Borderers blocked the Volunteers' return to Dublin, demanding a 
surrender of weapons. While the front ranks of the Volunteers held 
off soldiers with rifle butts, those in the rear drifted away with their 
guns. Frustrated Borderers returned to the city in a touchy mood. As 
they marched down Bachelor's Walk, a sidewalk crowd shouted 
insults, and some of its members threw stones. Suddenly, a few 
Borderers lost control and fired into the crowd, killing three, wound-
ing thirty-six. 
The next day in the Commons, Redmond asked for a delay on 
the amending bill debate so that the government could investigate 
the Bachelor's Walk incident. In his speech, he wondered why the 
Ulster Volunteers could publicly display their smuggled arms, while 
military force was employed against the Irish Volunteers? It was an 
excellent question, and the government could not provide a satisfac-
tory answer. Instead, as usually happens in these cases, the politicians 
found scapegoats. Because David Harrel, the assistant commissioner 
of the Dublin police, admitted that sending soldiers to disarm the 
Irish Volunteers was illegal, a judicial committee of inquiry censured 
him and the commanding officer of the Borderers. 
The delay in the amending bill debate and Austria's declara-
tion of war on Serbia, which were followed by massive mobilization 
by all the great powers and Germany's declarations of war on Russia 
and France, turned the attention of the Commons and the British 
132 The Irish Question 
public away from Ireland toward the Continent. When the foreign 
secretary, Sir Edward Grey, informed Parliament on August 3 that 
Germany's threat to Belgian neutrality and Britain's commitments to 
France made probable a war against the Central Powers, John Red-
mond, with patriotic enthusiasm, announced that nationalists in the 
south would join unionists in the north to defend their country. 
British MPs cheered the leader of Irish nationalism, the successor to 
O'Connell and Parnell, as a patriotic defender of British interests, 
which in 1914 he sincerely believed represented freedom and civili-
zation. 
When Britain joined France and Russia against Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, Asquith, to win approval of and support for the war 
effort from both nationalist and unionist Irelands, pushed Home 
Rule through Parliament, but suspended its operation for the dura-
tion of hostilities. Then, he said, the government would take up the 
Ulster issue. World War I might have saved Britain from the devas-
tation of civil war but at a terrible cost. Neither British nor Irish party 
politicians realized that the 1912-14 Home Rule crisis so altered Irish 
nationalism that the final solution to the Irish Question would not be 
achieved in the British Parliament. Carson's effort to preserve the 
Union through physical-force intimidation, British Conservative 
support for Ulster loyalist fanaticism, and British Liberal weakness 
in the face of Conservative-backed Ulster defiance created a mistrust 
of British integrity in nationalist Ireland and an atmosphere of vio-
lence that would reignite revolutionary Irish republicanism, destroy 
the United Kingdom, and partition Ireland. Bullets, grenades, and 
world opinion, not Irish or British ballots, would decide Ireland's 
future. 
7 
The Rose Tree 
1914-1922 
There's nothing but our own red blood 
Can Make a right Rose Tree. 
William Butler Yeats 
"The Rose Tree" 
John Redmond believed that Ireland's partlctpation in a moral 
crusade against German authoritarianism and militarism and in de-
fense of the integrity of small nations such as Belgium would con-
vince Britain that it deserved Home Rule and demonstrate its will 
and capacity for self-government. Redmond urged Irish Volunteers 
to enlist in the British army, but Sinn Feiners perceived the conflict 
between Britain and Germany as a power struggle for empire and not 
a contest between good and evil. They pointed out that it was Britain 
not Germany that conquered, occupied, and oppressed Ireland. And 
they told Irishmen to stay home and prepare to fight for Ireland's 
cultural and political sovereignty. 
In August 1914 only 12,000 of the 180,000 Irish Volunteers 
rejected Redmond's view of the war. Those that accepted it took the 
name National Volunteers, and many enlisted in the British army. 
Eoin MacNeill, professor of early Irish history at University College, 
Dublin, remained chief of staff of the minority Irish Volunteers. He 
continued to be unaware of the strong IRB influence in the organi-
zation. 
MacNeill intended the Irish Volunteers as a defensive rather 
than an offensive force, a reminder to Britain that Ireland was deter-
mined to have Home Rule. But shortly after the start of hostilities 
on the Continent, the Supreme Council of the IRB decided that it 
should take advantage of Britain's preoccupation with the war, and 
created a Military Council to plan a rebellion. IRB leaders reasoned 
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that even if an insurrection failed, there was a good chance that it 
would earn Ireland a voice in postwar peace talks. Patrick Pearse, 
IRB director of organizations, barrister by training, poet by inclina-
tion, and master of St. Enda's, a school teaching all subjects in Irish, 
was the link between the Military Council and the Irish Volunteers. 
The Clan na Gael joined the revolutionary scheming. John 
Devoy received a commitment from the German ambassador in 
Washington that his government would aid a rebellion in Ireland. Sir 
Roger Casement, reared in a strict Ulster Presbyterian setting, also 
entered the conspiracy. Before converting to Irish nationalism, Case-
ment, as a member of the British foreign service, earned a knighthood 
for exposing the brutal treatment of natives in the Congo and South 
America. He was in the United States when the world war began, but 
he left for Germany to obtain material support for a rising and to 
recruit Irish prisoners of war for a brigade to fight the British. 
Germans did not take Casement seriously, and only a few Irish POWs 
joined the brigade. Other IRB envoys made more of an impression 
in Berlin and were able to obtain solid guarantees of guns and 
ammunition. 
Pearse and two other poets in the IRB, Joseph Mary Plunkett 
and Thomas MacDonagh, did not consider victory the ultimate 
purpose or objective of the coming rebellion. In their poetry they 
spoke of Ireland's need for a blood sacrifice to redeem Irish nation-
alism from the apathy, compromise ethic, and West Britonism of 
Home Rule politics. They promised that if brave young men shed 
their blood and sacrificed their lives for Irish freedom, the fire of 
nationalism, dampened into embers by parliamentarianism, would 
blaze again. They said that the first martyrs would inspire others to 
complete their mission and eventually drive the British out of the 
country, liberating it from the cultural and political corruptions of 
Anglicization. 
After James Larkin left for the United States in October 1914, 
James Connolly, an Irish-Catholic socialist sympathetic to syndicalist 
tactics, took command of the Irish Transport and General Workers 
Union and its small, ZOO-member, well-disciplined Citizen Army. 
Independent of the IRB Military Council, he also was planning a 
rebellion. At first, blood sacrifice did not inspire Connolly's revolu-
tionary purpose. He was confident of success, convinced that a 
Dublin-commenced rebellion would spread throughout the country 
and that the British, caught by surprise, tied down on the Western 
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Front and reluctant to destroy property in Ireland, would evacuate 
their oldest colony, leading to an Irish socialist republic. 
In the first year of the Great War, most Irish nationalists 
remained loyal to Redmond, Home Rule, and the Irish party, and 
enthusiastically supported Britain against the Central Powers. But 
events in 1915 began the process of disenchantment. Lord Kitch-
ener, secretary for war, did much to undermine the Irish party and its 
leader. Hostile to Irish-Catholic nationalism, he refused to woo its 
support for the war effort. While permitting Ulster Volunteers to 
enlist as a separate division with their own officers and emblem, the 
Red Hand of Ulster, Kitchenerwould not let the National Volunteers 
join as a unit with their own Catholic officers and insignia, the gold 
harp on a green field. For the most part, Anglo-Irish and British 
Protestants commanded Irish Catholics fighting on the war's various 
battlefields. Kitchener's calculated insult to Catholic Ireland cur-
tailed enlistments in Leinster, Munster, and Connacht. Heavy Irish 
casualties in the 1915-16 Gallipoli campaign increased antiwar feel-
ings, and also discouraged Catholic Irishmen from joining the British 
armed forces. 
Heavy casualties on the Western Front and at Gallipoli and 
the prospects of a long, bloody war dampened spirits in Britain as 
well as Ireland. In order to raise morale and cement national unity, 
Asquith invited Unionists and Irish party leaders to participate in a 
coalition government in 1915. Loyal to nationalist principles, Red-
mond refused to participate in a British administration, but Carson, 
Bonar Law, and F. E. Smith (later Lord Birkenhead)-old and fanatic 
enemies of Home Rule-did join the government. Since the situ-
ation did not augur well for the postwar future of Home Rule, Irish 
nationalists responded negatively to an Orange-tainted British gov-
ernment. 
Irish Volunteers and the Citizen Army drilled in the mountains 
and held public reviews in city streets. Sinn Fein and the IRB 
organized anti-recruiting campaigns; their newspapers preached 
Irish-nationalist neutrality in the conflict between the Allies and the 
Central Powers. To avoid a repetition of the July 1914 Bachelor's 
Walk incident, British authorities in Dublin Castle permitted the 
drilling and parading, but jailed or deported some Sinn Feiners and 
republicans, and closed down what they considered extremist na-
tionalist newspapers. Most reappeared under new names. 
Without informing the Supreme Council, the IRB's Military 
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Council finally selected a date for revolution, Easter Sunday (April 
23), 1916. Considering that blood sacrifice ideology melded revolu-
tionary theory with symbols of Christian redemptive theology, the 
choice of Easter Sunday for the resurrection of Ireland, after the long 
passion of British conquest and occupation, was no coincidence. 
Pearse and his associates persuaded Connolly to join the Military 
Council, and the Germans promised to land guns and ammunition 
during Holy Week on Ireland's southern coast. Pearse then per-
suaded MacNeill to call for a general review of all Volunteer units 
with full military equipment on Easter Sunday; he did not inform 
MacNeill that the general review would turn into a rebellion. 
Plunkett helped forge a British government document indicating 
that the authorities were preparing to raid the headquarters of the 
Irish Volunteers, the Citizen Army, Sinn Fein, and the Gaelic 
League, and to arrest their leaders. The Military Council used this 
document, which may have represented British intentions, to psy-
chologically prepare MacNeill and the Volunteers for a defensive war 
without revealing its total strategy for Easter Sunday. 
On Holy Thursday, Bulmer Hobson, an Ulster Quaker, a 
former member of the IRB 's Supreme Council, a strong supporter of 
the Gaelic language movement, and a founding member of the Irish 
Volunteers, discovered the Military Council's plan for an Easter 
rebellion and told MacNeill. They agreed that blood sacrifice would 
be a futile gesture endangering the prospects of self-government. 
MacNeill continued to insist that the Volunteers existed as a defen-
sive force exhibiting Ireland's determination to be free, and that it 
could only be used as an army of liberation if Britain reneged on its 
pledge of Home Rule. He also said that initiating a rebellion without 
a chance of success was an "immoral" waste of life. Hobson com-
plained that the Military Council was violating the IRB's 1873 con-
vention decision that insisted on prior majority support from the Irish 
people for any rebellion. He described Pearse and his friends as a 
cabal unrepresentative of either the IRB or Irish nationalism. 
To prevent Hobson's strong persuasive powers from stopping 
Easter arrangements, Sean MacDermott, a member of the Military 
Council, pulled a gun on his old friend and had him detained until 
the rebellion began. After Pearse told him that German equipment 
was on the way, MacNeill decided it was too late to prevent the rising 
and turned control of the Volunteers over to the Military Council. 
Rebellion plans began to unravel on Good Friday morning 
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when constables arrested Casement in Kerry after he came ashore 
from a German submarine with the intention of telling nationalists 
to call off the ill-fated rebellion. That afternoon, when a German 
ship, the Aud, arrived off the Kerry coast, no Volunteers appeared to 
unload her cargo. While she waited, British warships intercepted the 
vessel, and the captain scuttled her, sending obsolete Russian rifles 
and ammunition, captured on the Eastern Front, to the bottom of 
the sea. When the news of these disasters reached Dublin on Holy 
Saturday, MacNeill, convinced that the rebellion would fail, canceled 
Volunteer orders to mobilize and march on Easter Sunday. 
Although he knew that few Volunteers would be available, 
Pearse decided to proceed with the rising, his mind fixed on blood 
sacrifice. He hoped that events in Dublin would inspire the rest of 
the country to take up arms. Connolly also was determined to lead 
the Citizen Army into action. Pearse seems to have convinced him 
that a few must offer their lives to redeem the many. Accepting a 
redemptive theological-ideological justification for the rising, Con-
nolly wrote: "Without the shedding of blood there is no redemption." 
But he still entertained a small, naive hope that a capitalist British 
government would not destroy private property in order to subdue 
Irish rebels. 
On Easter Monday a force of 1,528 rebels, 27 of them women 
auxiliaries, marched through the streets of Dublin, and seized the 
General Post Office and other strategic buildings. Rebels lowered 
the Union Jack from the post office flagpole and in its place hoisted 
a tricolor: green for the Catholic tradition, orange for the Protestant, 
and white for the theoretical bond of love between them. From the 
post office balcony Pearse read a document: 
POBLACHT NA h-EIREANN 
THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 
OF THE 
IRISH REPUBLIC 
TO THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND 
It proclaimed the "Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent 
State." In addition to blood sacrifice and Gaelic cultural nationalism, 
the proclamation articulated an inclusive view of Irish nationalism, a 
commitment to liberal democratic values, and some of Connolly's 
socialist ideals. In part, the document read: "We declare the right of 
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the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland and to the unfet-
tered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible." 
The document went on to say that "the Republic guarantees relig-
ious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its 
citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and pros-
perity of the whole nation and all of its parts, cherishing all the 
children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences 
carefully fostered by an alien government, which have divided a 
minority from the majority in the past." Copies ofPearse's statement 
were posted throughout Dublin. 
From Monday until they surrendered on Saturday, the rebels 
held off the police and the army, quickly reenforced from Britain. 
Vicious and intense fighting claimed many casualties: 508 people 
were killed (300 civilians, 132 soldiers and policemen, and 76 mem-
bers of the Volunteer and Citizen Armies); 2,520 were wounded 
(2,000 civilians, 400 soldiers and policemen, and 120 rebels). Con-
nolly was wrong: "Britannia's sons with their long range guns" bom-
barded the city and by fire and shell destroyed many buildings, 
turning much of Dublin's main thoroughfare, Sack ville (now O'Con-
nell) Street, into rubble. 
Easter Week did not inspire many Irish people to join the fight 
for freedom. While rebels bravely but hopelessly engaged the British 
army and the Dublin Metropolitan Police, many Dubliners took 
advantage of the chaos to loot shops, and at Westminster Redmond 
condemned the rising as a German plot involving a fanatic and 
misguided small minority. "Respectable" Irish opinion considered 
Pearse's Volunteers and the Citizen Army as "hooligans" and dirty 
traitors. Since many Irish nationalists had husbands, sweethearts, 
brothers, sons, and friends fighting in France, they condemned what 
they first interpreted as a "stab in the back." When British soldiers 
marched rebel prisoners to jail, people lining the way cursed, jeered, 
and spat at them. 
Engaged in a life-or-death struggle with Germany, Britain 
reacted in anger and vengeance against "treason" in Dublin. The 
government's decision to mercilessly punish Irish rebels turned out 
to be a dreadful mistake. Over a period of ten days, military tribunals 
tried and executed fourteen rebel leaders, including Pearse, Con-
nolly, Plunkett, MacDonagh, and other signers of the Easter Monday 
proclamation. (The British tried and executed another rebel in Cork, 
and later did the same to Casement in Britain.) Although he was 
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badly wounded in the post office, soldiers strapped Connolly to a 
chair and shot him. The authorities imprisoned more than two 
thousand Sinn Feiners and republicans, many without trials. 
Easter Week 1916 transformed Irish nationalism, steering it 
away from constitutionalism in the direction of physical force. The 
republic, the bullet, and the grenade replaced Home Rule, the ballot 
box, and parliamentary debates as the goal and route oflrish nation-
alism. Executions of "traitors" in time of war is common, but the 
court-martials and firing-squad executions made it clear that Britain 
had substituted sadistic revenge and terror for justice. And the 
imprisonment of so many men, without normal legal procedures, 
seemed cruel and arbitrary. Within a few weeks the "dirty traitors" 
of Easter Week became gallant martyrs and national heroes. Irish 
homes displayed their pictures, and Irish people bought, read, and 
quoted their speeches and poems. The British made Pearse's case: 
blood sacrifice did convert nationalist apathy into passion. As Yeats 
wrote shortly after the rising, "A terrible beauty is born." 
Irish nationalism's changing mood compelled Westminster 
politicians to reassess their Irish policy. In 1916 they were trying to 
persuade the United States to enter the war on Britain's side, but 
Irish America, a powerful force in the ruling Democratic party, allied 
with German America, insisted on neutrality. Asquith assigned Lloyd 
George, who soon replaced him as prime minister, the task of paci-
fying Ireland. Lloyd George decided on an immediate application of 
the third Home Rule bill with the exclusion of six Ulster counties 
until a postwar Parliament could determine the extent and duration 
of partition. Unionists objected to the plan because it did not insure 
that the six counties would always remain British, and Redmond 
withdrew his blessing when he became convinced that Lloyd George 
intended a permanently divided Ireland. 
When immediate Home Rule proved politically inexpedient, 
the government attempted to cool the Irish situation by releasing 
republican prisoners. One of the returnees was Eamon de Valera, a 
mathematics teacher who had commanded Volunteers in Boland's 
flour mill, blocking the route of British reinforcements marching 
from Kingstown to central Dublin. His unit was the last to surrender. 
A military tribunal had sentenced him to death, but British and Irish 
reactions against further executions and de Valera's technical Ameri-
can citizenship (he was born in New York) saved his life. As the only 
surviving Easter Week commandant, de Valera returned to Ireland a 
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hero, the popularly recognized leader of republican nationalism. 
With other released republicans, he set out to reorganize the Volun-
teers and to challenge the Irish party. Before the end of the war, under 
a Sinn Fein label, they won seven by-elections, and then refused to 
take their seats at Westminster. 
When the United States entered the war in the spring of 1917, 
President Woodrow Wilson, a strong Anglophile with an Ulster Pres-
byterian heritage, hostile to Irish-American ethnicity but aware of its 
power in the urban wing of the Democratic party, told the British that 
enlisting maximum American energy and enthusiasm behind the 
Allies would be difficult as long as the Irish Question remained 
unresolved. To satisfy Wilson, and to revive Irish support for the war, 
Lloyd George, now prime minister, decided at Redmond's sugges-
tion to approve an Irish Convention representing all shades of opin-
ion-Sinn Fein, Home Rule, and unionist-to work out an 
acceptable Home Rule proposal. 
Sinn Fein rejected Redmond's invitation, but southern un-
ionists attending the Convention were prepared to cooperate in an 
effort to create a limited Irish legislature. Ulster unionists, how-
ever, encouraged by their British colleagues, disrupted unity ef-
forts. Redmond was so generous in his willingness to make 
concessions to Irish Protestants that he antagonized some impor-
tant Catholic nationalists, including members of the church hier-
archy. The Convention held its first session in July 1917 and 
concluded in an April 1918 stalemate. A month before the Con-
vention adjourned, Redmond died of complic-ations following a 
routine gallstone operation. Exhaustion and disillusionment con-
tributed to his death. 
By late 1917 the war on the Western Front was going badly for 
Britain and France, and the future looked bleak. Brutal trench 
warfare had taken the lives or wounded millions of soldiers, creating 
a serious troop shortage. Reacting against unrestricted German sub-
marine warfare, the United States had entered the war in April, but 
the British and French calculated that it would take a considerable 
length of time for Americans to mobilize their manpower and re-
sources. Meanwhile, with the Bolsheviks in Russia ready to make 
peace, Germany could concentrate its total army on the Western 
Front. Desperate for canon fodder, in April1918 Parliament author-
ized Lloyd George to draft Irishmen into the British army. Immedi-
ately, the Irish party left the Commons and joined Sinn Fein, 
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Catholic bishops and priests, and trade unions in a common front 
against conscription. 
Negative Irish reactions to a draft strengthened republican-
ism, hastened Volunteer reorganization, and goaded Britain into a 
strict coercion policy. Authorities deported many Sinn Feiners, and 
sent others, including de Valera, to prison, but, due to the unexpect-
edly quick American impact, the war concluded before Britain ap-
plied conscription to Ireland. 
The December 1918 post-Armistice general election resulted 
in victories for the Coalition government in. Britain and for Sinn Fein 
in Ireland. Republicans won seventy-three seats to six for the Irish 
party and twenty-six for the Unionists. But these figures exaggerate 
the republicanism of Irish nationalism. Because of Sinn Fein intimi-
dation, Home Rulers did not contest a number of constituencies. In 
those that they did challenge, only 69 percent of the eligible voters 
cast ballots, and just 47 percent of them voted Sinn Fein. By extend-
ing the suffrage to men over twenty-one and women over thirty, the 
1918 Representation of the People Act increased the Irish franchise 
from 701,475 in 1910 to 1,936,673. Since 1918 election results showed 
an actual gain in votes for the Irish party in contested constituencies, 
it seems that older voters tended to stay with Home Rule while 
republicanism captivated younger electors. But election contests 
were not clearcut generational clashes. Many of the local branch 
leaders of the United Irish League, the Irish party's constituency 
base, switched over to Sinn Fein when it became evident after 1916 
that republicanism was the political wave of the future. Their skills 
and experience were valuable assets in Sinn Fein's development. 
Refusing to sit at Westminster, Sinn Fein MPs met in Dublin 
and established an Irish parliament, Dail Eireann, which attempted 
to govern in the name of the Irish Republic. It created arbitration 
courts to supersede the British legal system, a board to settle indus-
trial disputes, and a land bank to make loans to people wishing to 
purchase farms; it also sent delegates to the Versailles Peace Confer-
ence to plead the case for Ireland's independence. Refusing to 
antagonize his British ally, the great apostle of national self-determi-
nation, Woodrow Wilson, ignored Irish delegates. This snub of-
fended Irish America, costing the president support for his League 
of Nations and for his party in the 1920 election. 
In February 1919 Michael Collins, who did most to revive the 
Volunteers, and his close friend, Harry Boland, another member of 
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the Sinn Fein executive, engineered de Valera's escape from Lincoln 
Gaol in England. After his return to Ireland, the Dail elected de 
Valera its president in April. In June he left for the United States to 
raise money for the Republic, remaining there until December 1920, 
collecting a considerable sum but dividing Irish America in a feud 
with Devoy and another powerful Clan na Gaeler, Judge Daniel 
Cahalan. The quarrel was largely a conflict of personalities, but it also 
involved different views oflrish nationalism. Like many Irish Ameri-
cans, Devoy and Cahalan were more fanatically anti-British than the 
Irish in Ireland. They considered de Valera's suggestion that Ireland 
would accept a Monroe Doctrine for the British Isles in order to 
appease British security anxieties a contradiction oflrish sovereignty. 
While de Valera was in the United States, Arthur Griffith 
served as acting president of the Dail. Collins was in charge of 
finances, but he retained his rank and duties as adjutant general and 
director of organization for the Volunteers; Cathal Brugha was min-
ister of defense and Volunteer chief of staff. There was friction 
between Brugha and Collins; perhaps the former was jealous of the 
latter~ Collins' brilliant intelligence network, his daring escapes, and 
his dashing personality m~de him a popular hero and overshadowed 
the more pedestrian efforts of Brugha. 
In January 1919 Sinn Fein's passive resistance to British rule 
evolved into a shooting war, forcing Britain to strengthen the Royal 
Irish Constabulary, the main target for rebel attacks, and to increase 
the size of the army serving in Ireland. In March 1920 the British 
government began recruiting ex-servicemen in England and sending 
them to Ireland to supplement the beleaguered RIC. Because of a 
uniform shortage, they wore dark green caps with khaki shirts and 
pants. Because of this color combination, Irish nationalists referred 
to them as the Black and Tans or just Tans. Later in 1920, Britain 
recruited former army officers to serve as a special RIC auxiliary 
force. 
During the Anglo-Irish War, the Irish Republican Army (the 
new name of the Volunteers) adopted guerrilla tactics. Men in civilian 
clothing ambushed lorries, assassinated "spies" and "informers," 
attacked and burned RIC barracks, shot soldiers, policemen, Tans, 
and Auxiliaries, then quickly melded into the civilian population, 
which sheltered and refused to inform on them. British officials 
described IRA guerrilla tactics as murder, but they were the only 
The Rose Tree 143 
practical way for a small nation limited in resources and population 
to fight a war of liberation against a world power. 
Court-martial tribunals tried captured republicans. Fre-
quently torture was used to try to elicit confessions and information. 
British security forces met terror with terror in a policy of reprisals. 
They burned, looted, and occasionally murdered. To focus interna-
tional attention on Ireland's struggle for freedom, some rebel prison-
ers went on hunger strike. Terence MacSwiney, lord mayor of Cork, 
died of starvation in England's Brixton prison on October 25, 1920. 
At his mayoral inauguration ceremony, he had articulated the theme 
and purpose oflrish martyrdom: "It is not those who inflict the most 
but those who suffer the most who will conquer." The courage and 
sacrifice of hunger strikers provided powerful ammunition in Sinn 
Fein's propaganda campaign. 
The ambiguity and complexity of the situation limited British 
efforts to cope with the Dail and the IRA. Since it refused to 
recognize the existence of the Irish Republic, Britain was technically 
involved in a police action to put down rebellion. Because Westmin-
ster politicians could not afford to admit that they were fighting the 
Irish nation by waging a total war for victory, they attempted a limited 
campaign against Sinn Fein and the IRA that they hoped would not 
jeopardize a future peaceful settlement with the Irish people. 
World and British opinion also fettered Lloyd George's gov-
ernment. Black and Tan and Auxiliary reprisals damaged Britain's 
image and shocked a growing number of its people. Prominent 
clergymen in the Anglican church, notably the archbishop of Canter-
bury, Asquith Liberals, and Labour party MPs condemned British 
policy in Ireland and demanded a negotiated settlement. They 
argued that IRA terror tactics did not justify barbaric retaliation from 
representatives of a country that had recently fought a war defending 
the self-determination of small nations. Constant pressure from the 
pulpit, opposition benches in the Commons, and the left-wing press 
insisted on a self-government solution to the Irish Question. 
Reacting to anti-government British and world opinion, Lloyd 
George in 1920 attempted to end the Anglo-Irish War with the Better 
Government of Ireland BilL It created two Irish Parliaments-one 
for the six northeast counties of Ulster and one for the rest of the 
country and a Council of Ireland composed of representatives from 
both legislatures. By administering services delegated to it by both 
Parliaments, the Council of Ireland was supposed to function as a 
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bridge leading to a United Ireland. The Better Government of 
Ireland Bill also placed some Irish nationalist and Unionist MPs in 
the British Parliament. 
By 1920 British opinion was pro-Home Rule, but.the 1912-14 
constitutional crisis, Easter Week, and the Anglo-Irish War had 
moved Irish nationalism far beyond that point. While 1920 elections 
produced a Unionist Parliament and government in six-county Ul-
ster, nationalists in the other twenty-six counties used the ballot box 
to reassert republican commitments. The war went on with its 
ambushes, assassinations, burnings, lootings, and murders. "Bloody 
Sunday," November 21, 1920, is a prime example of the vicious 
quality of the Anglo-Irish War. On that day, Collins h~d twelve men 
shot, some in front of their wives; eleven were British counter-intel-
ligence officers. In retaliation, the Auxiliaries and the RIC strafed a 
Gaelic football crowd at Croke Park, Dublin, killing twelve, includ-
ing a woman, a child, and a football player, and wounding sixty others. 
"Bloody Sunday" exemplified the brutality of reprisals, increasing 
and intensifying British opposition to Lloyd George's Irish policy. 
Failing to solve the Irish Question with Home Rule and partition, or 
with physical force, the prime minister had to bargain directly with 
de Valera. In July 1921 they agreed on a truce as a preliminary step 
to negotiations. 
London conversations between the British and Irish leaders 
were fruitless. The wily, pragmatic Welshman could not communi-
cate with the Irish republican. When Lloyd George tried to discuss 
specific terms, de Valera replied with lectures on Irish history. But 
the prime minister did make it clear that he was ready to concede 
dominion status with the following reservations: Britain would con-
tinue to maintain naval and air bases in Ireland and recruit Irishmen 
for her armed forces; Ireland would have to limit her army in con-
formity with the British military establishment, maintain free trade 
relations with Britain, and contribute to the British war debt. De 
Valera rejected the offer as too restrictive on Irish sovereignty. When 
Lloyd George threatened a resumption of the war, the Irish leader 
agreed to take the British offer back to the Dail for discussion. 
Although the Dail, on his recommendation, rejected Lloyd 
George's offer, de Valera told General Jan Smuts of South Africa 
among others that he realized that Britain would never concede the 
republic and that he was prepared to accept something less. Believ-
ing the door still remained open for a compromise settlement, Lloyd 
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George scheduled an autumn conference in London. In a puzzling 
decision still debated among Irish nationalists, de Valera announced 
that he would not go, and the Dail selected Griffith to head the 
delegation accompanied by Collins, George Gavan Duffy, Robert 
Barton, and Eamon Duggan. Barton's cousin, English-born and 
-educated Erskine Childers, went along as one of the secretaries to 
the Irish delegation. Childers was author of the superb spy novel The 
Riddle of the Sands, captain of the Asgard, which carried guns to the 
Volunteers at Howth in 1914, a British naval intelligence commander 
in World War I, and an uncompromising republican. The envoys were 
commissioned to negotiate and conclude a treaty with the British 
government, but were ordered not to sign any agreement unless the 
Dail first approved the contents. When Griffith and his fellow nego-
tiators left Dublin, they had no clear definition of what would be an 
acceptable settlement. 
Historians supporting de Valera's decision to remain in Dublin 
have said that he was of more use there restraining hotheaded 
republicans such as Brugha and Austin Stack and controlling the 
tempo of the London negotiations. Since the Irish envoys would 
have to refer all offers to the Republic's Cabinet for discussion and 
approval, they could not cave in to British pressure. Critics hostile to 
de Valera have suggested that he did not go to London because the 
British would not concede a republic, and he wanted to use Collins, 
his rival in popularity, as a scapegoat for frustrated Irish expectations. 
When London deliberations began in October, the Irish dele-
gation, experienced in combat but not in diplomacy, confronted a 
British team familiar with all the nuances of politics and negotia-
tions-Lloyd George, Austen Chamberlain, Lord Birkenhead, and 
Winston Churchill. Lloyd George was willing to be flexible, but he 
was the leader of a coalition government dominated by anti-Irish 
Unionists. This political reality limited the concessions he could 
make. Irish envoys were caught between the exigencies of British 
politics and Irish republican fanaticism. 
Lloyd George resubmitted his offer of dominion status in the 
form of an Irish Free State, but two issues emerged as major obstacles 
to a final settlement: the oath of allegiance to the British monarch 
and the status of the six counties in the northeast. Instead of concen-
trating on the most important-and to the British most embarrass-
ing- issue, partition, the Irish delegation focused on the abstract 
oath of allegiance. Lloyd George told them that it had to be part of 
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an Irish Free State constitution. As an alternative to an oath-bound 
dominion status, Irish envoys offered de Valera's idea of external 
association. According to this formula, the Irish republic would be-
long to the British Commonwealth and recognize the Crown as its 
head. Following World War II, Britain yielded external Common-
wealth association in regard to such republics as India and Pakistan, 
but in 1921 this was too advanced a notion for acceptance. Instead, 
Lloyd George offered to let the Irish design an oath of allegiance that 
would not be any more demanding than those in other dominions, 
and would emphasize primary allegiance to the Free State rather than 
to the Crown. 
When Irish envoys informed Lloyd George that they could not 
consent to a permanently divided Ireland, he replied that Sir James 
Craig, Northern Ireland premier, had the support of the British 
Unionist majority at Westminster in his refusal to accept the jurisdic-
tion of a Dublin parliament. As a compromise, the prime minister 
suggested a Boundary Commission to survey six-county loyalties 
before drawing a final border between the two lrelands. He led 
Griffith, Collins, and the others to believe that the Boundary Com-
mission, basing its decision on the will of inhabitants, would award 
the Irish Free State Fermanagh and Tyrone and perhaps parts of 
South Down, South Armagh, and Derry City. Lloyd George told 
them that such a large territorial transfer would eventually doom an 
economically unfeasible Northern Ireland and lead to national unity. 
Irish envoys accepted the Boundary Commission as a plausible 
solution to the partition issue. 
During a pause in the London negotiations, the Irish delega-
tion returned to Dublin. Under pressure from republican extremists 
Brugha and Stack, de Valera rejected dominion status with an oath 
of allegiance to the Crown and insisted on external association as a 
maximum compromise. But in early December, Lloyd George impa-
tiently decided to intimidate the inexperienced Irish diplomats into 
signing an agreement. He issued an ultimatum: dominion status or 
all-out war. Griffith, whose original Sinn Fein program was con-
structed around the principle of dual monarchy, had no objection in 
principle to dominion status. Michael Collins, in a position to know, 
was convinced that the IRA and war-weary Irish civilians were not 
prepared for a resumption of hostilities, and he considered the British 
offer a major concession. Lloyd George's ultimatum might have been 
a bluff, bm Irish republicans were in no position to call it. With heavy 
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hearts and many doubts, the envoys signed an agreement with the 
British government on December 6, 1921, establishing the Irish Free 
State as a dominion within the British Commonwealth. 
From December 14, 1921, to january 7, 1922, the Dail debated 
the Anglo-Irish Treaty. De Valera led the opposition, insisting that 
when Griffith, Collins, and the others signed it they betrayed the 
Republic that had been duly established on Easter Monday 1916. 
Collins replied that Lloyd George's offer was the best deal that Irish 
nationalism could expect, and that a continued military effort would 
not improve the situation. He also emphasized that dominion status 
was far more than previous nationalist movements asked for, and that 
it could be a beginning rather than an end to the quest for national 
sovereignty. Surprisingly, considering the importance it would later 
have, the Treaty debate paid scant attention to partition. Irish repub-
licans were more concerned about the metaphysics of the oath of 
allegiance than they were about the harsh reality of a divided Ireland. 
And no doubt Boundary Commission prospects diminished the sig-
nificance of the six-county issue in many minds. Some of the most 
passionate opponents of the Treaty were female members of the 
Dail-the widows, mothers, and sisters of men who gave their lives 
for the Republic. They spoke of the Free State as a bitter betrayal of 
the "martyred" dead. After all the speeches were made and the vote 
was taken the Dail ratified the Treaty sixty-four to fifty-seven. 
After his defeat, de Valera resigned as president of the Dail, 
and its members elected Griffith as his successor. Within a few 
weeks, British officials transferred the instruments of government to 
Free State authorities and, except for naval bases at Cobh, Lough 
Swilly, and Berehaven ("the Treaty ports"), began to evacuate three 
provinces in a country they had occupied for almost eight hundred 
years. 
In a June general election, 80 percent of Irish voters preferred 
pro-Treaty Dail candidates. The 20 percent who opposed the Treaty, 
insisting that the Republic was inviolate and that the majority had 
no right to be wrong, were prepared to wage civil war. Although de 
Valera preferred persuasion, his words incited violence. On St. Pat-
rick's Day 1922, he warned that the Free State would lead to fratri-
cide. In the republican scheme of things, de Valera remained 
legitimate president of the Republic, and Griffith and Collins were 
pretenders, British pawns operating a colonial enterprise, but the 
IRA shoved politicians such as de Valera aside and took up the gun. 
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In April 1922 Rory O'Connor, a prominent IRA commandant 
in the Anglo-Irish War, led a republican occupying force into the Four 
Courts, the hub of Ireland's legal system. Westminster politicians, 
especially Winston Churchill, warned Collins that unless the Free 
State army evicted O'Connor, the British would have to do so. On 
June 26 Collins ordered government troops using British-provided 
canons to shell the Four Courts, commencing the Civil War. 
Most Anglo-Irish War heroes such as O'Connor, Liam Mel-
lows, Ernie O'Malley, Sean Russell, Tom Barry, Harry Boland, Er-
skine Childers, and Cathal Brugha fought for the Republic. Devoted 
republican women, represented by Cumann na mBann, rallied be-
hind rebel troops, and many suffered imprisonment. IRA bravery and 
commitments could not compete with superior Free State numbers 
and equipment. Many Irishmen who fought in the British army in 
World War I contributed their experience and expertise to the gov-
ernment army. But the main difference between the Anglo-Irish 
conflict and the Civil War was the response of Irish opinion. Since a 
large majority of the Irish people were pro-Treaty, were tired of 
debating the metaphysical, almost theological, implications of the 
oath of allegiance, and wanted to get on with the business of con-
structing a viable nation-state, guerrilla tactics no longer worked. 
Anti-Treaty rebels could no longer depend on a sympathetic public 
to shelter them. Trade union spokesmen, the Labour party, and the 
Catholic hierarchy condemned republican violence and endorsed the 
Free State. 
The Civil War placed a heavy human and financial burden on 
the Free State. More than 600 people lost their lives, and 3,000 were 
wounded (compared to the 752 dead and 866 wounded in the much 
longer Anglo-Irish War). It cost the government about £17,000,000 to 
defeat the rebels, a sum that would have been better invested in 
agriculture, industry, and social services. In addition, the Civil War 
deprived Ireland of valuable leaders. On August 22, 1922, Griffith 
died of a heart attack. Ten days later an ambush in County Cork took 
the life of Michael Collins. His one-time close friend, Harry Boland, 
and his passionate enemy, Cathal Brugha, both fell to Free State 
bullets. A government firing squad executed Erskine Childers for 
possessing a concealed weapon. 
William Cosgrave and Kevin O'Higgins, successors to Griffith 
and Collins, determined that majority rule and liberal democracy 
should prevail over minority republican fanaticism, ended the Civil 
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War by shooting seventy-eight republican prisoners, including 
Childers and O'Connor. In less than a year, Free State authorities 
executed far more than the twenty-four rebels shot by the British 
government during the entire course of the Anglo-Irish War. 
Free State. severity plus the hostility of Irish public opinion 
and the opposition of the Catholic Church demoralized republicans. 
Emerging from the shadows, de Valera finally persuaded the anti-
Treaty IRA to cease hostilities. In May 1923 commandants ordered 
their men to dump arms. Without officially surrendering, IRA mem-
bers returned to civilian life without abandoning their animosity 
toward the Free State. 
The Civil War left a legacy of hatred that continued to faction-
alize Irish politics. Instead of confronting pressing economic and 
social problems, from the 1920s through the 1940s politicians contin-
ued to debate the Treaty. Reflections on the past overshadowed the 
present and the future. Post-Civil War bitterness sometimes spilled 
over into violence. On July 10, 1927, assassins shot Kevin O'Higgins 
as he walked home from Sunday Mass. 
Generally, the continuing Treaty debate existed within ~he 
narrow confines of political nationalism. In this context, Free Staters 
appeared as reasonable and practical people attempting to create a 
functioning nation-state while republicans seemed simpleminded 
fanatics oblivious to reality. But there were some Treaty foes who 
embraced republicanism as a protest against conservative post-1922 
economic, political, and cultural policies. To them, the Free State 
symbolized an aborted revolution, a change of one establishment for 
another instead of a comprehensive transformation of society. From 
their perspective, the Catholic bishops and priests, large farmers, 
shopkeepers, and the former Protestant unionists who backed the 
Free State were counterrevolutionary preservers of the status quo 
and vested interests. 
Republican writers such as Sean O'Faolain and Frank O'Con-
nor, inheritors of Daniel O'Connell's liberal democratic political 
nationalism and the Literary Revival's inclusive cultural nationalism, 
found the ultra-Catholic, peasant-flavored, conservative Free State 
even more oppressive than British-dominated Ireland. They fought 
in the Anglo-Irish and civil wars to achieve a socially progressive, 
culturally diverse, and dynamic Ireland, and they were disappointed 
with the "pope's green island" results. Some enemies of the Free 
State were socialists, such as another distinguished writer, Peadar 
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O'Donnell. Although a small minority in Catholic Ireland, socialists 
were significant in the republican movement, sometimes exerting an 
influence far beyond their numbers. 
Ideological distinctions between friends and enemies of the 
Treaty can distort reality. Personal loyalties, always an important part 
of Irish psychology, often determined commitments. Emotional at-
tachments to Collins or de Valera or to IRA commandants could 
decide Free State or republican allegiances. Arthur Griffith was quite 
conservative on social, cultural, and economic issues, but that did not 
necessarily determine the Free State adherences of Catholic bishops, 
businessmen, large farmers, and wealthy Protestants, who were seek-
ing law and order. However, the support that religion and property 
gave to the Free State did nudge it in a status-quo direction. Pro-
Treaty Sinn Fein became the nucleus of conservative politics in 
post-Treaty Ireland. 
In 1966, during the fiftieth anniversary celebration of Easter Week, 
politicians, historians, and folksingers paid tribute to the triumph of 
physical-force nationalism. An IRA demolition expert blew up Nel-
son's Pillar in O'Connell street, inspiring a rare example of President 
Eamon de Valera's sense of humor. Inventing a newspaper headline, 
he said: "Noted British Admiral Departs Dublin By Air." In the 
atmosphere of jubilation that surrounded the semicentennial, few 
doubted the contributions to Irish freedom of Pearse, Connolly, and 
their 1916 comrades or of the IRA during the Anglo-Irish War. The 
consensus held that revolutionary republicanism had emancipated 
Ireland from British colonialism, and established a nation-state that 
had survived as a successful example of liberal democracy. 
By the early 1970s events in Northern Ireland initiated a 
historical revisionism challenging the pieties and tenets of physical-
force republicanism. In the summer of 1972, Studies, a scholarly Jesuit 
quarterly, published the late Francis Shaw's "The Canon of Irish 
History-a Challenge," an essay that the journal's editors had 
thought inappropriate when the author submitted it in 1966. Father 
Shaw's piece dissected the revolutionary ideas of Theobald Wolfe 
Tone and Patrick Pearse, and their impact on Irish thought and 
action. He condemned Tone's adherence to French Revolutionary 
doctrine and his anti-Catholicism, and he accused him of hating 
Britain more than loving Ireland. Shaw was even more critical of 
Pearse, deploring his confusion of pagan Celtic mythology with 
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Christian theology and his equating patriotism with holiness. He said 
that Pearse's muddled thinking made Christianity an accessory to the 
moral evils of hatred and violence. Shaw rejected as myth the idea 
that 1916 redeemed Ireland from the decadence and West Britonism 
of constitutional nationalism. 
Conor Cruise O'Brien is among the most significant and influ-
ential revisionists of Irish history. In a number of publications, prin-
cipally States of Ireland (1972), he has denounced nationalism, 
especially the physical-force variety, as a great moral evil of modern 
times, particularly when associated with religious passions. O'Brien 
doubts that Easter Week or the Anglo-Irish War were necessary 
preludes to Irish independence. He is sure that England would have 
conceded Home Rule after World War I and, considering what has 
since happened in the empire and Commonwealth, the Irish could 
have expanded it to even greater degrees of sovereignty, including 
attaining republic status. O'Brien argues not only that 1916 and the 
Anglo-Irish War were a waste of lives, but that in glorifying blood 
sacrifice they have endangered the civility oflrish society. Ever since 
1922, gunmen insisting that the majority have no right to be wrong 
have threatened the existence of Irish liberal democracy. O'Brien 
also unfavorably compares the exclusive Gaelic and Catholic post-
1916 Irish nationalism with its inclusive Home Rule predecessor. 
There is considerable merit in revisionist reassessments of 
revolutionary republicanism. In 1922, physical-force nationalism 
achieved a greater measure of sovereignty than O'Connell, Young 
Ireland, Butt, Parnell, or Redmond demanded, but it also abandoned 
most of Ulster. As we shall see, the Boundary Commission turned 
out to be a farce. And, as critics have remarked, the Irish nationalism 
that emerged from the alliance between Catholic and Gaelic Ireland 
and from the violence of revolution was narrow, provincial, and 
exclusive, discouraging economic modernization, social reform, in-
tellectual creativity, and cooperation between north and south. Inde-
pendent Ireland's static way of life encouraged ambitious and 
talented young people to continue the pattern of emigration. 
Perhaps Conor Cruise O'Brien and other critics of revolution-
ary nationalism are right. The British might have kept faith and 
granted Home Rule, and it could have evolved into something much 
more, sparing Ireland the curses of fanaticism, intolerance, and 
violence. But after the 1912-14 Home Rule crisis it was difficult for 
Irish nationalism to have confidence in the integrity of Westminster 
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politicians. In discussing what might have been, revisionists ignore 
the importance of legend and myth in the historical process. Easter 
Week and the Anglo-Irish War, like the American Revolution, pro-
vided examples of heroism and sacrifice that sustained a new nation 
through difficult times and adjustments. Because people did die 
and/or suffer for Irish independence, it became precious to succeed-
ing generations. 
The relevance oflreland's struggle for freedom and the after-
math extends beyond the confines of a small island on the western 
fringe of Europe. The Anglo-Irish conflict was the twentieth cen-
tury's first successful guerrilla war of liberation, an inspiration and 
model for revolutionary movements all over the globe. When it was 
over, Ireland faced the same problems of stability, civil war, and 
reconstruction that would later challenge other emerging nations in 
Asia, Africa, and the collapsing Soviet empire. Like them, Ireland 
confronted the challenge of independence with young leaders 
trained in the ideological rigidity of revolution rather than the com-
promise of politics. Men with years of legislative experience and 
political skill, the members of the Irish parliamentary party, were 
among the casualties of Easter Week and the Anglo-Irish conflict. 
Repudiated by their people, they were unable to contribute their 
considerable talents and common sense to the new nation they had 
served so well in the past. But despite the liabilities of limited 
political experience, the bitterness of civil war factionalism, and the 
narrowness of Gaelic and Catholic cultural nationalism, Ireland has 
survived as a relatively rare example of a successful post-revolution-
ary liberal democracy. 
8 
Unfinished Business 
1922-1995 
Collins and Griffith were right, de Valera and his friends were 
wrong: the Treaty was a "stepping stone" to complete political 
independence. Under William T. Cosgrave's Cummann na nGaed-
heal (Community of Irishmen) government, Ireland entered the 
League of Nations and articulated an independent foreign policy, 
appointed ambassadors to and established consulates in other coun-
tries, and issued passports. Led by Kevin O'Higgins and Desmond 
Fitzgerald, Irish delegates to Commonwealth conferences joined 
those from Canada and South Africa in demanding maximum domin-
ion sovereignty. Due to their efforts, governors general became 
representatives of the Crown rather than the London government, 
the Westminster Parliament abandoned its claim to legislate for other 
members of the Commonwealth, and dominions no longer had to 
abide by British treaties with other nations. 
Irish diplomats played an important role in formulating the 
1931 Statute of Westminster, which defined the Commonwealth as 
a free association of sovereign and equal nations united in allegiance 
to the same monarch. This interpretation of dominion sovereignty 
came close to achieving de Valera's idea of external association. 
Continuing to insist that the Free State was an impostor, and 
that the second Dail elected in 1920 was the legitimate government, 
republicans refused to participate in Irish politics. In 1925 de Valera 
decided that this was a futile policy and created the Fianna Fail 
(Soldiers of Destiny) party to achieve republican goals through con-
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stitutional methods. Because of the oath of allegiance, however, he 
refused to enter the Dail. In 1927, after the assassination of Kevin 
O'Higgins, government legislation denying candidacy rights to those 
unwilling to subscribe to the oath forced Fianna Fail reluctantly to 
take it and occupy their seats in Leinster House, the home of the 
Dail. Five years later, in the midst of the world-wide depression, 
Fianna Fail, campaigning on a platform including expanded social 
welfare, land for the rural proletariat, economic self-sufficiency, and 
refusal to pay annuities to Britain for land puchase, won a plurality 
in the Dail and, with the support of the Labour party, formed a 
government. 
From 1932 until 1948 Fianna Fail held the reins of power in 
the Free State. Operating within the parameters of the Statute of 
Westminster, de Valera made Ireland a republic in fact if not in name. 
In 1933 he eliminated the oath of allegiance from the Irish constitu-
tion and diminished the role of the governor general. Two years later 
he did away with the right of appeal from Irish courts to the judicial 
committee of the British Privy Council. Taking advantage of the 1936 
constitutional crisis in Britain, when Edward VIII abdicated and his 
brother became George VI, de Valera abolished the office of governor 
general and removed the Crown from the Irish constitution except 
for purposes of external association. 
In 193 7 de Valera offered the Irish people a new constitution. 
It changed the name of the Free State to Eire (Ireland), and replaced 
the discarded governor general with a president as symbolic head of 
state. The taoiseach (chief) or prime minister exercised real executive 
power. In a national referendum, 685,105 said yes to the new consti-
tution while 526,945 said no, but 31 percent of eligible voters stayed 
home. 
True to his campaign pledge, de Valera refused to pay land 
annuities to Britain. He collected them from Irish farmers in a 
reduced amount, and then applied the income to Irish needs. De 
Valera's refusal to continue payment on the annuities initiated a trade 
war with Britain, Ireland's almost exclusive outlet for exports. Britain 
placed tariffs on Irish agricultural products, and Ireland retaliated 
with duties on British industrial goods. The trade war hurt and 
antagonized large farmers, but de Valera believed it provided Ireland 
with an opportunity to develop its own small industries on the road 
to self-sufficiency. 
Attempting to establish good relations with Ireland in an 
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increasingly troubled Europe, Britain's prime mmtster, Neville 
Chamberlain, invited de Valera to London for talks in 1938. The 
results were a considerable victory for the Irish leader. Chamberlain 
refused to discuss partition, but he made other significant conces-
sions. De Valera agreed to pay Britain £10,000,000 as a settlement of 
the annuities claim. Britain lifted duties on Irish goods, Ireland 
responded accordingly, and the two countries signed a reciprocal 
trade pact. Chamberlain's most generous gesture was a surrender of 
the Treaty ports (Cobh, Berehaven, and Lough Swilly) to Eire, 
infuriating Winston Churchill as Britain faced serious threats from 
increasingly aggressive German Nazism and Italian fascism. And, as 
he predicted, for some time during World War II, until the British 
and Americans made use offacilities in Northern Ireland, the loss of 
the Treaty ports handicapped the Allies in their efforts to counteract 
the effect of German submarines in Atlantic shipping lanes. 
The ultimate proof and test of Ireland's sovereignty was the 
decision, in the face of tremendous pressure from London and 
Washington, to stay neutral in World War II. Despite strong anti-com-
munist emotions among her overwhelming Catholic majority, Ireland 
remained neutral throughout the Cold War, declining to join the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Representatives of the coalition 
government that came into office in 1948 did tell the United States 
that it would consider NATO membership if Washington would 
pressure Britain to end partition. American strategists decided that 
since the Allies were able to win World War II despite Ireland's 
neutrality, they could survive another conflict without Irish partici-
pation. President Harry Truman informed the Dublin government 
that partition was an Anglo-Irish rather than an American problem. 
The 1948-51 coalition government was a political alliance 
between the Fine Gael (United Ireland) party, a successor to Cum-
mann na nGaedheal, Clann na Poblachta (Republican Family), a new 
breakaway Sinn Fein party with a social democrat agenda, Clann na 
Talmhan, the farmer's party, and independent James Dillon, the son 
of the former chair of the Irish party. Fine Gael's John Costello was 
taoiseach. To outflank Fianna Fail and to please his Clann na 
Poblachta colleagues, Costello declared Ireland a republic in 1948 at 
a Commonwealth conference in Canada. (The Dail's Republic of 
Ireland Bill was implemented on Easter Monday 1949.) De Valera 
had never taken that final step because he believed that by remaining 
in external association with Britain, Ireland would retain ties with the 
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north that might someday result in a united Ireland. De Valera's fears 
were confirmed when Clement Attlee's Labour government re-
sponded to the Republic of Ireland Bill by pledging continuing 
British support for Northern Ireland's existence as long as it retained 
the allegiance of a majority of six-county citizens. 
Northern Ireland was a peculiar concoction of a statelet. Dur-
ing the 1912-14 Home Rule crisis, and then again in 1920, British 
politicians decided that it was unfair to submit a 25 percent Protes-
tant minority to the authority of a Dublin legislature. Instead, they 
included a 33 percent Catholic minority in Protestant-dominated 
Northern Ireland. Two of the six Northern Ireland counties, Ferman-
agh and Tyrone, had small Catholic majorities, and the South Down, 
South Armagh, and West Derry border areas were largely Catholic. 
Very early, Northern Ireland's prime minister, Sir James Craig, made 
it clear that he was leading a "Protestant nation for a Protestant 
people." 
Most six-county Catholics, committed to the destiny and 
values of Irish nationalism, could not accept exclusion from the 
long-awaited Irish Zion or permanent inclusion in the United King-
dom. But in 1922, after local government councils in predominantly 
Catholic areas rejected the authority of the Northern Ireland Parlia-
ment and voted to join the Free State, Craig shut them down and, 
with the consent of Britain, eliminated the proportional repre-
sentation feature of the 1920 Better Government of Ireland Act. 
Consequently, as a result of gerrymandering, extra votes for business 
properties, and a strict household suffrage, Catholic majorities had to 
suffer Protestant minority local government. Derry city was an obvi-
ous example of this injustice. There Catholics clearly outnumbered 
Protestants, but the city council had twelve Protestant to eight 
Catholic representatives. 
Since local government distributed housing and jobs, Catho-
lics had a shortage of both in Northern Ireland. They were denied 
private as well as public employment. Protestants owned most of the 
large businesses and industries and hired their own. Craig's successor 
as prime minister, Sir Basil Brooke, advised Protestants to drive 
Catholics out of Northern Ireland by not hiring them. In economic 
development programs, the Northern Ireland government ignored 
the territory west of the Bann river with its large Catholic numbers. 
There have been and are many poor Protestants in Northern Ireland, 
especially since the post-World War II decline in the linen and 
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shipbuilding industries, but in many areas of the north Catholic 
unemployment has hovered around 40 percent. After three genera-
tions on the dole, many Northern Ireland Catholics are too psycho-
logically disabled to work. 
After Northern Ireland's Stormont Parliament fashioned a 
Protestant Ascendancy, Orange Order-influenced, Unionist-party 
state depriving Catholics of basic civil rights, economic opportuni-
ties, and adequate social services, the minority had good reason to 
believe that it was oppressed by an authoritarian regime. Stormont 
supplemented the Royal Ulster Constabulary with the exclusively 
Protestant B-Specials, which functioned as an Orange gestapo har-
assing and terrorizing Catholics. The 1922 Civil Authorities (Special 
Powers) Act made the work of the RUC and B-Specials easier by 
permitting authorities to arrest and detain suspected nationalist 
subversives for indefinite periods without trial. 
There is some validity to the socialist view that large land-
owners and wealthy businessmen have promoted sectarian conflict 
and hatred in Northern Ireland in order to divide and control the 
working class. Six-county Protestant attitudes, however, represent 
more than capitalist manipulation. Protestants view themselves as 
separate and distinct from Catholics, and more British than Irish in 
cultural and national allegiances. Similar to the poor whites in the 
United States who despise poor blacks, working-class Ulster Protes-
tants get a psychological lift from believing that they are superior to 
Catholics. Their xenophobia is expressed in racial rhetoric describing 
Catholics as treacherous, violent, improvident, filthy, and lazy scum 
who breed like rabbits. They believe that ignorant and superstitious 
"Fenians" are pawns of their priests, who are agents of Dublin and 
Rome. 
In the north, anti-Catholicism has often moved beyond rheto-
ric to violence. During the 1920s and 1930s, Protestant mobs physi-
cally assaulted Catholics, burned their homes, and drove them out of 
shipyards and factories. On July 12, when Protestants celebrate the 
victory of William III over James II at the Boyne in 1690, or on August 
11, when they commemorate successful resistance to the 1689 Siege 
of Derry, Catholics have not been safe on Northern Ireland streets, 
and sometimes not even in their homes. 
Britain bears responsibility for the denial of civil rights to the 
Northern Ireland minority. During the discussion of the third Home 
Rule bill, British MPs insisted on and obtained guarantees safeguard-
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ing Protestant interests in the proposed Irish state. When construct-
ing Northern Ireland, why did Westminster ignore the interests of an 
even larger Catholic minority? And why for over fifty years did British 
governments tolerate discrimination and violence against Catholics 
in a part of the United Kingdom? Throughout this period, Britain, a 
self-proclaimed champion ofliberal democracy, a foe of authoritarian 
rule in other countries, gave tacit approval to the apartheid policies 
of the Northern Ireland government, one that it sustained and 
preserved with welfare-state subsidies. 
Constant, often violent, Protestant persecution, poverty, and 
second-class citizenship discouraged Catholics from participating in 
the system. Most retreated into ghettos of the mind as well as of 
place. Sectarian cultural separateness in Northern Ireland has been 
even more pronounced than racial segregation in the pre-civil rights 
American South. Northern Ireland has two distinct religious-cultural 
communities, one essentially Irish, the other fanatically British. 
Catholic conditions in the six counties produced fury as well 
as passivity, and anti-British emotions far more intense than in the 
rest oflreland. Frustrated by poverty and oppression, disgusted with 
the small Catholic, conservative nationalist party ("Green Tories) in 
the Stormont Parliament-the voice of bishops, shopkeepers, pro-
fessionals, and pub owners but not of the working class-some 
nationalists joined the Irish Republican Army, illegal on both sides 
of the border. The IRA engaged in acts of terrorism against symbols 
of British authority: custom posts and RUC barracks. During World 
War II, the IRA pursued subversive activities in Britain, but large 
numbers of Catholics from both sides of the border fought bravely 
and well in the British armed forces. 
Although Protestant unionist prejudice, paranoia, and fears of 
Irish nationalist irredentism, combined with British indifference to 
injustices, were most responsible for discrimination and cultural 
apartheid in Northern Ireland, politicians in the Free State, Eire, and 
the Republic contributed their share. In their insistence that the 
British presence was the only obstacle to a unified Ireland, they failed 
to comprehend that the border was cultural as well as geographic. 
During the Dail Treaty debate, as previously discussed, parti-
tion was a minor issue compared to the oath of allegiance to the 
Crown. No doubt participants from both sides trusted the Boundary 
Commission to transfer so much of Northern Ireland to the Free 
State that the former would cease to be a viable entity. But when the 
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Commission met in 1924, Justice R. Feetham of South Africa, its 
chair, and the British-chosen representative for Northern Ireland, 
J.R. Fisher, made it clear to Eoin MacNeill, the Free State member, 
that they would rule on the "economic and geographic" rather than 
the "wishes of the inhabitants" part of the Treaty's Article XII. After 
the Free State government learned that Feetham and Fisher were 
going to maintain Northern Ireland pretty much as it was-taking 
away a bit of South Armagh, adding some of East Donegal-it 
decided to negotiate with Britain to prevent the publication of the 
Commission report, which would have given it the force of law. In a 
tripartite agreement with Britain and Northern Ireland, Cosgrave's 
government accepted the existing frontier; in return Britain can-
celled the Free State's and Northern Ireland's obligation to the 
British debt. The agreement also abolished the Council of Ireland, 
the intended bridge of eventual unity between north and south. In 
exchange, the Free State and Northern Ireland governments agreed 
to discuss and negotiate problems of mutual interest. 
Free State leaders thought that they had salvaged something 
from the tripartite agreement, but Sinn Fein republicans accused 
them of sanctioning permanent partition. They said that the Free 
State sold out a united Ireland for a mess of British pottage. From 
1925 on, partition was the principle item in the republican indict-
ment of the Free State, and the target ofiRA activities against Britain 
and Northern Ireland. 
Although both Free Staters and Sinn Feiners continually 
denounced Britain as the sustaining force of partition, and expressed 
determination to erase the border, their efforts to create a Gaelic and 
Catholic Ireland reinforced the cultural and religious boundaries 
between north and south. Attempting to achieve Pearse's goal of an 
Ireland not only free but Gaelic as well, Cumman na nGaedheal, 
Fianna Fail, and coalition governments insisted on compulsory Irish 
in the schools and competence in the language as a requirement for 
the secondary school leaving certificate (and thus access to universi-
ties) and for civil service employment. They also appropriated con-
siderable sums of money to preserve Irish-speaking (Gaeltacht) 
districts. Despite these efforts, emigration to the English-speaking 
world and economic, social, and tourism ties with Britain, the United 
States, and Commonwealth countries continued to decrease the 
number of Irish speakers. Many of the well-educated middle class 
were Gaelic language enthusiasts, but English was the vernacular for 
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most business and professional people, as well as for farmers and the 
city and town working class. 
Support for a Gaelic Ireland was more nationalist piety than 
conviction, but the Catholic tradition was deeply engrained. Legis-
lation of Catholic morality, particularly in regard to marriage and sex, 
and the influence of bishops and priests on the lives of the people 
and government decisions turned Ireland into a confessional state, 
contradicting the inclusive theory oflrish nationalism. De Valera, the 
most outspoken foe of partition, did the most to create an Ireland 
religiously and culturally offensive to Northern Ireland Protestants. 
His vision oflreland as essentially rural, Catholic, and Gaelic not only 
froze the economy in a pre-modern mold, driving masses of young 
men and women out of the country, it confirmed Ulster loyalist 
opinion that a British rather than an Irish identity best served their 
interests. 
Formulated by the distinguished Cork writer Daniel Corkery, 
a narrow, provincial cultural nationalism gave support to the Gaelic, 
Catholic Ireland efforts of politicians. Like the original thrust of the 
Gaelic League, it insisted that a true Irish literature had to be in the 
native language, and that Ireland should defend its spiritual suprem-
acy from the secular materialism of the outside world. Corkery's 
one-time proteges, Sean O'Faolain and Frank O'Connor, led other 
writers in resisting the tide of Catholic clericalism and cultural 
isolationism. They defended the liberal, democratic, and inclusive 
beginnings of Irish nationalism, and pointed out that Irish culture 
blended the Anglo-Irish Protestant and Ulster Presbyterian with the 
Irish Catholic Gaelic tradition. 
World War II, along with cultural, religious, and economic 
differences, played a part in maintaining a divided Ireland. The great 
crusade against fascism and Nazism was a defining twentieth-cen-
tury event. Ireland's neutrality leaned toward the liberal democra-
cies, and hundreds of thousands of its citizens served in the British 
armed forces or worked in British defense plants, but Northern 
Ireland was directly involved in the conflict, and served as host for 
American navy and army personnel patrolling the North Atlantic or 
preparing to invade France. Ireland's neutrality while Britain was in 
danger, and its postwar decision to remain outside NATO, contrib-
uted to another nongeographic aspect of a divided Ireland: unshared 
history. 
During the late 1950s and into the 1960s, as Ireland experi-
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enced significant social, economic, and cultural changes, partition 
receded as a priority issue. Tourism, television, the printing press, 
and the cinema brought the outside world to Ireland, dissolving 
much of her provincial cultural and religious isolationism. De Valera 
moved to the presidency, and Sean Lemass replaced him as taoiseach 
and Fianna Fail leader. Lemass encouraged foreign investment and 
the expansion of industry. Slowly but surely, Ireland became more 
urban than rural, gradually diminishing the influence of Catholicism 
and Gaelic nationalism. Citing its own experience of colonialism, 
Ireland entered the United Nations in 1956 as a champion of under-
developed countries newly emancipated from imperialism and then 
joined the European Economic Community in 1973, changing its 
focus from the Third World to its partners in the Common Market. 
Cosmopolitanism and internationalism decreased hostility to and 
encouraged cooperation with Britain as a partner in a new Europe. 
In the late 1960s Lemass and the Northern Ireland prime 
minister, Terence O'Neill, exchanged visits, and representatives of 
their two governments began to discuss problems of mutual con-
cern-energy, foreign investment, and tourism. Just when observers 
predicted that tensions between north and south were disappearing 
and an epoch of harmony and peace was approaching, Northern 
Ireland burst into a passionate conflict of interests between the 
Protestant majority and the Catholic minority. The conflict began 
with peaceful civil rights demonstrations. 
From the 1920s through the 1930s and 1940s, educational 
deficiencies, the product of poverty as well as of Protestant bigotry, 
victimized Catholics. This started to change in 1947 when the British 
Education Act opened secondary school and university doors to 
young people on the basis of talent rather than wealth. Bright young 
Catholics attended Queen's in Belfast, the New University of Ulster 
in Coleraine, Oxford, Cambridge, and other institutions of higher 
learning in Britain. But when they earned their degrees, they discov-
ered that Northern Ireland unionists denied them the rewards of 
talent and training. Although bitter, they did not seek a solution in 
traditional nationalism. They decided that a united Ireland was a far 
off fantasy land, the catchword of politicians and the deluded IRA. 
They wanted first-class citizenship in the United Kingdom with all 
the benefits of its generous welfare state. 
Inspired by the African-American struggle for equality, a mod-
erate 1964 Catholic protest against discrimination in housing pro-
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duced the Campaign for Social Justice. Four years later this move-
ment evolved into the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, a 
coalition of middle-class Catholics, socialists, republicans, Protestant 
and Nonconformist liberals, and the People's Democracy, a radical 
student group from Queen's University, featuring the charismatic 
Bernadette Devlin. In 1968 anti-Catholic mobs violently responded 
to civil rights demonstrations. Frequently members of the RUC 
looked away while marchers suffered physical abuse; sometimes 
policemen participated in the beatings. 
In the summer of 1969 unionist violence revived the IRA. It 
had been moribund since 1962, the time of its last terrorist campaign. 
After its resurrection, the IRA split into Official (Marxist) and Provi-
sional (traditional republican terrorist) wings. Catholics retreated 
into barricaded ghettos in Belfast and Derry. To protect them from 
Protestant and Presbyterian violence and possible extermination, 
Britain sent troops to Northern Ireland in August 1969. At first, 
Catholics welcomed the soldiers as saviors, giving them tea and 
cookies, but when the army began to function as a police auxiliary of 
the Stormont regime, their attitude shifted and the IRA went to war 
against British troops. 
On August 9, 1971, British soldiers assisted the constabulary 
in interning 342 people suspected of IRA connections. By mid-De-
cember authorities had apprehended over 1,500 suspects (943 were 
quickly released). The torture of some internees consolidated Catho-
lic ghettos behind the IRA. When soldiers killed 13 Derry Catholic 
demonstrators on January 30, 1972, Catholic opinion exploded in 
anger. Reactions to "Bloody Sunday" in Britain, the United States, 
and the Irish Republic doomed the Stormont regime. In what was 
supposed to be a temporary measure, Britain suspended the North-
ern Ireland Parliament in March 1972, instituting direct rule from 
Westminster. 
Following June 1973 elections, Britain established a Northern 
Ireland Assembly of eighty members, based on the principle of power 
sharing rather than majority rule. Official Unionists, led by Brian 
Faulkner, chair of the Assembly's Executive Committee, cooperated 
with Gerry Fitt (deputy chair) and John Hume of the Social Demo-
cratic and Labour party (SDLP), the successor of the Nationalist 
party, as the voice of majority Catholic opinion, and the unionist, 
pro-civil rights, non-sectarian Alliance party. 
In December 1973 representatives of the Irish, British, and 
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Northern Irehind governments assembled for four days in Sunning-
dale, England, and established a Council of Ireland to discuss prob-
lems affecting north and south. Shortly after this meeting, both the 
British and Irish governments published statements agreeing that an 
undivided Ireland was the best solution to the Ulster crisis, but that 
such an arrangement necessitated the consent of the Northern Ire-
land majority. 
Opinion in Britain and the Irish Republic was optimistic that 
power sharing and Sunningdale would pacify the six counties and 
bring Ireland closer to unification. But the IRA insisted that only the 
end of partition would satisfy its demands, and unionist extremists, 
such as Reverend Ian Paisley of the Free Presbyterian Church, a 
fanatic no-popery bigot, and William Craig, leader of the Vanguard 
movement, a strong no-surrender pressure group in the Unionist 
party supported by anti-Catholic paramilitaries, rejected power shar-
ing, demanded majority rule, and denounced the Council of Ireland 
as a stealthy approach to a unified Ireland. Meanwhile, the violence 
continued. The Provisional IRA's bullets killed British soldiers, and 
its bombs often took the lives of innocent women and children 
without sectarian or political discrimination. Loyalist paramilitaries 
killed Catholics. By the spring of 1974 over a thousand people had 
died from shootings, bombings, and fires; three years later the total 
number of fatalities approached fifteen hundred. 
In May 1974 Craig's Protestant Workers' Council, allied with 
a variety of ultra-unionist groups and loyalist paramilitaries such as 
Vanguard and the Ulster Defense Association, began a general strike 
that intimidated the power-sharing government into rejecting par-
ticipation in the Council of Ireland and finally into abolishing itself. 
Westminster resumed direct rule, frequently attempting to restore 
some form of Northern Ireland legislature, always to be thwarted by 
extreme unionist demands for majority rule, and the SDLP's refusal 
to abandon the principle of power sharing. 
Intending to intimidate British public opinion-already op-
posed to involvement in Irish affairs-into pressuring its government 
to withdraw from Northern Ireland, the Provisional IRA decided to 
bring terrorism to Britain. Plans to assassinate prominent politicians 
failed, but in 1973 and 1974 IRA bombs caused extensive property 
damage and killed many innocent people. On Thursday, November 
21, 1973, explosives planted in two Birmingham pubs slaughtered 21 
and injured 162 people. In October and November 1974 the IRA 
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killed 7 and wounded 92 in pub bombings in Guildford and Woolrich. 
The police arrested six Northern Ireland natives living in Birming-
ham for the atrocity in that city, and four, two from the six counties, 
for the Guildford and Woolrich murders. After torture-induced con-
fessions, juries declared them guilty and judges sentenced them to 
life in prison. Later legal decisions reversed these verdicts, and 
released the prisoners. 
Instead of increasing public opinion demands that Britain 
withdraw from Northern Ireland, IRA terrorism escalated anti-Irish 
sentiments and strengthened government resolve to remain in six-
county Ulster until it achieved a satisfactory arrangement between 
majority and minority populations. Nevertheless, the IRA continued 
bombing British targets into the 1980s and 1990s, and the British 
reluctantly settled for an acceptable level of violence rather than law 
and order. 
In 1972 the Official IRA agreed to a truce with the British 
military and, as the Workers' party, directed its energy to politics in 
both Irelands. In 1975 a militant Trotskyite faction broke with the 
Officials and formed the Irish Republican Socialist party. Its military 
expression, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), became the 
most promiscuously terrorist organization operating on the national-
ist side of the Northern Ireland conflict. In addition to the indiscrimi-
nate slaughter of many innocents, it killed Aire Neave, MP, a 
prominent Conservative hard-liner on Northern Ireland. 
Provisional Sinn Fein is the political wing of the Provisional 
IRA. Its leader, Gerry Adams, has argued that military efforts alone 
cannot drive the British out of Northern Ireland. He has insisted that 
political action is also necessary, and has projected an all-Ireland 
socialist republic as the ultimate goal of the armed, politically assisted 
struggle. Sinn Fein has contested elections in Northern Ireland and 
the Republic with little success in the south and a second-place 
showing to the SDLP among Catholics in the north. 
For a long time, IRA, INLA, and unionist terrorists seemed 
indifferent to British, Irish, and world opinion that branded them 
murderers. Unionist paramilitaries have accused Britain of taking a 
soft line on the IRA, and of preparing to compromise the integrity of 
Northern Ireland. They have said that they are fighting fire with fire 
in order to preserve the existence of their community and its cultural 
values. Playing on the themes and traditions of Irish republicanism, 
IRA propagandists have argued that history demonstrates that Britain 
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submits to Irish force rather than Irish reason. Heralding the justice 
of their cause in traditional republican rhetoric, they have replied to 
critics that even if most Irish nationalists disagree with their methods 
the majority has no right to be wrong. They also have reminded 
fault-finders that while most of the Irish rejected Pearse and Con-
nolly during Easter Week 1916, their blood sacrifice redeemed and 
energized Irish nationalism for victory. And they have pointed out to 
people in the Republic that their freedom is a product of IRA 
terrorism during the Anglo-Irish War, and that Fianna Fail was once 
a minority republican expression. IRA spokesmen have predicted 
that someday the Irish public will consider them, like the patriots of 
Easter Week and the Anglo-Irish War, as heroic freedom fighters. 
The Provisional IRA apologia disturbs old IRA veterans, who say "we 
did not kill our own people, especially women and children." 
IRA members have represented a mixed bag of motives. Some 
come from families that for generations have played the patriot game. 
For many, the means-blood sacrifice-is more important than the 
end-one Ireland. Others in the organization are products of the 
poverty and hopelessness of Catholic ghettos. In other countries they 
might be members of street gangs. But in Northern Ireland patriotic 
slogans have sanctified thuggery and violence. Belonging to the IRA 
and fighting for the cause has given meaning to what were meaning-
less lives. The above explanations for the participation of Catholic 
nationalists in the IRA also apply to non-Catholics who have joined 
loyalist terrorist groups. 
Nationalist and unionist patriotisms sanction extortion as well 
as murder. Terrorists often have more control over sectarian neigh-
borhoods in Northern Ireland cities than do the RUC or British 
security forces, and they enforce codes of conduct. Suspected in-
formers or moral delinquents are brutally punished, often by knee-
capping. Many members of the IRA and the unionist Ulster Defense 
Association (which in 1971 synchronized the activities of a large 
number of loyalist paramilitary organizations) have found profit in 
intimidation and violence. They operate pubs, taxi services, and 
protection rackets. Because bombing has destroyed so many build-
ings in Belfast, the British government has poured money into 
reconstruction. The IRA and their unionist foes control hiring on 
building sites, often working in concert. 
From the beginning of the civil rights movement through the 
early years of British army occupation, there was considerable sym-
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pathy and support in the Republic for Catholics in the North. The 
Fianna Fail government protested their treatment to Britain, tried 
without success to get the United Nations to mediate the situation, 
and established camps for refugees fleeing anti-Catholic rage in the 
six counties. Irish spokesmen told the British that they could not idly 
stand by if Stormont and loyalist mobs continued to mistreat nation-
alists. The Fianna Fail government also tolerated personnel from the 
Irish army training Northern Ireland Catholics in weaponry. Impor-
tant members of the party encouraged Provisional IRA terrorism; 
some were indicted for arms smuggling into the north. 
In 1970, two Fianna Fail Cabinet ministers, Neil Blaney and 
Charles Haughey, were allegedly involved in a scheme to provide 
guns and ammunition to the IRA. Before they faced conspiracy 
charges in court, Jack Lynch, the taoiseach, dismissed them from the 
government for promoting a six-county policy in conflict with Fianna 
Fail's. Haughey and Blaney were acquitted, but the arms smuggling 
scandal forced Lynch to realize the contagion of Northern Ireland 
violence. In 1972, after loyalist bombs exploded in Dublin, he rushed 
emergency anti-terrorist legislation through the Dail, similar to that 
existing in the six counties. 
More serious loyalist bombings in 1974 in Dublin and Mona-
ghan, November 1975 explosions in various parts of Dublin, includ-
ing the airport, the 1976 IRA assassination of the popular British 
ambassador to Ireland, Christopher Ewart-Biggs, the 1979 bomb that 
killed Lord Mountbatten and four of his boating party off the Sligo 
coast, and IRA bank robberies and kidnappings for ransom intensi-
fied apprehensions that northern madness had crossed the border. 
After the Ewart-Biggs murder, the Dail and Senate passed resolu-
tions declaring a state of emergency. Liam Cosgrave's Fine Gael-La-
bour Coalition government passed an Emergency Powers Bill 
increasing the authority of the state to apprehend and intern sus-
pected terrorists. Since 1972 the Republic has incarcerated many of 
the IRA. 
One of Ireland's leading intellectuals, Conor Cruise O'Brien, 
a Labour party TO (member of the Dail) and a minister in the 
Coalition government, responded in his 1972 States of Ireland to the 
traditional nationalist position that Northern Ireland was an artificial 
state that the British created and preserved by their presence. He 
said that there were two nations in Ireland, and that Northern Ireland 
truly represented Ulster-Protestant culture and determination to 
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remain British. While not prepared to go as far as O'Brien, other Irish 
politicians have realized that aggressive Gaelic nationalism and the 
Catholic confessional state prevent the possibility of a pluralistic 
united Ireland. They have also understood that the Republic's mea-
ger social benefits would not entice northern Protestants away from 
the generosity of the British welfare state. 
In an effort to demonstrate the Republic's good intentions to 
Ulster unionists, a 1972 referendum removed Article 44 from the 
constitution, canceling the special status of the Catholic Church. The 
government also raised most welfare benefits up to the British level 
and removed Irish as a requirement for civil service employment. In 
1973 the Irish Supreme Court ruled that existing prohibitions on 
contraceptives violated the constitution, forcing the Dail to legalize 
birth-control devices. In 1983, however, by an almost two-to-one 
majority, an Irish referendum added an anti-abortion amendment to 
the constitution. There is not a strong abortion movement in Ireland, 
but the taoiseach, Garret Fitzgerald, opposed the amendment be-
cause it would preserve the international view that Ireland was a 
narrow-minded, Catholic confessional state, impeding progress to-
ward a pluralistic, united Ireland. But Catholic pressures on both the 
Fianna Fail and Fine Gael parties overcame Fitzgerald's opposition 
to a strongly-worded referendum amendment. Three years later, for 
social as well as religious reasons, a majority of voters in another 
referendum refused to lift the ban on divorce. 
Easing some of the burdens of Gaelic chauvinism and Catholic 
clericalism extended the freedom of Irish citizens, but failed to 
impress loyalists in the north. They suspected that these reforms 
were hypocritical, and that popery still reigned south of the border. 
Protestants and Presbyterians continued to insist on their cultural 
uniqueness and their intention to remain British. 
Money and guns for the IRA have come from the diaspora, 
especially the American branch. Before the Northern Ireland trou-
bles began, upwardly mobile, well-educated, middle-class Irish-
American suburbanites had shed much of their interest in or 
knowledge of Ireland. Like their fellow countrymen, they consid-
ered Britain, America's ally in two world wars and the cold war, a 
friendly nation. But when they turned on their television sets in the 
summer of 1969 and watched loyalist mobs, with the connivance of 
the RUC, brutalizing civil rights marchers in Northern Ireland, their 
genetic memories came into play. Many accepted the IRA as freedom 
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fighters and generously gave money to its front organizations, most 
notably the Northern Ireland Aid Committee. NORAID claimed 
that it collected funds in the United States to distribute to families 
of interned nationalists in the six counties. But the Irish, British, and 
American governments have said that NORAID finances the IRA. 
Eventually, barbarous IRA tactics disgusted and alienated 
law-and-order, middle-class Irish-Americans who share the antipathy 
to terrorism of the majority of people in the United States. They 
continue to endorse the Northern Ireland Catholic demand for civil 
rights, and they sympathize with the idea of a united Ireland, but 
they believe that these goals are best accomplished through negotia-
tions, not violence. Encouraged by the Irish ambassador to the 
United States, Sean Donlon, such leading Irish-American politicians 
as former Speaker of the House of Representatives Thomas P. "Tip" 
O'Neill, Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Edward Kennedy, 
and former New York Governor Hugh Carey asked Irish-Americans 
to encourage the political process in Northern Ireland rather than 
funding terrorism. A Friends of Ireland group in Congress, repre-
senting both parties, has continually worked for a negotiated settle-
ment to sectarian and political tensions in the six counties. 
A diminishing minority of Irish-Americans has continued to 
supply dollars to NORAID and other IRA support groups. For the 
most part, they represent immigrants of the 1950s, and sometimes 
their families, who left Ireland bitter because de Valera and other 
politicians could not provide them with jobs or a decent standard of 
living. When they arrived in the United States, they found it difficult 
to assimilate into middle-class, suburban Irish America. Their sup-
port for the IRA indicates not only anger with the hereditary enemy, 
Britain, and with an Ireland that let them down, but also a sense of 
alienation and a search for identity in the United States. 
For a brief time, IRA and INLA hunger strikes in Belfast's 
Long Kesh (Maze) prison rekindled widespread Irish-American sup-
port for nationalist militancy in Northern Ireland. Early in the 1970s 
British authorities gave a special status to interned nationalists and 
unionists, permitting them to wear civilian clothes and to mingle with 
their comrades. From 1976 to 1979, on the orders of the government, 
prison officials phased out special treatment, touching off a series of 
protest tactics culminating in the 1981 hunger strike that resulted in 
the death of Bobby Sands and eight other IRA and INLA republicans 
in Long Kesh. 
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Northern Ireland's Protestants and Britain's Catholics and 
Protestants condemned hunger strikes as suicide, and the Irish-
Catholic hierarchy and clergy pleaded with the strikers to halt their 
death journeys. Sinn Fein propagandists rejected the suicide charge. 
Using both Catholic and republican blood sacrifice symbolism, they 
argued that it was noble to give up one's life for a just cause, and that 
Sands and his colleagues were engaged in a redemptive process to 
free their people and create one Ireland. The influence of Father 
Denis Faul, a close friend of the internees, helped create parental 
pressure that ended the hunger strike. 
At first the hunger strike brought significant dividends to the 
IRA. Each loss of life resulted in riots. Death watches and patriot 
funerals focused television cameras on Northern Ireland. American 
monetary contributions increased. In the midst of his ordeal, voters 
in Fermanagh and Tyrone elected Sands to the British Parliament. 
And Sinn Fein candidates drew considerable votes for another pro-
posed Northern Ireland assembly and for local government offices. 
As time passed, however, people outside Northern Ireland lost 
interest in the macabre events taking place in the Maze. American 
reactions became increasingly negative, dwindling the NORAID 
treasury. Like other Americans, the Irish in the United States are not 
great admirers of lost causes and martyrdom. They believe that it is 
more important to live than to die for one's country; blood sacrifice 
symbolizes an "un-American" loser mentality. 
In 1980 and early 1981 there was a marked improvement in 
Anglo-Irish relations. Charles Haughey, the Irish taoiseach, had 
friendly discussions with Margaret Thatcher, the British prime min-
ister. And his successor, Garret Fitzgerald, leader of a Fine Gael-La-
bour Coalition, had a summit conference with Thatcher. They 
agreed that representatives of their two countries would frequently 
meet to discuss common problems. The Anglo-Irish atmosphere 
darkened during the hunger strike when Irish Catholics in Northern 
Ireland, Ireland, and the United States directed considerable 
venom toward Thatcher for her inflexibility in regard to Maze 
prisoner demands. Relations between Britain and Ireland continued 
to deteriorate in 1982, when much of Irish public opinion was 
sympathetic to Argentina in the war over the Falklands, and when 
the taoiseach, Charles Haughey, back in power, gave only reluctant 
support to the EEC's economic sanctions against the Buenos Aires 
government. 
170 The Irish Question 
A major breakthrough in the Northern Ireland situation oc-
curred in May 1983 when, on the suggestion of John Hume, leader 
of the SDLP, Fitzgerald, once more taoiseach, organized the New 
Ireland Forum to arrive at a formula for solving the six-county 
dilemma. After hearing evidence from a variety of sources (Sinn Fein 
was not invited), the Forum suggested three possibilities: a federal 
Ireland with considerable autonomy for each province; a single state 
guaranteeing minority rights; or dual Irish and British administration 
of Northern Ireland. Thatcher's immediate response to the Forum 
report was "No, No, No!" but continuing negotiations led in 1985 to 
the Hillsborough Conference in County Down, close to Belfast. 
At Hillsborough, Fitzgerald and Thatcher established an In-
tergovernmental Conference through which Irish and British repre-
sentatives could discuss matters of mutual interest and concern 
regarding Northern Ireland. The Hillsborough Accord also gave the 
Irish Republic an advisory role in the administration of the six 
counties. During discussions, the British said that they would be 
willing to relinquish their authority in Northern Ireland and recog-
nize a united Ireland when a majority of the six-county population 
consented to such an arrangement. Fitgerald also agreed that the 
unification of Ireland depended on the wishes of the Northern 
Ireland majority. President Jimmy Carter and his successor, Ronald 
Reagan, both promised American financial aid if there was progress 
toward peace in Northern Ireland. Seven months after Hillsborough, 
the United States Congress passed a $50 billion aid bill for Northern 
Ireland. It was intended as the beginning of a long-range effort to 
revitalize the areas's beleaguered economy. 
Both the British Parliament and the Dail ratified the Hillsbor-
ough Accord. Although it did little to reduce six-county poverty and 
unemployment, most Northern Ireland Catholics considered it a 
major step in the right direction. Nationalist and unionist extremists 
rejected the Fitzgerald-Thatcher agreement. Ian Paisley and his 
cohorts vehemently insisted that Britain had sold out to Irish nation-
alism, compromising the integrity of Northern Ireland. Provisional 
Sinn Fein and the IRA argued that instead ofleading to an undivided 
Ireland, Hillsborough perpetuated partition. 
Despite Hillsborough, violence still troubled Northern Ire-
land. The IRA continued its war against the British army, other 
security forces, and loyalist enemies, as well as its bombing strategy 
at home and in Britain. In their opposition to the Anglo-Irish Accord, 
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unionist terrorist groups found themselves in conflict with the army 
and the constabulary as well as the IRA. The Ulster Freedom 
Fighters, the sociopathic loyalist equivalent to the INLA, from 1992 
to 1994 killed more people than the IRA, murdering Catholics solely 
on the basis of their religion. There were also frequent tensions 
between Ireland and Britain. The latter protested Dublin's reluc-
tance to extradite IRA members who fled south of the border to 
escape arrest; the former accused Westminster of insensitivity to Irish 
feeling. To buttress this charge, the Irish government pointed to 
Britain's decision not to punish members of the RUC responsible for 
killing six unarmed Catholics in 1982, the slaughter of weaponless 
IRA members in Gibraltar by the British army in 1988, the slowness 
in reexamining the evidence that jailed six innocent Catholics for the 
1974 Birmingham pub bombings (they were eventually released), 
and the revelation in 1989 that members of the RUC turned over the 
identities of suspected IRA members to Protestant terrorists. 
Although hatred and misery have continued to cloud life in 
Northern Ireland, the the condition of Catholics has certainly im-
proved. Starting in 1969, British pressure and pragmatic necessity 
persuaded the Stormont government to curtail most aspects of Prot-
estant Ascendancy. Change continued under Westminster supervi-
sion. Equity exists in public housing and the dispensation of social 
services, and the substitution of one-person-one-vote for dual and 
household franchises and the end of gerrymandering have trans-
ferred control of local government to Catholics in Derry and other 
places where they are a majority. British cultural and educational 
policies in Northern Ireland support Catholics in their Gaelic heri-
tage interests, encourage Protestants, Nonconformists, and Catholics 
to comprehend and appreciate each other's traditions, and prod 
schools to teach Irish as well as British history. The presence of 
Catholic majorities in the student bodies at Queen's and the New 
University of Ulster is an indication of an increasingly important 
Catholic middle class with a stake in Northern Ireland. The works 
of poets such as Seamus Heaney and John Montague and playwright 
Brian Friel from the Northern Ireland Catholic community are evi-
dence that Irish nationalism continues to inspire and foster the 
self-consciousness of literary genius. 
While the overwhelming majority of educated Protestants 
remain unionists, many have converted to belief in civil rights and 
social justice for all Northern Irelanders. Dismal employment pros-
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pects trouble Catholics and non-Catholics alike in the six counties. 
British rule, however, has opened civil service opportunities to the 
former and is attempting to ensure fair employment practices in the 
private sector. 
Since the founding of Northern Ireland, the Catholic propor-
tion of the population has increased from approximately 33 to more 
than 40 percent, strengthening its local government potential. It is 
conceivable that by the middle of the twenty-first century, if not 
before, Catholics could outnumber Protestants and Nonconformists 
and vote the six counties into a united Ireland. But it appears that a 
large block of Catholics are not especially enthusiastic about such an 
outcome. For them, equal citizenship in the United Kingdom, with 
all of its advantages, benefits, and opportunities, is a more pressing 
concern than an undivided Ireland. Britain still has the attraction of 
a generous if reduced welfare state and has provided more funds for 
Catholic education in the north than the Dublin government has in 
the south. 
John Hume, head of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, 
has been the most courageous, imaginative, pragmatically liberal, and 
intelligent leader involved in the search for a Northern Ireland 
solution. His goal is a united Ireland but he understands Protestant 
fears of incorporation into a majority Catholic state and their intense 
British identity, as well as the reservations some of his own people 
have about severing the United Kingdom connection. He has con-
sistently tried to make other Irish nationalists, north and south, aware 
of Ulster loyalist emotions, including Gerry Adams, Martin McGuin-
ness, and other Sinn Fein leaders. Hume is trying to educate his own 
people to realize that a united Ireland is a long process needing the 
consent of the non-Catholic majority in Northern Ireland. He also 
attempts to reassure British and Northern Ireland unionists that in 
the long-run one Ireland would serve the best interests of all con-
cerned. 
Hume's influence encouraged continuing negotiations be-
tween the British and Irish governments that led to another major 
Anglo-Irish agreement. Meeting in London on December 15, 1993, 
Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, head of a Fianna Fail-Labour Coalition 
government, and Prime Minister John Major, leader of Britain's 
Conservative party, issued a joint statement concerning Northern 
Ireland. Major rejected the idea of any British selfish or economic 
interest there. He said that the future of both parts oflreland was up 
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to the Irish people, north and south, and if they eventually decided 
to become one nation, Britain would help speed the process. The 
prime minister emphasized, however, that Britain would continue to 
support the principle that the Northern Ireland majority must decide 
its nationality, British or Irish. Major promised full British coopera-
tion with the Irish government in the effort to reconcile differences 
between Catholics and Protestants in the six counties while at the 
same time respecting their separate cultures. 
Reynolds agreed with Major that the final status of the six 
counties depended on majority consent in the province, and he 
pledged that the Republic would not try to force a united Ireland. 
The taoiseach acknowledged that there were elements in the Irish 
constitution offensive to Protestant unionists, and that his govern-
ment would carefully examine and do its best to remove them, 
particularly those relating to irredentist claims on the north. 
Reynolds said that Ireland in cooperation with Britain would try to 
end a long history of conflict in Ulster, always paying respect to 
Protestant unionist as well as Catholic nationalist traditions. The 
Irish and British leaders indicated their intention to negotiate with 
all constitutional parties in Northern Ireland, including Sinn Fein if 
it renounced violence. 
The Downing Street Declaration received enthusiastic re-
sponses in Britain and Ireland, but there was more dissension than 
unanimity in Northern Ireland. As expected, Paisley described the 
Major-Reynolds agreement as another British sellout to Irish nation-
alism and popery. Speaking for Sinn Fein, Gerry Adams asked for 
clarifications before he would agree to join with other parties in 
discussing and mapping out the future of the six counties. On August 
1, 1994, after a Sinn Fein convention in Letterkenny, County Don-
egal, Adams announced that his party favored the peace process, but 
not the Downing Street Declaration. He said that Sinn Fein could 
not accept the proposition that Northern Ireland loyalists could have 
a veto over the future of Ireland. Adams said a referendum on 
national unity should involve all of the thirty-two county population. 
Refusing to give up on the peace process, John Hume contin-
ued to talk with Adams in an effort to involve him in negotiations 
with all parties in Northern Ireland and with representatives of the 
Irish and British governments. It appears that the Sinn Fein leader, 
like de Valera in the 1920s and Sean McBride, Clan na Poblachta 
head in the 1940s, came to realize that the persuasive powers of 
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violence had reached a dead end. Funds from Irish America had 
dwindled to a trickle, and the IRA had been caught up in an inter-
national revulsion against terrorism. But it took some time for Adams 
to persuade republican hard-liners that it was time to give politics a 
chance. He did, however, succeed. On August 31, 1994, Adams 
announced an IRA ceasefire to begin at midnight. Irish Catholics 
throughout the world, along with other advocates of peace, cele-
brated what might be the end of twenty-five years of violence that 
has killed over thirty-one hundred and wounded over thirty thou-
sand. On September 2, President Bill Clinton promised the Irish 
foreign minister and deputy taoiseach, Dick Spring that the United 
States would guarantee a peace dividend by contributing more to 
Irish economic development. 
Despite the jubilation, the IRA ceasefire did not guarantee the 
end of six-county violence. Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, optimistic 
about prospects for resolving conflicts between nationalists and un-
ionists in the north, urged an early start to negotiations with Sinn 
Fein and other interested parties. Prime Minister Major, dependent 
on Ulster Unionist MPs to sustain an increasingly unpopular Conser-
vative government at Westminster, complained that the IRA had not 
explicitly promised a permanent cessation of violence. But it was 
clear. that if the IRA kept its promise for three months, Sinn Fein 
would be included in talks about the future of Northern Ireland. 
Loyalist extremists, Paisleyites and paramilitaries, interpreted 
the IRA ceasefire as the product of a conspiracy between nationalists 
and the Irish and British governments to maneuver Northern Ireland 
: into an eventual union with the Republic. Loyalist extremists con-
tinued to assassinate Catholics and planted a bomb on a Belfast to 
Dublin train that exploded without any casualties. Despite provoca-
tions, the IRA maintained its ceasefire, and Prime Minister Major 
continued to assure Northern Ireland Protestants and Presbyterians 
that they would not be coerced into a united Ireland and that they 
would decide their own future. Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, John 
Hume, and Gerry Adams, in Ireland, Northern Ireland, and during 
an American tour, kept urging Major to begin negotiations with Sinn 
Fein, but the British leader kept insisting that the IRA must give 
pledges of a permanent ceasefire. 
Finally, on October 13, loyalist paramilitaries announced a 
ceasefire, and ten days later Major said that negotiations on a North-
ern Ireland arrangement would soon begin. A temporary hitch in the 
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peace and solution process developed in late November when a split 
in the Fianna Fail-Labour Coalition government forced Reynolds to 
resign as taoiseach and Fianna Fail leader. He had made the mistake 
of appointing the attorney general, Harry Whelehan, president of the 
high court, without consulting Spring and other Labour leaders. As 
attorney general, Whelehan had not responded to a seven-month 
British request to extradite a Catholic priest, Brendan Smyth, who 
had fled south of the border after being accused of pedophilia in 
Northern Ireland. Finally, the cleric returned to Northern Ireland, 
gave himself up, was convicted, and is now in prison. Spring reacted 
to Whelehan's appointment to the high court by resigning as taniste 
(deputy prime minister), and Labour left the coalition. After nego-
tiations between Spring and other party leaders, on December 11 a 
new coalition government was agreed on. It involves Fine Gael, 
Labour, and the Democratic left (the former Official Sinn Fein 
Workers' party). Fine Gael's John Bruton is the taoiseach, and Spring 
resumes his position as taniste. Ideologically, the coalition is fragile 
and has only a five-seat majority in the Dail. 
In December 1994, representatives of the British government 
held exploratory conversations with Sinn Fein and unionist leaders. 
Negotiations between all parties involved in the Northern Ireland 
situation are expected to start in early 1995. But the joy and optimism 
that dialogue has replaced violence should not obscure the difficulty 
of arriving at a satisfatory conclusion. There are tremendous insecu-
rities in the loyalist community. Although Gerry Adams said in an 
October 30, 1994, Ulster Television interview that he was prepared 
to compromise on a united Ireland, when Sinn Fein enters negotia-
tions, it and the IRA will not have abandoned their ultimate objec-
tive, a single Irish nation, and a shorter-range goal, the withdrawal of 
British troops. The former will not be on the table and the latter 
probably will not happen until a political settlement guarantees 
peace and law and order. Britain cannot concede a united Ireland 
until it has the support of a Northern Ireland majority. At present, 
with few exceptions, non-Catholics in the six counties remain loyal 
to their British allegiance, and a portion of the Catholic minority is 
either indifferent or hostile to giving up United Kingdom citizenship 
benefits. And in the Irish Republic, with its own severe unemploy-
ment problems, there are reservations about assimilating the eco-
nomically and socially troubled north. Furthermore, there are many 
in the Republic who are reluctant to surrender the cultural and 
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religious homogeneity of their country. They worry about the disrup-
tions that could come from trying to cope with the discontent and 
potential violence of a large non-Catholic minority. 
Many experts doubt that, after centuries of cultural and physi-
cal conflict and unshared history and the bitterness and bloodshed 
of the past twenty-five years, Catholic nationalists and Protestant and 
Presbyterian unionists can reach a satisfactory accommodation. But 
if Sinn Fein can control the IRA and exhibit the patience to sit down 
and negotiate with moderate unionists, the SDLP, the Alliance party, 
and representatives of the Irish and British governments, and if 
fair-minded unionists can prevent temper tantrums from extremists 
in the loyalist camp during the talks and their aftermath, and if 
everyone at the bargaining table accepts the necessity of compro-
mise, positive things can happen. Perhaps all sides can agree on a 
form of power sharing in a restored Northern Ireland parliament. A 
political settlement could lead to a gradual withdrawal of British 
troops, a larger advisory role for the Irish Republic in Northern 
Ireland affairs and the removal of irredentist clauses from its consti-
tution, and an increase in foreign investment that could alleviate the 
economic aspect of sectarian tensions. 
If these changes take place, Northern Ireland politics could 
evolve from parties based upon sectarian interests to those repre-
senting differing opinions on social and economic issues. And per-
haps some time in the distant future, peaceful coexistence and a 
shared history will result in a pluralistic, united Ireland, providing 
the final answer to the Irish Question. 
Conclusion 
Contradicting George Santayana's admonishment that "Those 
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it," the Irish 
obsession with their past has seemed to guarantee repetition. Many 
Irish share James Joyce's view that history "is a nightmare from which 
I am trying to escape." G.M. Young, the distinguished historian of 
Victorian Britain observed that what England "could never remem-
ber, Ireland could never forget." Of course it is much easier for victors 
than losers to have a memory loss. But a number of recent historians 
insist that what the Irish remember is myth calculated to preserve 
and incite bitterness and hatred rather than objective history. They 
would agree with Jose Ortega y Gasset's comment that "We have 
need of history in its entirety, not to fall back into it, but to see if we 
can escape from it." 
Revisionist scholars argue that nationalism-substituting ide-
ology for reality-has influenced the interpretation of Irish history, 
especially on the popular level. They claim that historians, profes-
sionals and amateurs, have concentrated too much on the British 
presence, neglecting indigenous, pre-Union aspects such as land-
lord-tenant tensions, overpopulation, a primitive agrarian economy, 
and religious and cultural conflicts between Irish Catholics, Anglo-
Irish Protestants, and Ulster Presbyterians. Would an Irish Commons 
and Lords, dominated by the Anglo-Irish aristocracy and gentry, have 
been much more sensitive to the social and economic problems of 
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Irish-Catholic peasants than their Westminster counterparts? Per-
haps yes, probably no. 
All capable historians are revisionists in the sense of bringing 
new methods, research, and questions to the examination of old 
issues. But some historians of Ireland have accused many of their 
colleagues of overreacting to the revolutionary nationalism that ter-
rorizes Northern Ireland and threatens political stability in the Re-
public. They say that this has led to the replacement of old myths 
with new ones that underestimate British responsibility for Irish 
misfortunes, and denigrate heroes, traditions, and values essential to 
the psychological health of the Irish nation. 
Revisionists such as R.F. Foster are correct in their accusation 
that a number of historians have paid too much attention to British 
and not enough to local sources of Irish discontent, but in the period 
1801-1922 Ireland was part of the United Kingdom-its fate was in 
Westminster's hands. The contemporary Ulster crisis is the product 
of Britain partitioning Ireland, and its indifference to injustices in 
Northern Ireland that have been the source of considerable pain and 
suffering for a large Catholic minority. 
Of course the tensions between Ireland and Britain, and the 
antagonisms that divide religious groups in the former, commenced 
long before the 1920 Better Government of Ireland Act, which split 
the country in two. Britain engineered the 1800 Act of Union to 
insure her own security from a potential French invasion of an Ireland 
seething with Catholic, liberal Protestant, and Ulster Presbyterian 
unrest. British politicians worried that an Ireland dominated by a 
hostile Continental power would neutralize their country's most 
important defensive weapon, naval supremacy, exposing it to enemy 
attacks from both east and west. Although Britain insisted that the 
Union was a security necessity, it never fully integrated Ireland into 
the United Kingdom. Ireland retained separate administrations and 
institutions. More important, the 75 percent Catholic majority en-
tered the Union as second-class citizens, denied their basic civil 
rights. 
In addition to the religious issue, the disparity between Ire-
land, with one of the most underdeveloped agrarian economies in 
Europe, and Britain, the most industrially advanced country in the 
world, also complicated Anglo-Irish relations. With the exception of 
Sir Robert Peel's attempt to solve Ireland's religious, educational, and 
economic problems in the 1840s, and William Ewart Gladstone's 
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efforts to deal with the total spectrum of Irish discontent, including 
the national question, in the 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s, few British 
politicians wanted to address the Irish situation until the Unionist 
plan to "kill Home Rule with kindness" in the 1890s. British politi-
cians found it difficult to view Ireland from an Irish perspective. 
Those on the left, dogmatically insisting that what was good for 
Britain must also be right for Ireland, imposed an Irish policy in-
structed by laissez-faire precepts. Fearing that radical changes in 
Ireland would create precedents threatening privileged class inter-
ests in Britain, those on the right defended Protestant Ascendancy 
and the social, economic, and political status quo across the Irish Sea. 
The anti-Catholic core of British nativism generated much of 
the insensitivity exhibited by British governments to the Irish Ques-
tion. Encouraging and exploiting British, Anglo-Irish Protestant, and 
Ulster Presbyterian no-popery, Westminster politicians were antago-
nistic to a people they considered an alien and subversive threat to 
British cultural values and traditions. Affected by Social Darwinism 
in the late nineteenth century, British nativism's conviction that Irish 
Catholics were religiously and culturally inferior was expanded into 
the belief that they were also biologically defective. Religious and 
racial prejudices as well as economic doctrines explain half-hearted 
British responses to Ireland's great disaster, the Famine of the 1840s. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, Conservative politicians 
manipulated anti-Catholicism to oppose reformist Liberal policies in 
Ireland and obstruct the progress of Irish nationalism. During the 
1912-14 crisis over the third Home Rule bill, this strategy brought 
the United Kingdom to the brink of civil war. Not only did Conser-
vative exploitation of religious and ethnic bigotry do much to destroy 
the Liberal party and frustrate Home Rule, it undermined faith in 
constitutional nationalism in Ireland, opening the door to revolution-
ary republicanism, escalating the Irish plea for limited self-govern-
ment to a demand for complete separation from Britain. 
British anti-Catholicism energized as well as thwarted Irish 
nationalism. In his agitation for Catholic Emancipation, Daniel 
O'Connell expanded a religious into a national identity. Although his 
success in providing Catholics with political rights and opportunities 
frightened Anglo-Irish Protestants and Ulster Presbyterians with the 
prospect of a Catholic peasant democracy, O'Connell did not intend 
to substitute a Catholic for a Protestant Ascendancy. Influenced by 
the ideas of such liberal democrats as Thomas Paine, William God-
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win, and Jeremy Bentham, he injected their values into the blood-
stream oflrish nationalism. Moving beyond O'Connell's Enlighten-
ment political attitudes, Young Ireland romanticism defined and 
articulated an Irish cultural nationalism that insisted on the unique-
ness and brilliance of the Gaelic tradition. Maintaining that their 
country could never be truly sovereign unless liberated from the 
cultural tentacles of British industrial materialism, Young Irelanders 
insisted on de-Anglicization. They worked for the preservation of the 
Irish language where it survived and for its restoration where it had 
perished as the proper vernacular of the people, the true expression 
of their folk soul. 
Young lrelanders intended their cultural nationalism as an 
inclusive alternative to the sectarian and class loyalties that divided 
the Irish people. Instead, it proved to be as divisive, if not more so, 
than O'Connell's political nationalism. Anglo-Irish Protestants and 
Ulster Presbyterians associated the Gaelic with the Catholic tradi-
tion, reinforcing their loyalty to the Union and their identity as the 
British garrison in Ireland. 
In the late nineteenth century, Anglo-Saxon racism, growing 
cynicism toward political nationalism after the fall of Charles Stewart 
Parnell and the split in the Irish party, and blocked opportunities in 
the British civil service for middle-class Irish Catholics sparked a 
revival of cultural nationalism in athletic, linguistic, and literary 
forms. But conflicts between Gaelic Leaguers, who demanded the 
subordination of literature to the national purpose, and Literary 
Revivalists, who insisted on artistic independence and integrity, and 
the alliance between Irish and Catholic Ireland converted cultural 
nationalism from an inclusive to an exclusive movement. Revolu-
tionary republicans infiltrated and eventually captured Gaelic Irish-
Ireland movements, using them to destroy constitutional efforts to 
obtain Home Rule, and as an inspirational theme for the blood 
sacrifice of Easter Week 1916 and the 1919-22 guerrilla war of 
liberation. 
Anglo-Irish relations during the Union not only reveal the 
impact of British policy, politics, and nativism on Ireland, they also 
exhibit a significant Irish influence on Britain. O'Connell's Catholic 
Association and his agitation techniques provided models of organi-
zation and public opinion pressure for a variety of English reform 
movements. Parnell's Home Rule MPs were the first effectively 
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organized, disciplined, and financed party in the House of Commons, 
an exemplar for Liberals and Conservatives. 
Constitutional Irish nationalism offered more than a model for 
British imitation, it also inst-.tiled and sustained British governments. 
Irish, like Scottish and Welsh voters, tended to be more liberal than 
the English. Therefore, the Celtic fringe often put Liberals in power 
against the wishes of English opinion. Without O'Connell's Repeal-
ers, Melbourne's Whigs would not have been in office for much of 
the 1830s. Parnell decided whether Liberals or Conservatives would 
rule Britain before making an alliance with the former in 1885. From 
1910 to 1914 Herbert Asquith's Liberal government depended on 
the votes of John Redmond's Irish party. 
Not only did Irish nationalism at times determine which party 
ruled the United Kingdom, it also played a significant role in defining 
the content of British politics, making the Conservatives more con-
servative and the Liberals more liberal. Wellington's and Peel's 
concession of Catholic Emancipation split their party into Tory and 
Conservative factions. During the 1830s, right-wing Whigs left the 
party over the issue of applying funds from the Church of Ireland to 
general purposes, eventually finding their way to the Conservative 
side of the House of Commons. Peel's efforts in the 1840s to destroy 
Irish nationalism by satisfying the needs of its ally, Irish Catholicism, 
enraged Tories, who satisfied their appetite for revenge by destroying 
his Conservative administration. Peelites, most notably William 
Ewart Gladstone, took a route that finally led to the Liberal benches. 
In the 1880s, anti-Home Rule Whigs and Joseph Chamberlain's 
Radical imperialists abandoned Gladstone, dubbed themselves Lib-
eral Unionists, and finally joined with Conservatives under a Union-
ist party banner. Reactions to the Irish Question demarcated the 
boundaries between British liberalism and conservatism, distin-
guishing between the conflicting impulses for change and reform and 
for the preservation of the status quo. 
Ireland's impact on Britain went beyond the issue of party 
politics. When Westminster politicians finally addressed the social 
and economic dimensions of the Irish Question, they created, some-
times unintentionally, precedents applying to Britain as well. Parlia-
mentary legislation in regard to land tenure and purchase, public 
works projects, and economic development in Ireland did much to 
move British economic and social theory and practice away from an 
individualistic to a communal liberalism. 
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In general, pressures from Irish nationalism promoted the 
advance of liberal democracy throughout the United Kingdom. 
O'Connell's Catholic Emancipation agitation was the first successful 
political mass movement in the two islands. It was a major break-
through in civil rights, preceding and inspiring Jewish emancipation 
and the abolition of slavery in the British empire. As previously 
mentioned, O'Connell's Catholic Association was a model for British 
reform movements, and he and his Repeal party played an important 
part in the passage of the 1832 Reform Bill and other Whig reform 
legislation. Peel's Irish policy began the dissolution of Protestant 
Ascendancy in Ireland, completed when his protege, Gladstone, 
disestablished the Church of Ireland in 1869. Election intimidation 
by landlords, nationalists, and priests in Ireland induced Parliament 
in 1872 to pass the Ballot Act, which enabled voters to make a private 
decision on candidates for office. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century the absolute veto power of the House of Lords and the denial 
of women's suffrage were the last two obstacles to British political 
and social democracy. The Irish and Labour parties, holding the 
balance of power, forced the Liberal government in 1911 to put an 
end to the former obstruction. 
Irish-Catholic contributions to Britain extended beyond poli-
tics. Although many, but not all, voiced objections to the empire, they 
served in the armed and security forces that conquered and main-
tained it in numbers far above their proportion of the United King-
dom population. They were also a large majority of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary that preserved British rule and law and order in Ireland. 
A significant number of middle-class Catholics served Britain and 
the empire as civil servants. And the priests, nuns, and religious 
brothers who ministered to the Irish spiritual empire at home, in 
Britain, and the Irish diaspora, also were an advance guard and 
stabilizing force for British imperialism in Africa and Asia. 
Influences have traveled east and west across the Irish Sea. 
Despite the objections of cultural nationalists, Ireland has been 
Anglicized in a number of ways. English became the vernacular for 
a large majority of the population, as well as for Irish novelists, short 
story writers, poets, and playwrights, considered some of the fore-
most in the world. English popular entertainments, manners of dress, 
values, and (unfortunately) culinary tastes successfully invaded Ire-
land. Irish puritanism owes almost as much to the influence of British 
Victorian prudery as it does to the teachings of the Roman Catholic 
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Church. Although there are unique features to Irish politics, much 
of it is based on the British parliamentary model. The Irish and 
British legal and educational systems are basically the same. 
After the Anglo-Irish War and the creation of the Free State, 
the Irish continued to put their stamp on British affairs. As delegates 
to Commonwealth conferences, they were the most outspoken and 
effective champions of maximum dominion sovereignty. Desmond 
Fitzgerald and Kevin O'Higgins were largely responsible for passage 
of the 1931 Statute of Westminster, which defined the Common-
wealth as a union of equals bound by common allegiance to the 
British monarch. Later, the Commonwealth expanded its definition 
of membership to include republics, a principle of external associa-
tion that Eamon de Valera originally suggested to the British during 
the 1921 Treaty negotiations. 
Although Ireland remained neutral in World War II and the 
subsequent Cold War and left the Commonwealth to become a 
republic in 1949, the Irish have continued their contribution to 
British life. More citizens of Eire than Northern Ireland fought for 
Britain in World War II, and many others worked in British defense 
industries. Since 1920 far more Irish emigrants have settled in Britain 
than in the United States. Most are members of the working class, 
but a good number are professionals or important in the arts. Studies 
of the Irish in Britain indicate a rather rapid assimilation. Since 1973, 
Britain and Ireland have been partners in the Common Market and 
European community. 
Considering the centuries of conflict between British coloni-
alism and Irish nationalism, Anglo-Irish relations since 1922 have 
been surprisingly cordial. But the existence of Northern Ireland has 
promoted discord. 
. In 1920, during the Anglo-Irish War, Britain partitioned Ire-
land to appease Ulster Protestants and Nonconformists, mostly Pres-
byterian, who fanatically opposed incorporation in a predominantly 
Catholic state. To persuade Irish nationalists to sign a treaty estab-
lishing the Free State, David Lloyd George, the British prime min-
ister, promised them a Boundary Commission to settle the border 
between north and south, suggesting that a large Catholic portion of 
the former would be transferred to the latter, leading to the collapse 
of an economically unviable Northern Ireland and its merger with 
the rest of the country. This did not happen, and the six-county 
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statelet continued its existence, much to the consternation of nation-
alists in both Irelands. 
Northern Ireland's two-thirds Protestant majority deprived its 
one-third Catholic minority of basic civil rights, economic opportu-
nities, and social services, and terrorized them with the B-Special 
emergency security force and the Special Powers Act. Northern 
Ireland had a home rule parliament, but remained part of the United 
Kingdom under British sovereignty. Westminster politicians, how-
ever, were not only indifferent to the political, social, and economic 
inequities and injustices that six-county Catholics suffered, they 
assured the survival of Northern Ireland through generous subsidies 
for social and educational services. 
Leaders in the Free State and Republic focused on partition 
as a key issue in Anglo-Irish relations and domestic politics. But they 
failed to understand the inconsistency in their demand for a united 
Ireland and the Gaelic and Catholic state that they insisted on for 
their own people. Protestants and Nonconformists were guilty of 
creating an oppressive and discriminatory Northern Ireland, British 
politicians were responsible for permitting the violation of civil rights 
and the denial of social justice in the Irish portion of the United 
Kingdom, and politicians in the Free State, Eire, and the Republic, 
rejecting the earlier ideal of an inclusive Irish nationalism, reinforced. 
the psychological, sectarian, and cultural boundary between north 
and south. 
Inspired by the African-American civil rights movement, 
Northern Ireland Catholic responses to their minority position 
shifted in the 1960s from physical and mental ghettoization or physi-
cal-force resistance to an agitation to achieve equal citizenship and 
opportunities in the United Kingdom. But Northern Ireland unionist 
opposition to Catholic equality quickly escalated to sectarian vio-
lence and the intervention of British troops, who came to save 
Catholics from Protestant and Presbyterian anger and hatred, but 
remained to support the security policies of the Northern Ireland 
government. The result was a war between the revived Irish Repub-
lican Army and the British army and other security forces, and 
between the IRA and numerous loyalist paramilitaries. 
Over the twenty-five years of the latest Northern Ireland 
crisis, relations between Britain and Ireland have evolved from an-
tagonism and suspicion to cooperation and finally to a common 
policy. In the late 1960s and early 1970s nationalists in the Republic 
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were furious at Northern Ireland Protestant resistance to Catholic 
civil rights, the internment and sometimes torture of suspected IRA 
members and collaborators, and with British army atrocities, particu-
larly the January 1972 Bloody Sunday slaughter of thirteen Catholic 
protest marchers in Derry. But when the violence of the north 
threatened to spread south, politicians and people in the Republic 
began to reassess their original reactions to the six-county situation. 
They condemned and outlawed IRA terrorism and attempted to 
make Ireland more culturally inclusive. 
Meanwhile, British politicians finally began to take responsi-
bility for Northern Ireland. They abolished the Stormont Parliament 
and ruled the six counties from Westminster. They then attempted 
to establish a power-sharing Northern Ireland Assembly that loyalist 
extremists managed to sabotage, forcing Britain to resume direct rule. 
Under British administration, most of the injustices that oppressed 
and enraged the Catholic minority have been eliminated. In fact, a 
significant portion of the expanding Catholic population has reser-
vations about giving up the benefits of the United Kingdom for the 
questionable advantages of a united Ireland. 
With Ireland taking a realistic look at the north and Britain 
finally accepting accountability for a province it created and subsi-
dized, representatives of the two governments found it possible to 
find common ground. In a series of conferences that began in De-
cember 1973 at Sunningdale in England, British and Irish heads of 
government have agreed that a united Ireland is desirable if a major-
ity of Northern Icelanders consents to such an arrangement. At the 
Hillsborough meeting in 1986, Britain conceded Ireland an advisory 
role in the administration of the six counties. In December 1993, 
Britain's prime minister, John Major, and Ireland's taoiseach, Albert 
Reynolds, repeated that the fate of Northern Ireland, Irish or British, 
rested on the decision of a majority of its people. Both leaders agreed 
to work for reconcilation between Catholic and Protestant commu-
nities in the north, and to negotiate with all parties in the province 
(including the IRA if it would agree to cease military operations). On 
August 31, 1994, Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, the political 
wing of the IRA, announced a republican ceasefire. On October 13, 
loyalist paramilitaries also decided to stop fighting. 
When negotiations begin, a united Ireland will not be the 
result. But a power-sharing government is a possibility. Peace and 
stability could lead to a British military withdrawal, economic invest-
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ment, particularly from the the United States, and a reduction in the 
massive (almost 18 percent) unemployment that increases religious 
antagonisms in Northern Ireland. In time, politics there could focus 
on economic and social rather than sectarian issues. Someday, far 
down the road, a climate of cooperation in the north, the retreat of 
Catholic clericalism in the south, continuing good relations between 
Dublin and London, and an increasing European identity on both 
sides of the Irish Sea might lead to a united Ireland. Despite these 
possibilities and the optimism that existed in Ireland, Britain, and 
the United States following the announcement of the IRA ceasefire, 
experts who understand the complexities of the Northern Ireland 
situation know that maintaining peace will be difficult, and negoti-
ating a satisfactory settlement even more so. 
Historians such as Conor Cruise O'Brien, ES.L. Lyons, and 
John A. Murphy have pointed out that there is more than one cultural 
nation in Ireland. Anglo-Irish Protestants, Ulster Presbyterians, and 
Irish Catholics have separate historical experiences and perspectives. 
Heroes and victories to one side are villains and defeats to the other. 
Both sides have a siege mentality. Catholic defensiveness reflects the 
reality of oppression, while the Protestant version is based more on 
fear of what might be than on what actually did occur. In the United 
States, tensions between North and South existed long after the Civil 
War, but after the descendents of Confederate and Union soldiers 
fought together in the Spanish-American conflict, World Wars I and 
II, Korea, and Vietnam, an American patriotism superceded sectional 
loyalties. Irish unionists and nationalists have fought together in the 
British army but for Britain and the empire, not for Ireland. To Irish 
nationalists, Easter Week 1916 was a brave and noble event, a prelude 
to the liberating Anglo-Irish War; to Ulster unionists it was a stab in 
the back to Britain fighting a war against Germany on the Western 
Front. And in World War II, a loyalty-defining event, when Britain 
faced defeat and perhaps extermination, the Irish Republic remained 
neutral, as it did when the Western democracies confronted the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
While events in Northern Ireland have brought Britain and 
the Irish Republic closer together, violence has increased sectarian 
bitterness and hatred in the six counties. It will be difficult if not 
impossible for victims of nationalist or unionist terrorism or the 
brutality of security forces to forget what has happened. Many well-
educated middle-class Catholics, Protestants, and Nonconformists 
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seem to have developed a tolerance for one another's religion, tradi-
tions, and culture, but among the working class fanatic sectarian and 
political loyalties have increased. 
Vested interests also are at work to perpetuate a politically, 
religiously, and culturally divided Ireland. Many of nationalist and 
unionist paramilitaries have been playing their separate patriot 
games for a long time. In an economically depressed province with a 
long history of anger and distrust, revolutionary republicanism and 
British loyalism give meaning to meaningless lives. And there are 
paramilitary leaders on both sides who have an economic stake in 
civil conflict. They operate public houses, taxi services, and protec-
tion rackets and control jobs on business sites. Real peace and 
understanding would put them out of business. 
For many reasons Britain would like to wash her hands of 
Northern Ireland. The cost of maintaining security and subsidizing 
social services and education in the six counties is a tremendous 
burden on British taxpayers, many of whom really do not understand 
what Northern Ireland is all about. Their religiously indifferent, 
recently multicultural society has passed beyond the anti-Catholic 
nativism of the nineteenth century that continues to define the 
loyalism of Northern Ireland unionists. Much to their credit, British 
politicians understand their country's responsibility for sectarian 
bitterness in the six counties and its role in partitioning Ireland. 
Therefore, they have resisted public opinion pressures to desert their 
Irish obligation, and have tried, in concert with the Republic, to reach 
some workable settlement in the Ulster province. 
Although politicians in the Republic have rejected irreden-
tism and have acknowledged the reality of Ulster Protestant and 
Presbyterian resistance to a united Ireland, they still stubbornly 
pursue it as an objective of Irish nationalism. Their persistence may 
not accurately represent the views of their constituents. A modern-
izing, increasingly cosmopolitan and sophisticated Irish Republic 
expresses a growing indifference to Northern Ireland and its multi-
plicity of problems. A united Ireland would only enlarge an already 
massive unemployment problem in the south, necessitate incurring 
the expense of implementing standard British educational, social, 
and medical services, and introduce a stubborn unionist faction into 
the life and politics of the Republic. 
In All I Survey, G.K. Chesterton wrote: "The disadvantage of 
men not knowing the past is that they do not know the present. 
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History is a hill or high point of vantage from which alone men see 
the town in which they live or the age in which they are living." In 
Northern Ireland unionists and nationalists look at history from 
different heights and see segregated towns, and for many of them the 
past is indistinguishable from the present. 
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successful reading assignment in both undergraduate and graduate Irish 
history courses. L.M. Cullen, An Economic History of Ireland (Baltimore, 
1972), and Mary E. Daly, Social and Economic History of Ireland since 1800 
(Dublin, 1981), are the best surveys of important and, until rather recently, 
neglected aspects of Irish history. 
Although it is not the only significant dimension oflrish nationalism, 
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Catholicism is and was the most important ingredient in developing Irish 
national self-consciousness, and the Catholic Church remains the most 
prestigious institution in modern Ireland. Emmet Larkin is the pioneer and 
premier historian of the Irish Catholic Church. His brilliant essay, "The 
Devotional Revolution in Ireland, 1850-1875," American Historical Review 77 
(June 1972), 625-52, sparked a significant controversy in Irish historiography 
and inspired important research on nineteenth-century Irish Catholicism. 
This essay and three others from the AHR are combined in his The Historical 
Dimensions oflrish Catholicism (Washington, D.C., 1984 ). In his massive effort 
to present the total picture of nineteenth-century Irish Catholicism, Larkin 
has published The Making of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland, 1850-1860 
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980); The Consolidation of the Roman Catholic Church in 
Ireland, 1860-187 0 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1987); The Roman Catholic Church and 
the Home Rule Movement in Ireland, 1870-1874 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1990); The 
Roman Catholic Church and the Creation of the Modern Irish State, 1878-1886 
(Philadelphia, 1975); The Roman Catholic Church and the Plan of Campaign, 
1886-1888 (Cork, 1978); and The Roman Catholic Church and the Fall of Parnell, 
1888-1891 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979). Larkin also edited and translated Alexis 
de Tocqueville's Journey in Ireland,July-August, 1835 (Washington, D.C., 1990). 
In the "Devotional Revolution" essay, Larkin argues that pre-Fam-
ine Irish Catholicism featured an ignorant laity lax in religious practice; an 
inadequately educated, rebellious clergy; quarreling bishops; and a shortage 
of priests and chapels. He attributed reform to the elimination by the 
Famine of the surplus population, particularly agricultural laborers, reduc-
ing the chapel and priest shonages, and lessening the difficulty of priests in 
instructing the people on their religious faith and its obligations. But 
according to Larkin, it was the leadership of Paul Cardinal Cullen that 
Romanized the Church in Ireland and made the Irish the most devotionally 
religious Catholics in the Western world. Desmond Bowen, Paul Cardinal 
Cullen and the Making of Modern Irish Catholicism (Dublin, 1983) is a harsh 
judgment on Cullen as a main source of sectarian enmity in Ireland. Larkin's 
view of Cullen is more balanced. 
Larkin's depiction of the pre-Famine Catholic Church is supported 
inS.]. Connolly, Priests and People in Pre-Famine Ireland, 1780-1845 (New 
York, 1982). In another volume, Religion and Society in Nineteenth-Century 
Ireland (Dublin, 1985), Connolly credits the Famine for accelerating a 
Catholic reform that had already begun, and claims that the disaster was 
more important than Cullen's leadership. David W. Miller's "Irish Catholi-
cism and the Great Famine," Journal ofSocial History 9 (September 1975), 
81-98, is a perceptive analysis of the impact of the Famine on Irish Catholi-
cism. In "The Great Hunger and Irish Catholicism," Societas 8 (Spring 1978), 
137-56, Eugene Hynes argues that Irish-Catholic puritanism stemmed from 
the impact of the Famine more than from the Church's teachings on sex. 
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Determined to avoid another social disaster, the Irish married late if at all, 
with the Catholic moral code reinforcing economic necessity. Larkin's de-
scription of the condition of pre- and post-Famine Irish Catholicism is 
challenged in Patrick Corish's excellent overview, The Irish Catholic Experi-
ence: A Historical Survey (Wilmington, Del., 1985); James O'Shea's thorough 
local study, Priests, Politics and Society in Post-Famine Ireland: A Study of County 
Tipperary, 1850-1891 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1983); and K. Theodore 
Hoppen's thought-provoking, revisionist Elections, Politics, and Society in 
Ireland, 1832-1885 (Oxford, 1984). These studies indicate that pre-Famine 
Catholicism differed in various parts oflreland depending on economic and 
social conditions and the quantity and quality of priests. They and Larkin's 
introduction to The Historical Dimensions of Irish Catholicism have modified 
the interpretation of the Devotional Revolution into an evolution. But 
Larkin sticks to his guns in claiming important significance for the Famine 
and Cullen's leadership. For comprehensive, well-written, and intelligently 
interpreted examinations of the Irish Catholic church in the twentieth 
century and its relationships to politics and nationalism, see David W. Miller, 
Church, State, and Nation in Ireland, 1898-1921 (Pittsburgh, 1973); and John 
Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland (New York, 1971). 
Irish Protestantism is the topic for Donald Harmon Akenson, The 
Church of Ireland: Ecclesiastical Reform and Revolution, 1800-1885 (New Ha-
ven, Conn., 1971); and Desmond Bowen, The Protestant Crusade in Ireland, 
1800-1870: A Study of Protestant Catholic Relations between the Act of Union and 
Disestablishment (Montreal, 1978). As in his biography of Cullen, Bowen 
accuses the Cardinal of provoking religious antagonisms in Ireland while not 
placing sufficient blame on Protestant persecution for creating Catholic 
defensiveness. 
Despite the new historiographic interest in other subjects, Irish 
nationalism still attracts scholarly analysis and significant popular interest. 
The most readable and highly informative survey of the subject is Robert 
Kee, The Green Flag: The Turbulent History of the IrishNationaiMovement(New 
York, 1972). Excellent competition is D. George Boyce, Nationalism in 
Ireland (Baltimore, 1982).0wen Dudley Edwards has a long section on 
Ireland in his Celtic Nationalism (New York, 1 <t68). Tom Garvin, The Evolution 
of Irish Nationalist Politics (Dublin, 1981), is a first-rate, highly intelligent, 
and imaginative discussion and interpretation of various aspects of Irish 
nationalism from the eighteenth century to the present. In his Nationalist 
Revolutionaries in Ireland, 1858-1928 (Oxford, 1987), Garvin describes Irish 
nationalist leaders as mainly lower middle-class Catholics, many from Mun-
ster, who were anti-Protestant and anti-British. They were radical in tech-
nique but conservative in goals with little vision of the Ireland they were 
attempting to create. Thomas E. Hachey tells part of the story of Irish 
constitutional and physical force nationalism in Britain and Irish Separatism: 
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From the Fenians to the Free State, 1867-1922 (Skokie, Ill., 1977). In Thomas 
E. Hachey and Lawrence J. McCaffrey, eds., Perspectives on Irish Nationalism 
(Lexington, Ky., 1988), such scholars as the editors, R.V. Comerford, Mary 
Helen Thuente, Thomas Flanagan, James Donnelly, and Emmet Larkin 
discuss the language, folklore, literature, agrarian, and religious aspects of 
Irish nationalism. A most important contribution to a comprehension oflrish 
nationalism is Thomas N. Brown, "Nationalism and the Irish Peasant, 
1800-1848," Review of Politics 15 (October 1953), 403-45, republished in the 
American Committee for Irish Studies Reprint Series, Emmet Larkin and 
Lawrence J. McCaffrey, eds., and in Lawrence J. McCaffrey, ed., Irish 
American Nationalism and the American Contribution (New York, 1976). 
Because of the significance of Irish literature and its connections 
with Irish nationalism, cultural nationalism has been a major subject for 
scholarly investigation and interpretation. Thomas Flanagan's beautifully 
written and perceptive "Literature in English, 1801-1891" is one of the most 
valuable contributions to Ireland under the Union, I: 1801-1870, vo!. 5 of The 
New History of Ireland. Malcolm Brown, The Politics of Irish Literature from 
Thomas Davis to W. B. Yeats (Seattle, 1972), is a useful survey of Irish literary 
nationalism from Young Ireland through the Literary Revival. In The Harp 
Restrong: The United Irishmen and the Rise of Irish Literary Nationalism 
(Syracuse, 1994), Mary Helen Thuente makes the point that there was a 
cultural as well as a political dimension to the nationalism of the Society of 
United Irishmen and that the United Irishmen anticipated Young Ireland 
and other subsequent expressions of cultural nationalism. Her essays on 
Thomas Moore and Young Ireland are also quite well done. Thomas Flana-
gan, The Irish Novelists, 1800-1850 (New York, 1959), intelligently discusses 
the search for an Irish identity among such Irish writers as Maria Edgeworth, 
Lady Morgan, John Banim, Gerald Griffin, and William Carleton. Benjamin 
Kiely, Poor Scholar: A Study of the Works and Days of William Carleton, 1794-
1869 (London, 194 7), remains the best study of Carleton. Charles Kickham, 
the Fenian leader, was far from a great writer, but his novels about Ireland 
inspired nationalist sentiments in Ireland and among the diaspora. R.V. 
Comerford, Charles Kickham (1828-82): A Study in Irish Nationalism and 
Literature (Dublin, 1979), is a quality portrait of the man and his work. 
There are several valuable studies of the Literary Revival worth a 
readers attention: Richard Fallis, The Irish Renaissance (Syracuse, 1977); 
Ulick O'Connor, All the Olympians: A Biographical Portrait of the Irish Literary 
Renaissance (New York, 1987); and Herbert Howarth, The Irish Writers: Lit-
erature and Nationalism, 1880-1940 (New York, 1959). John Wilson Foster 
has made significant contributions to Irish literary studies. His Fictions of the 
Irish Literary Revival: A Challenging Art (Syracuse, 1987) gives credit to the 
much-neglected prose dimension of the Revival. Two other major Foster 
contributions are Forces and Themes in Ulster Fiction (Totowa, N.J., 197 4 ), and 
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Colonial Consequences (Dublin, 1991), a collection of essays. In the latter he 
pays attention to Irish modernism. G.}. Watson, Irish Identity and the Literary 
Revial: Synge, Yeats, Joyce and O'Casey (London, 1979), is another valuable 
volume. Richard]. Loftus, Nationalism in Modern Anglo-Irish Poetry (Madi-
son, 1964), connects the work of WB. Yeats, George W Russell (A.E.), 
Patrick Pearse, Thomas MacDonagh, Joseph Mary Plunkett, Padraic Col-
umn, James Stephens, F.R. Higgins, and Austin Clarke to nationalism. John 
Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the 
Creation of the Irish Nation State (London, 1987), is a brilliant attempt to use 
the Irish experience as a paradigm of modern cultural nationalism, and to 
integrate historical analysis and sociological definitions. Hutchinson com-
pares and contrasts the purposes of political and cultural nationalism, dis-
cusses the authors and propagandists of cultural nationalism, and explains 
the blocked mobility that converted a generation of bright young people 
into cultural nationalists. 
Although literature is the most recognized contribution of Ireland 
and has been closely associated with Irish nationalism, Irish intellectual 
history has been a neglected subject. O'Faolain's The Irish was a pioneer 
effort and, more recently, F.S.L. Lyons, Culture and Anarchy in Ireland, 
1890-1939, is an accomplished piece of work. The latter intelligently dis-
cusses the conflicts between Irish Catholics, Anglo-Irish Protestants, and 
Ulster Presbyterians that have resulted in a culturally divided Ireland. 
Terence Brown, Ireland.· A Social and Cultural History, 1922-79 (Ithaca, 1985), 
is intelligent, nicely written, and the only comprehensive analysis of Irish 
intellectual and social history since the Treaty. Daniel Corkery, The Hidden 
Ireland (Dublin, 1924, 1967) and Synge and Anglo-Irish Literature (Cork, 1935, 
1955), articulate a post-Treaty cultural nationalism that rested on Catholi-
cism, land, and the Gaelic tradition, and insisted that true Irish literature 
must be in the native language. In his "Proem" to The King of the Beggars 
(Dublin, 1938, 1980), Sean O'Faolain, a Corkery protege, brilliantly at-
tacked the basic premises of The Hidden Ireland. In "Daniel Corkery," Dublin 
Magazine 11 (April-June 1936): 49-61; The Irish; and in his autobiography, Vive 
Moi (London, 1963), he criticizes Corkery's exclusive view of Irish nation-
alism while emphasizing the many influences on Irish culture. Eire-Ireland 
8 (spring 1973), 35-51, published Lawrence}. McCaffrey, "Daniel Corkery 
and Irish Cultural Nationalism," and Emmet Larkin, "A Reconsideration: 
Daniel Corkery and His ideas of Cultural Nationalism," two essays on 
Daniel Corkery's literary accomplishments and the strengths and weak-
nessess of his Irish identity views. 
Stimulated by the crisis in Northern Ireland, Irish intellectuals have 
been attempting to define an Irish identity separate from sectarian consid-
erations. The Crane Bag was an important periodical that sought a multicul-
tural, inclusive Ireland as did the Field Day pamphlets. For an example of 
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the latter see Seamus Deane, Seamus Heaney, Richard Kearney, Declan 
Kiberd, and Tom Paulin, Ireland's Field Day (Notre Dame, 1986). 
In the nineteenth century, land as well as religion motivated the 
forces of Irish nationalism. John Pomfret, The Struggle for Land in Ireland 
(Princeton, 1930), was a pioneer study in the agrarian dimension of the Irish 
Question and still offers a useful analysis. James S. Donnelly Jr. has contrib-
uted two valuable volumes to the historiography of the land issue. His The 
Land and People of Nineteenth Century Cork (London, 1975) is a prize-winning 
classic. In it Donnelly states that Cork is a representative counry with which 
to analyze the Irish agrarian economy in all of its complexity. Donnelly's 
Landlord and Tenant in Nineteenth Century Ireland (Dublin, 1973) was de-
signed for the use of secondary school students, but it is effective on all levels 
and deserves republication. Another worthy study of landlord and tenant 
relations is W.E. Vaughn, Landlords and Tenants in Ireland, 1848-1904 (Dub-
lin, 1984). R.D. Crotry's highly regarded Irish Agricultural Production: Its 
Volume and Structure (Cork, 1966) concerns the economics of Irish farming. 
Barbara Lewis Solow, The Land Question and the Irish Economy, 1870-1903 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1971), is an important contribution to an understanding 
of the economic realiry as distinct from the propaganda of agrarian agitation. 
Her evidence makes clear that in terms of prices and tenant security the 
post-Famine agrarian situation improved economically and socially, and that 
land reform, including peasant proprietorship, did not increase production. 
The results of Solow's efforts suggest that land was more of a social and 
national than an economic issue. Paul Bew, Land and the National Question in 
Ireland, 1858-82 (Dublin, 1978), is a good analysis of the relationship be-
tween agrarian and nationalist agitations. Maureen Wall, "The White boys," 
and Joseph Lee, "The Ribbonmen," in T. Desmond Williams, ed., Secret 
Societies in Ireland (Dublin, 1973), discuss two of the leading agrarian 
protest movements of the pre-Famine period. Perhaps the best published 
material on secret agrarian societies and their intimidation tactics is con-
tained in the essays by David Dickson, Paul E.W. Roberts, and James S. 
Donnelly Jr. in Samuel Clark and James S. Donnelly Jr., eds., Irish Peasants 
and Political Unrest, 1780-1914 (Madison, 1983). This work also contains 
informative essays on a variety of topics dealing with the agrarian situation. 
Clark has also authored Social Origins of the Irish Land War (Princeton, 1979), 
one of the most significant examinations of that subject. In it, the author 
reveals how important the shopkeepers in the towns were to Land League 
leadership. Another important contribution to the history of agrarian agita-
tion and its contribution to Irish nationalism is Laurence M. Geary, The Plan 
of Campaign, 1886-1891 (Cork, 1987). Irish agrarian agitation and British 
responses are the subjects of E.D. Steele, Irish Land and British Politics: 
Tenant Right and Nationality, 1865-1870 (Cambridge, 1974); and Charles 
Townshend's fascinating Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resis-
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tance since 1848 (New York, 1983). Irish peasant life involved more than 
agitation, politics, and nationalism. Using the parish of Killashandra in 
County Cavan, Kevin O'Neill's Family and Farm in Pre-Famine Ireland 
(Madison, 1984) points to British economic policy as the main factor in the 
collapse of rural Irish social structures and eventually of the Famine. His 
book is the product of extensive research and thoughtful analysis. Daniel]. 
Casey and Robert E. Rhodes, eds., Views of the Irish Peasantry, 1800-1916 
(Hamden, Conn., 1977), contains a number of informative essays on the lives 
and problems of Irish rural folk. Conrad Arensberg was a trailblazer in 
anthropological studies of Irish peasants. His The Irish Countryman 
(Gloucester, 1937) remains a classic, as does his Family and Community in 
Ireland (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), co-authored with Solon T. Kimball. But 
the most important and artistic folklore approaches to Irish rural life are 
Henry Glassie, Irish Folk History (Philadelphia, 1982), and Passing the Time 
in Ballymenone: Culture and History of an Ulster Community (Philadelphia, 
1982). 
Emigration affected Ireland more than any other European country, 
and the diasporic Irish had considerable influence on the course of Irish 
nationalism and Anglo-Irish relations. David Fitzpatrick, Irish Emigration, 
1801-1921 (Dundalk, Ireland, 1984), focuses on the social and economic 
factors that encouraged or forced young people to leave Ireland. Fitzpa-
trick's essay, "Irish Emigration in the Later Nineteenth Century," Irish 
Historical Studies 22 (September, 1980), 126-43, has informative and useful 
information concerning the class and gender backgrounds of people emi-
grating to the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, where 
they settled, and what they did in their new homelands. In his prize-winning 
Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and the Exodus to North America (New York, 
1985) Kerby A. Miller discusses the reasons that persuaded Irish Catholics 
and Ulster Presbyterians to leave Ireland, and describes their American 
experiences. Leaning on emigrant letters, Miller argues that Irish Catholics 
were too culturally and psychologically disabled to cope with Protestant and 
urban America and as a result felt alienated and saw themselves as exiles. 
He interprets Irish-American nationalism as an expression of loneliness and 
discontent. Donald H. Akens on, The Irish Diaspora: A Primer(Toronto, 1994 ), 
offers evidence that relatively easy Irish social mobility in the United States 
and various parts of the British empire disproves Miller's thesis that Irish 
Catholics were culturally and psychologically unready for life outside of 
Ireland. The problem with Akenson's book is that he tries too hard to 
minimize differences between Irish Catholics, Anglo-Irish Protestants, and 
Ulster Presbyterians, arguing that geography is more important than culture 
and religion in determining national identity. He also stretches the compari-
sons between various branches of the diaspora, neglecting the considerable 
situational differences. The Canadian or Australian experiences of the Irish 
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reveal very little about problems and developments in the United States. 
Arnold Schrier's Ireland and the American Emigration, 1850-1900 (Minneapo-
lis, 1956) is another study making use of immigrant letters. 
In my "From a Land Across the Sea" in Textures of Irish America 
(Syracuse, 1992), I take issue with both Miller's thesis on alienation and 
Akenson's opinion that American Irish ethnic identity was not essentially 
Catholic and urban. Terry Coleman, Going to America (New York, 1971), and 
Philip Taylor's The Distant Magnet (New York, 1971) discuss the emigration 
process. Coleman features the departure from Liverpool, the harsh Atlantic 
crossing, and the sometimes painful American reception. Taylor reviews the 
entire scope of European emigration, the journey to and the entry into the 
United States. Robert E. Kennedy, The Irish: Emigration, Marriage, and 
Fertility (London, 1973), is a social science masterpiece. One of the unique 
aspects of Irish emigration is the large number of single women involved. 
In Ourselves Alone: Female Emigration from Ireland, 1825-1920 (Lexington, 
Ky., 1989), Janet Ann Nolan intelligently and interestingly argues that the 
Great Famine so altered Irish marriage patterns that women had more 
reasons to leave Ireland than men. Nolan's position finds support in an 
exceptionally well-written article, '"She Never Then After that Forgot 
Him': Irishwomen and Emigration to the United States in Irish Folklore," 
by Grace Neville, Mid-America 74 (October 1992), 271-90. Thomas N. 
Brown, the leading investigator of the subject, in his "Origins and Character 
of Irish-American Nationalism," Review of Politics 18 (July 1956), 327-58, 
reprinted in Irish Nationalism and the American Contribution (New York, 1976 ), 
indicates that Irish-American nationalism originated in "loneliness, poverty 
and prejudice." In his Irish-American Nationalism (Philadelphia, 1966), 
Brown, while describing the element of alienation involved in their support 
for freedom efforts in Ireland, provides strong evidence that by the late 
nineteenth century economically mobile Irish-Americans, deeply in love 
with the United States and searching for respectability, decided that an 
independent Ireland could provide it. 
In Fenians and Anglo-American Relations during Reconstruction (Ithaca, 
N.Y., 1969), Brian Jenkins relates how the United States government en-
couraged Fenianism to intimidate Britain into settling claims concerning 
the British-built Confederate blockade runner Alabama and recognizing the 
naturalization of former British citizens. Michael Funchion, Chicago's Irish 
Nationalists, 1881-1890 (New York, 1976), focuses on conflict in the Clan na 
Gael when Chicago's A.M. Sullivan was its dominant personality. Joseph 
Patrick O'Grady, Irish-Americans and Anglo-Irish Relations, 1880-1888 (New 
York, 1976); Francis M. Carroll, American Opinion and the Irish Question, 
1910-1923 (New York, 1978); Joseph Edward Cuddy, Irish America and 
National Isolationism, 1914-1920 (New York, 1976); Alan]. Ward, Ireland and 
Anglo-American Relations, 1880-1921 (London, 1969); Sean Cronin, Washing-
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ton~ Irish Policy, 1916-1989: Independence, Partition, Neutrality (Dublin, 1986 ); 
and Jack Holland, The American Connection: U. S. Guns, Money, and Influence 
in Northern Ireland (New York, 1987), all discuss the significance of Irish 
America on Irish nationalism and Anglo-Irish and Anglo-American relations. 
There are a number of general studies of Irish America that have valuable 
information: those that highlight its contributions to Irish nationalism in-
clude Donald Akenson, The United States and Ireland (Cambridge, Mass., 
1973); John B. Duff, The Irish inAmerica(Belmont, Cal., 1971); Dennis Clark, 
Hibernia America: The Irish and Regional Cultures (New York, 1986); Marjorie 
Fallows, Irish-Americans: Identity and Assimilation (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 
1977); Andrew M. Greeley, The Irish-Americans: The Rise to Money and Power 
(New York, 1981 ); William D. Griffin, A Portrait of the Irish in America (New 
York, 1981), and The Book of Irish-Americans (New York, 1990); Lawrence J. 
McCaffrey, The Irish Diaspora in America (Bloomington, Ind., 1976; Washing-
ton, D.C., 1984), and Textures of Irish America; William V. Shannon, The 
American Irish (New York, 1974); and Carl Wittke, The Irish in America (New 
York, 1970). Wittke is rich in detail, Shannon offers informative and percep-
tive essays on important Irish-American individuals, politics, literature, 
sports, entertainment, and religion. Greeley offers a sociological perspec-
tive, insisting that Irish America evolved into a prosperous, respectable, and 
progressive force in the United States. Fallows also blends historical and 
sociological approaches into an informative, lively analysis. Duff is a short 
study but useful in ethnic courses. Griffin's Portrait of the Irish is a pictorial 
look at Irish America. In my two books I emphasize the impact of the Irish 
experience on Irish America and conclude that they gave as much as they 
took from the United States; I agree with Greeley and others that Irish 
America deserves to be seen as a success story. With great skill, Clark 
compares and contrasts the Irish experience in various parts of the United 
States, describing regional impacts on the Irish personality. Patrick Bless-
ing's "The Irish" in the Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1980), Stephen Thernstrom, ed., is an exceptionally 
informative and intelligent analysis of its subject. David Noel Doyle and 
Owen Dudley Edwards, eds., America and Ireland (Westport, Conn., 1980), 
and P.J. Drudy, The Irish in America (New York, 1985), both contain some 
first-rate essays, but the Drudy book is more consistent in quality. 
Other branches of the diaspora have lacked the attention given to 
the American, but important work has been done. Patrick O'Farrell, The Irish 
in Australia (Notre Dame, Ind., 1989), deservedly is a highly regarded book; 
so is L.H. Lees, Exiles of Erin: Irish Migrants in Victorian London (Manchester, 
England, 1979). Other studies of the Irish in Britain worth consulting are 
John Archer Jackson, The Irish in Britain (Cleveland, 1963); Kevin O'Connor, 
The Irish in Britain (London, 1972); and John Hickey, Urban Catholics (Lon-
don, 1967). Robert O'Driscoll and Lorna Reynolds, The Irish in Canada, 2 
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vols. (Toronto, 1988), has a number of excellent articles. As previously 
mentioned, Donald H. Akenson's The Irish Diaspora: A Primer attempts with 
uneven success to compare and contrast the various branches of the diaspora. 
The 1798 rebellion was an important prelude to the Act of Union. 
Thomas Pakenham, The Year of Liberty: The Great Rebellion of 1798 (London, 
1966), offers a scholarly description of the rising. Thomas Flanagan, The Year 
of the French (New York, 1979), is a gem of a historical novel. It discusses the 
ideologies, interests, and issues involved in the events of 1798, provides 
excellent character studies of the various class, religious, and political 
components of Irish society, and describes the events in Mayo during the 
rising. Marianne Elliott has produced two masterful books on the Society of 
United Irishmen: Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France 
(New Haven, Conn., 1982), and Wo!fe Tone: Prophet of Irish Independence (New 
Haven, Conn., 1989). In the first book, Elliott not only discusses the 
ideology and personnel of the United Irishmen, she describes their French 
contacts and their role in international revolutionary activities. In her biog-
raphy of Tone, Elliott rescues him from nationalist iconolatry, showing how 
his anti-British republicanism slowly evolved from a reformist beginning. 
Elliott's Tone is not an original thinker but a first-rate propagandist. Though 
flawed in character, he deserves honor and respect, and his idea of a 
non-sectarian nationalism is still a noble objective. Tom Dunne, Theobald 
Wo!fe Tone: Colonial Outsider (Cork, 1982), questions Tone's nationalist and 
radical integrity. Dunne's Tone ends up as an Irish patriot after he is unable 
to find an important place within the British imperial system. In her 
gracefully written, thoroughly researched, and thoughtful The United Irish-
men: Popular Politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791-1798 (Oxford, 1994), Nancy 
Curtin portrays the United Irishmen as elitist reformers who educated the 
people on active citizenship and good government. Their Society evolved 
into a mass revolutionary movement. She also indicates that United Irish-
men were troubled by insubordination, sectarianism, and disagreements 
over objectives. Curtain blames timid leadership rather than faltering sup-
port for the failures of 1798. In A Deeper Silence: The Hidden Origins of the United 
Irishmen (London, 1994), A.T.Q. Stewart emphasizes the Ulster Presbyte-
rian contribution to the radicalism of the United Irishmen. He also points 
out that Freemasonry was a significant factor in the Society. Stewart claims 
that a radical inspiration for the United Irishmen was the republicanism of 
Oliver Cromwell. 
G.C. Bolton, The Passing of the Act of Union (Oxford, 1966), ably argues 
that nationalists have exaggerated the charge that corruption carried the Act 
of Union through the Irish Parliament. He points out that the use of 
patronage to win votes was an accepted practice in eighteenth-century 
Britain and Ireland. Bolton says that selfish and idealistic motives influ-
enced those for and against the British connection. For a study of the British 
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administration of Ireland in the early nineteenth century see Brian Jenkins, 
Era of Emancipation: The British Government of Ireland, 1812-1830 (Montreal, 
1988). Sir Robert Peel was the most important British administrator in 
Ireland during the immediate post-Union period. His career there is de-
scribed in Norman Gash, Mr. Secretary Peel (Cambridge, Mass., 1961). One 
of Peel's most influential decisions was the establishment of a police force 
in Ireland, an act discussed in Galen Broeker, Rural Disorder and Police 
Reform in Ireland, 1812-1836 (Toronto, 1970). 
Gear6id 6 Tuathaigh, Ireland before the Famine, 1798-1848 (The Gill 
History of Ireland 9; Dublin, 1972), is a perceptive survey of pre-Famine 
Ireland under the Union with a strong emphasis on the Gaelic tradition. 
Donal McCartney, The Dawning of Democracy: Ireland, 1800-1870 (Helicon 
History, of Ireland; Dublin, 1987), is also a valuable introduction to nine-
teenth-century Irish history. Kenneth Connell, The Population of Ireland, 
1750-1845 (London, 1950), is a clever, pioneer social analysis of pre-Famine 
Ireland, pointing to the potato as an important factor in overpopulation. 
Except for one essay, Connell's Irish Peasant Society (Oxford, 1968) is con-
cerned with post-Famine Ireland. Thomas W. Freeman, Pre-Famine Ireland: 
A Study in Historical Geography (Manchester, 1957); and E. Estyn Evans, Irish 
Heritage (Dundalk, Ireland, 1949), and The Personality of Ireland: Habitat, 
Heritage, and History (Cambridge, England, 1973), are interesting views of 
Irish rural culture, as is Kevin Danaher, In Ireland Long Ago (Dublin, 1976), 
and the previously mentioned Conrad Arensberg, The Irish Countrymen. 
Penal Laws that oppressed Catholics are the subject of Robert E. 
Burns, "The Irish Penal Code and Some of Its Historians," Review of Politics 
21 (January 1959), 276-99; and Maureen Wall, The Penal Laws, 1691-1760 
(Irish History Series, No. 1; Dundalk, Ireland, 1961). Burns interprets the 
Penal Laws as an effort to convert Catholics through punitive measures; Wall 
describes them as physical and psychological terrorism. She explains how 
their restrictions on landed propery purchase led to a relatively large Catho-
lic middle class in "The Rise of a Catholic Middle Class in Eighteenth 
Century Ireland," Irish Historical Studies 11 (September 1958), 91-115. 
One of the most significant contributions to recent Irish historiogra-
phy is Maurice R. O'Connell, ed., The Correspondence of Daniel O'Connell, 
8 vols. (New York, 1973-1980). This work made possible Oliver Mac-
Donagh's excellent two-volume biography, The Hereditary Bondsman: Daniel 
0 'Connell, 1775-1829 (New York, 1987), and The Emancipist: Daniel 0 'Connell, 
1830-1847 (New York, 1989). Although MacDonagh's is by far the best 
scholarly biography of O'Connell, Sean O'Faolain's King of the Beggars has an 
unmatched appeal. It is full of insights that only the creative and imaginative 
novelist can bring to the complicated and charismatic O'Connell. O'Con-
nell's resurrection in Irish historiography has been aided by two interesting 
books of essays: Kevin Nowlan and Maurice O'Connell, eds., Daniel O'Con-
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nell: Portrait of a Radical (Belfast, 1984 ); and Donal McCartney, ed., The World 
of Daniel O'Connell (Cork, 1980). James A. Reynolds, The Catholic Emancipa-
tion Crisis in Ireland, 1823-1829(New Haven, Conn., 1954), was an important 
analysis of the Catholic agitation crisis with rather harsh judgments on the 
personality of O'Connell. It has been superceded in value and information 
by Fergus O'Ferrall, Catholic Emancipation: Daniel O'Connell and the Birth of 
Irish Democracy, 1820-1830 (Dublin, 1985). According to O'Ferrall, O'Con-
nell, along with Andrew Jackson, created modern political democracy in 
action. Gash's Mr. Secretary Peel, and G.I.T. Machin, The Catholic Question in 
British Politics, 1820-1830 (London, 1964 ), present British political perspec-
tives on the Catholic Emancipation issue. British-instituted education in 
Ireland is the subject of D.H. Akenson, The Irish Education Experiment: The 
National System of Education in the Nineteenth Century (Toronto, 1970). 
O'Connell's nationalist activities in the 1830s and 1840s and his 
relations with the Whigs are the subjects of Angus Macintyre, The Liberator: 
Daniel O'Connell and the Irish Party, 1830-1847 (London, 1965). There are a 
number of informative and interesting studies concerning O'Connell's Re-
peal movement and British reactions; most important are Kevin Nowlan, 
The Politics of Repeal (Toronto, 1965), Lawrence J. McCaffrey, Daniel O'Con-
nell and the Repeal Year (Lexington, Ky., 1966); John E Broderick, S.J., The 
Holy See and the Irish Movement for Repeal of the Union with England, 1829-1847 
(Rome, 1951); Donal A. Kerr, Peel, Priest, and Politics(Oxford, 1982); George 
Kitson-Clark, Peel and the Conservative Party, 1822-1841 (Hamden, Conn., 
1964); and Norman Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel (London, 1953). British 
anti-Catholicism frustrated Peel's Irish policy, a subject carefully described 
and analyzed by Gilbert A. Cahill in "Irish Catholicism and English Tory-
ism," Review of Politics 19 (January 1957), 62-76, and "The Protestant 
Association and the Anti-Maynooth agitation of 1845," Catholic Historical 
Review 43 (October 1957), 273-308. E.R. Norman, ed., Anti-Catholicism in 
Victorian England (London, 1968), also treats British no-popery. 
Charles Gavan Duffy, Young Ireland: A Fragment of Irish History, 
1840-45 (London, 1896), is a readable but highly partisan examination. For 
a more objective approach seeR. Davis, The Young Ireland Movement(Dublin, 
1987). For discussions of events leading up to and during the 1848 rebellion 
see Denis Gwynn, O'Connell, Davis, and the Colleges Bill (Cork, 1948), and 
Young Ireland and 1848 (Cork, 1949); and Thomas P. O'Neill, "The Eco-
nomic and Political Ideas of James Fintan Lalor," Irish Ecclesiastical Record 
74 (November 1950), 398-409. Brendan O'Cathaoir, John Blake Dillon, Young 
Irelander (Dublin, 1990), rescues an important intellectual influence on 
Young Ireland and one of the leading figures in 1860s constitutional nation-
alism from undeserved neglect. Blanche M. Touhill, William Smith O'Brien 
and His Irish Revolutionary Companions in Penal Exile (Columbia, Mo., 1981 ), 
pays tribute to another important Young Irelander who merits attention. The 
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best analyses of Young Ireland's cultural nationalism are Malcolm Brown, 
The Politics of Irish Literature From Thomas Davis to W. B. Yeats, Part II; and 
Mary Helen Thuente, "Young Ireland Poetry," The Harp Unstrong: The 
United Irishmen and the Rise of Irish Literary Nationalism. 
R.D. Dudley Edwards and T. Desmond Williams, eds., The Great 
Famine: Studies in Irish History, 1845-1852 (Dublin, 1956), was the first 
significant scholarly investigation of the Famine containing essays on a 
number of subjects connected to this important event. Cecil Woodham-
Smith 's The Great Hunger, Ireland, 1845-49 (New York, 1962) leaned on the 
work of scholars to present an excellent, well-written, popular examination 
of the Famine. Woodham-Smith is quite harsh on the insensitivity and 
prejudice of British politicians in regard to their Irish subjects. Recently 
there have been a number of Famine studies. From an economic historian's 
perspective, Joel Mokyr, in Why Ireland Starved: A Quantitative and Analytic 
History of the Irish Economy, 1800-1850 (London, 1983), rejects the idea that 
the Famine was the result of too many people for available resources. He 
insists that a more productive agricultural and capital investment in industry 
could have saved Ireland. Mokyr also blames British attitudes and policies 
for starvation in Ireland. Mary E. Daly, The Famine in Ireland (Dundalk, 
Ireland, 1986), is revisionist in its calm analysis and explanation of British 
policy in Ireland. My own preferences in Famine studies are Cormac 6 
Grada, The Great Irish Famine (Atlanic Highlands, N.J., 1988); the eight 
chapters on "The Great Hunger, 1845-1851" by James S. Donnelly Jr. in 
Ireland under the Union, I (1801-1870), vo15 of The New History of Ireland and 
Christine Kinealy, This Great Calamity: The Irish Famine, 1845-52 (Dublin, 
1994 ). In less than two hundred clearly presented pages 6 Gnida synthesizes 
the best available research, including his own, on the subject and interprets 
it in an exciting and interesting manner. Donnelly also applies superb 
writing and synthesis skills to his discussion of the great disaster in Irish 
history. His effort deserves to be published separately to reach the wider 
reading audience it deserves. Both 6 Gnida and Donnelly absolve British 
officials of genocidal motives, but neither hesitates to blame them for 
causing considerable Irish misery. Kinealy effectively argues that British 
laissez-faire ideology and anti-Irish racism translated a serious but manage-
able food shortage into a massive calamity. Robert James Scally, The End of 
Hidden Ireland: Rebellion, Famine, and Emigration (Oxford, 1995) illuminates 
social and economic conditions in Famine Ireland by focusing on a commu-
nity in Roscommon. It is a thoroughly researched, perceptive, and excep-
tionally well-written condemnation of British policy in Ireland and 
responses to the Great Hunger. 
In The Modernization of Irish Society, 1848-1918 (The Gill History of 
Ireland 10; Dublin, 1973), Joseph Lee challenges the historical consensus 
on many issues. In a sprightly and provocative manner, Lee rejects the 
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notion that British legislation in regard to Ireland was an experiment in 
modernization, arguing that it perpetuated the status quo rather than 
change. Lee credits Parnell and the Irish party and Cullen's religious reforms 
with modernization tendencies. R.V. Comerford's four chapters on the 
1850-70 period in Ireland under the Union, I (1801-1870), is another stimulat-
ing interpretation of political, economic, social, and cultural trends and 
events. But Comerford does see modernization, Anglicization, and adjust-
ments to the United Kingdom in Irish life. He does not find evidence that 
a complete break with Britain was inevitable. 
John Whyte, The Independent Irish Party, 1850-59 (London, 1958), is 
a clear and comprehensive treatment of the 1850s tenant-right movement 
and the independent Irish party. It clears away the partisan distortions of 
Charles Gavan Duffy, The League of the North and South (London, 1886). 
There are a number of competent Fenian studies, including Maurice Har-
mon, ed., Fenians and Fenianism (Seattle, 1970); and T.W. Moody, ed., The 
Fenian Movement (Cork, 1968). But the best look at the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood is R.V. Comerford, The Fenians in Context: Irish Politics and 
Society (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1985). Comerford interprets the Fenians 
in Ireland as bright, lower middle-class young men, often journalists, 
blocked by the O'Connellite and Young Ireland establishments. Revolu-
tionary republicanism gave them an audience and status. Comerford also 
stresses the importance ofF enianism as a recreational and social outlet in a 
repressive rural environment. This aspect ofFenianism is adeptly explored 
in Brian Griffin, "Social Aspects of Fenianism in Connacht and Leinster, 
1858-1870," Eire-Ireland 12 (Spring 1986), 16-38. There are two historical 
novels that provide perceptive insights into nineteenth century Irish history. 
Thomas Flanagan, The Tenants of Time (New York, 1988), covers the period 
from the Fenians to the fall of Parnell. Sean O'Faolain, A Nest of Simple Folk 
(London, 1989), takes the reader from pre-Fenian times to Easter Week 
1916. Valuable information on the National Association can be found in E.R. 
Norman, The Catholic Church and Ireland in the Age of Rebellion, 1859-1873 
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1965). 
The beginnings of Home Rule and Issac Butt's leadership are the 
subjects of Lawrence J. McCaffrey, Irish Federalism in the 1870s: A Study in 
Conservative Nationalism (Philadelphia, 1962); and David Thornley, Isaac 
Butt and Home Rule (London, 1964). Terence De Vere White, The Road of 
Excess (Dublin, 1946), is a sympathetic and informative biography of Butt. 
The best analysis of the origin and contents of the New Departure is in 
Thomas N. Brown, Irish American Nationalism. Some of the above-men-
tioned books on the agrarian dimension of Irish nationalism refer to the 
Land League and its war on landlordism. T.W. Moody, Davitt and Irish 
Revolution, 1848-1882 (New York, 1982), is an outstanding biography of the 
founder of the Land League. Among a number of books on the life of 
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Parnell, I strongly recommend two: ES.L. Lyons, Charles Stewart Parnell 
(New York, 1977); and Robert Kee, The Laurel and the Ivy: The Story of Charles 
Stewart Parnell (New York, 1994 ). Lyons's The Fall of Parnell (Toronto, 1960) 
details the events that led to Committee Room 15 and the split in the Irish 
Party. Frank Callanan, The Parnell Split, 1890-91 (Syracuse, 1992), argues that 
the debate between Parnell and his enemies involved more than the strug-
gle over Irish party leadership and the role of the Catholic Church in the 
dispute. According to Callanan, Parnell offered the Irish an inclusive, secu-
lar, liberal, and democratic nationalism while Tim Healy and his allies 
presented an exclusive, Catholic, and conservative Home Rule Ireland. 
Conor Cruise O'Brien, Parnell and His Party, 1880-1890 (Oxford, 1960), is 
still the leading study of Parnell's leadership and the character of the Irish 
party in the 1880s. During the struggle for Home Rule, Irish nationalists 
began to take control over local government in Ireland. This process is the 
topic ofWilliam Feingold, Revolt of the Tenantry: The Transfer of Local Govern-
ment in Ireland (Boston, 1984). In The English Face of Irish Nationalism: 
Parnellite Involvement in British Politics, 1880-1886 (Dublin, 1977), Alan 
O'Day points out that many members of the Irish party had lived in Britain 
and accepted the values of British radicalism. In Parliament they became 
involved in British as well as Irish issues. ForyearsJ.L. Hammond, Gladstone 
and the Irish Nation (Hamden, Conn., 1962), was a standard and is still useful, 
but it has been challenged by James Loughlin, Gladstone, Home Rule, and the 
Ulster Question, 1892-93 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1987). Loughlin accuses 
Gladstone of considerable ignorance concerning Ireland. He claims that the 
Liberal leader believed Home Rule was a conservative solution to the Irish 
Question, one that would restore the reputations and leadership of land-
lords. Thomas William Heyck, The Dimensions of British Radicalism: The Case 
of Ireland, 1874-1895 (Urbana, Ill., 1974), tests the radical integrity of British 
radicals on the Irish Question and finds it wanting. 
L.P. Curtis Jr., Coercion and Conciliation in Ireland, 1880-189 2: A Study 
in Conservative Unionism (Princeton, N.J., 1963 ), focuses on the Conservative 
(Unionist) party's Irish policies. Under Arthur Balfour's guidance, the party 
blended coercion and concilation into an effort to impose law and order on 
Ireland while at the same time "killing Home Rule with kindness." In 
Ireland and the Death of Kindness: The Experience of Constrnctive Unionism, 
1890-1905 (Cork, 1987), Andrew Gailey says that there was much more to 
Unionist Irish policy than the destruction of Home Rule nationalism. He 
claims that Conservative leaders wanted to pacify Ireland so that they could 
concentrate on British and imperial affairs, appease Liberal Unionists in the 
coalition, and keep class-and sectarian-divided Ulster unionists in the party. 
For the best examination of the Irish phase of Arthur J. Balfour's career, see 
Catherine Shannon's thoroughly researched and clearly written Arthur J. 
Balfour and Ireland, 1874-1922 (Washington, D.C., 1988). Patrick Buckland, 
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Irish Unionism, i: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885-1922 (Dublin, 1972), 
and Irish Unionism, ii: Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland, 1886-
1922 (Dublin, 1973), combine to make a comprehensive examination of 
their subject. In Ulster Politics: The Formative Years, 1868-1886 (Belfast, 
1989), Brian M. Walker discusses the shift in Ulster politics from a conflict 
between Liberals and Conservatives to Unionists versus nationalists, setting 
the stage for the 1912-14 Home Rule crisis and the present conflict in 
Northern Ireland. Alvin Jackson, The Ulster Party: Irish Unionists in the House 
of Commons, 1884-1911 (Oxford, 1989), tells of the impact of Ulster unionism 
on British Conservatives and how after 1905 Protestants in the north begin 
to lose confidence in Parliament to preserve the United Kingdom. 
For a study of the Irish parliamentary party from the fall of Parnell 
to the eve of the 1912-14 Home Rule crisis see ES.L. Lyons, The Irish 
Parliamentary Party, 1890-1910 (London, 1951). Paul Bew, Conflict and 
Conciliation in Ireland, 1890-1910: Parnellites and Agrarian Radicals (Oxford, 
1987), demonstrates that the land question continued to be an important 
factor in Irish nationalism and Anglo-Irish relations after the land war of the 
late 1870s and early 1880s. 
In the late nineteenth century there was a revival of cultural nation-
alism that was both a supplement to and an alternative to Home Rule 
political nationalism. In my previous listing of books on cultural nationalism 
I mentioned a number of works pertinent to this subject. Janet Gareth 
Dunleavy and Gareth W. Dunleavy, Douglas Hyde: A Maker of Modern Ireland 
(Berkeley, Cal., 1991 ), is an important study of the co-founder of the Gaelic 
League. EX. Martin and EJ. Byrne, eds., The Scholar Revolutionary: Eoin 
MacNeil, 1867-1945 and the Making of the New Ireland (New York, 1973), 
discusses the life of the other founding father of the Gaelic League and the 
head of the Irish Volunteers. Racist Anglo-Saxon contempt for the Irish had 
much to do with the revival oflrish cultural nationalism. Anglo-Saxon racial 
attitudes are the subject of L.P. Curtis Jr., Anglo-Saxon and Celts: A Study in 
Anti-Irish Prejudice in Victorian England (Bridgeport, Conn., 1968), and Apes 
and Angels: The Irishman in Victorian Caricature (Washington, 1971); and 
Richard Ned Lebow, White Britain and Black Ireland: The Influence of Sterotypes 
on Colonial Policy (Philadelphia, 1976). R.E Foster's revisionist Paddy & Mr 
Punch: Connections in Irish and English History (New York, 1993) is a book of 
essays that rejects exclusive views of Irish identity, pointing out the contri-
butions of various traditions to Ireland, appealing for Irish multiculturalism, 
and arguing that Curtis exaggerates British anti-Irishness. 
Sinn Fein nationalism also questioned Home Rule. Richard Davis, 
Arthur Griffith and Non-violent Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1974), is a study of Sinn 
Fein's originator. The peasant orientation of Home Rule nationalism was 
challenged by labor militancy. Joseph V. O'Brien, Dear Dirty Dublin: A City 
in Distress, 1899-1916 (Berkeley, Cal., 1982), describes the social and eco-
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nomic conditions that created working-class unrest. Emmet Larkin, James 
Larkin, Irish Labour Leader, 1876-1947 (London, 1989), is not only an excel-
lent study of the founder of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union, 
it also provides interesting material on Irish urban social and economic 
problems. Dunsmore J. Clarkson, Labour and Nationalism in Ireland (New 
York, 1925), remains a classic study. Beresford P. Ellis, A History of the Irish 
Working Class (New York, 1973 ), and Arthur Mitchel, Labour in Irish Politics, 
1890-1930 (Shannon, 1974), are valuable contributions to the bibliography 
of the Irish working class. 
In the highly readable The Strange Death of Liberal England(New York, 
1961), George Dangerfield attributes the collapse of British Liberalism to 
three problems that it could not cope with: the radicalism of labor, the 
feminist movement, and the resistance of Ulster Unionists to Home Rule. 
Of the three, Dangerfield claims the last was most important. A.T.Q. 
Stewart, The Ulster Crisis (London, 1967), is sympathetic to the Ulster 
Unionist cause. The Curragh incident, which increased Liberal fears that 
the army could not be depended on in a conflict with Ulster unionists, is the 
subjectoflan W.E Beckett, TheArmyandtheCurraghlncident, 1914(London, 
1986); Sir James Ferguson, The Curragh Incident (London, 1964); and A.P. 
Ryan, Mutiny at the Curragh (New York, 1956). A new biography of John 
Redmond, a truly tragic figure in Irish history, is badly needed, but Denis 
Gwynn, The Life of John Redmond (London, 1932), is a more than competent 
portrait. In his perceptive Ideology and the Irish Question: Ulster Unionism and 
Irish Nationalism, 1912-1916 (Oxford, 1994), Paul Bew gives a favorable 
estimate of John Redmond's impact on Irish nationalism. Biographies of 
importance in understanding the 1912 Home Rule crisis are Roy Jenkins, 
Asquith (London, 1965); Joseph V. O'Brien, William O'Brien and the Course of 
Irish Politics, 1881-1918 (Berkeley, Cal., 1976); and Leon 6 Brain, The Chief 
Secretary: Augustine Birrell in Ireland (London, 1969). 
Two books of value that cover key issues in the early twentieth 
century are Cliona Murphy, The Woman s Suffrage Movement and Irish Society 
in the Early Twentieth Century (Philadelphia, 1989); and Thomas J. Morrisey, 
S.]., Toward a National University: William Delaney, S. J., 1835-1924 (Atlantic 
Highlands, N.J., 1985). Murphy criticizes some Irish party leaders for their 
hostility to the women's suffrage movement. The most comprehensive 
examination of the place of women in late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century Ireland is Joanna Bourke, Husbandry to Housewifery: Women, Eco-
nomic Change, and Housework in Ireland, 1890-1914 (Oxford, 1993 ). 
The most satisfying concise study of Easter Week 1916 is Alan J. 
Ward, The Easter Rising: Revolution and Irish Nationalism (Arlington Heights, 
Ill., 1980). Ward discusses the prelude to and aftermath of the rising as well 
as the event itself. William Irwin Thompson, The Imagination of an Insurrec-
tion: Dublin, Easter, 1916 (New York, 1967), treats the impact of the poetic 
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imagination on Irish revolutionary nationalism. Other worthwhile examina-
tions of Easter Week are Thomas Coffey, Agony at Easter (Baltimore, 1969); 
Roger McHugh, ed., Dublin, 1916 (London, 1966); and Kevin B. Nowlan, 
ed., The Making of 1916 (Dublin, 1969). Ruth Dudley Edwards Patrick Pearse: 
The Triumph ofF ailure (London, 1977), is an exceptionally good and impartial 
study of Easter Week's most prominent hero. Edwards also has contributed 
another biography of a 1916 martyr, James Connolly (Dublin, 1981). Another 
interpretation of the labor dimension of the rising is John Boyle, "Irish 
Labour and the Rising," Eire-Ireland2 (Autumn 1967), 122-31. 
For the political background of the Anglo-Irish War see Michael 
Laffan, "The Unification of Sinn Fein" Irish Historical Studies 27 ((March 
1971), 353-79; Brian Farrell, The Founding of Ddil Eireann: Parliament and 
Nation Building(Dublin, 1971); and David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life, 
1913-1921: Provincial Experience of War and Revolution (Dublin, 1977). 
Fitzpatrick traces the political triumph of Sinn Fein over the Irish party on 
the local level and how the former absorbed the organizational apparatus of 
the latter. The Anglo-Irish conflict and the following Civil War have been 
treated in a number of studies, including Edgar Holt, Protest in Arms: The 
Irish Troubles, 1916-1923 (London, 1960); Charles Townshend, Political 
Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance since 1848, and The British 
Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1922: The Development of Political and Military 
Policies (Oxford, 1975); and T.D. Williams, ed., The Irish Struggle, 1916-1926 
(London, 1966). The Townshend material is particularly good. Tom Garvin, 
The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics and Nationalist Revolutionaries in 
Ireland, 1858-1928, certainly help in an understanding of the dynamics of 
the Anglo-Irish and Civil Wars. D.G. Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles: 
British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy, 1918-1922 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1972), explains how Sinn Fein won the propaganda phase of the 
Anglo-Irish War, building British and world opinion against Lloyd George's 
government. Charles Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 1918-1940 
(Chicago, 1969), is one of the few British history texts that appreciates the 
full significance of the Irish Question. Two books that deal specifically with 
the Civil War are Eoin Neeson, The Civil War in Ireland (Cork, 1966); and 
Carlton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London, 1968). Tim Pat Coogan, 
Michael Collins (London, 1991 ), is an informative and flattering picture of the 
most dashing and romantic figure of the Anglo-Irish and Irish Civil War. 
Frank O'Connor, The Big Fellow: A Life of Michael Collins (London, 1961), is 
insightful and readable. R. Taylor, Michael Collins (London, 1958), is useful. 
Earl of Longford and T.P. O'Neill, Eamon de Valera (London, 1970), tells the 
reader a great deal about de Valera in a sympathetic way. Tim Pat Coogan, 
De Valera: Long Fellow, Long Shadow (London, 1973), is a highly unflattering 
look at the dominant personality in twentieth-century Irish life, seldom 
giving him the benefit of the doubt on any issue. J.P. O'Carroll and John A. 
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Murphy, eds., De Valera and His Times (Cork, 1983), contains a number of 
valuable and enlightening essays. In De Valera and the Ulster Question, 1917-
1973, (Oxford, 1982), John Bowman says that de Valera's concept of a Gaelic, 
Catholic Ireland worked against Irish unity, but that he was more flexible 
toward the north than most historians believe. De Valera was prepared to 
give considerable autonomy to the six counties in a united Ireland, and 
toward the end of his life he did begin to realize and appreciate the unique 
historical and cultural heritages of Anglo-Irish Protestants and Ulster Pres-
byterians. A most important biography dealing with the Anglo-Irish and 
Irish Civil Wars and the start of Irish independence is Maryann Gialanella 
Valiulis, Portrait of a Revolutionary: General Richard Mulcahy and the Founding 
of the Irish Free State (Lexington, Ky., 1992). Thomas Flanagan, The End of 
the Hunt (New York, 1994), presents the ideological and personality com-
plexities of the Anglo-Irish and Irish Civil Wars in an exceptionally fine 
historical novel. Joseph M. Curran, The Birth of the Irish Free State, 1921-1923 
(University, Alabama, 1980), is a well-written, thoroughly researched, and 
masterful discussion of the Anglo-Irish negotiations that resulted in the Free 
State and the resulting Irish Civil War. In The Greening of Dublin Castle: The 
Transformation of Bureaucratic and Judicial Personnel in Ireland, 1892-1922 
(Washington, D.C., 1991), Lawrence W. McBride describes and discusses 
the increasing number of Irish Catholic civil servants in the British admini-
stration of Ireland. They proved to be an important factor in the stability of 
post-revolutionary Ireland. 
John A Murphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century (Gill History of 
Ireland 11; Dublin, 1975); and Ronan Fanning, Independent Ireland (Helicon 
History of Ireland; Dublin, 1983 ), are informative, nicely written, relatively 
brief surveys oflreland in the twentieth century. J .J. Lee, Ireland, 1912-1985 
(New York, 1989), is a comprehensive look at Ireland from the beginning of 
the Home Rule crisis to recent times. Lee is quite critical of de Valera, 
blaming him and other politicians for freezing Ireland in the myths of rural 
romanticism and not facing up to economic realities, solving problems by 
emigration rather than change, and failing to understand the nuances of the 
Ulster problem. He credits Sean Lemass for bringing Ireland into the 
twentieth century. Lemass's impact is the subject of Paul Bew and Henry 
Patterson, Sean Lemass and the Making of Modern Ireland, 1945-1966 (Dublin, 
1982). Ronan Fanning, The Irish Department of Finance, 1922-1958 (Dublin, 
1978), is an exceptionally good example of administrative history and reveals 
much about the problems of the Free State before Lemass's period of power. 
Terence Brown, Ireland: A Social and Cultural History, 1922-79, and ES.L. 
Lyons, Culture and Anarchy in Ireland, 1890-1939, cover Irish intellectual life 
in the twentieth century. In The Restless Dominion: The Irish Free State and the 
British Commonwealth of Nations, 1921-1931 (Dublin, 1969), D.W. Harkness 
explains how Irish representatives at Commonwealth conferences ex-
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panded dominion sovereignty and played a key role in designing the Statute 
of Westminster. Anglo-Irish relations are the topic for Paul Canning, British 
Policy toward Ireland, 1921-1941 (Oxford, 1985); Deirdre McMahon, Repub-
licans and Imperialists: Anglo-Irish Relations in the 1930s (New Haven, Conn., 
1984 ), and "A Transient Apparition: British Policy towards the de Valera 
Government, 1932-1935," Irish Historical Studies 22 (1981); and D.W. Hark-
ness, "Mr. de Valera's Dominion: Ireland's Relations with Britain and the 
Commonwealth, 1932-1938," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 8 
(November 1970), 206-28. InA/most a Rebellion: The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924 
(Cork, 1985), Maryann Gialanella Valiulis discusses how civilian authority 
over the army at a critical time exemplified the liberal-democratic success 
of independent Ireland. World War II tested Ireland's sovereignty and 
aggravated her relations with Britain. These issues are discussed in Joseph 
T. Carroll, Ireland in the War Yean, 1939-1945 (Dublin, 1976); and Kevin B. 
Nowlan and T. Desmond Williams, eds., Ireland in the War Years and After, 
1939-1951 (Dublin, 1969). In Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth-Century 
Ireland (New York, 1977), E. Rumpf and A. C. Hepburn analyze why Irish 
nationalism and unionism, closely tied to sectarian loyalties, have triumphed 
over socialism in attracting popular allegiances. 
The contemporary crisis in Northern Ireland has generated a multi-
tude of books. Patrick Buckland, A History of Northern lreland(Dublin, 1981), 
is a useful volume. Peter Collins, ed., Nationalism and Unionism: Conflict in 
Ireland, 1885-1921 (Belfast, 1994), includes many valuable essays on events 
and issues that resulted in partition. Eamonn Phoenix, Notthern Nationalism: 
Nationalist Politics, Partition, and the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland, 
1890-1940 (Belfast, 1994 ), discusses the anguish of the Catholic community 
in six-county Ulster, isolated from their brethren in the south, persecuted 
by their Protestant neighbors. For readers interested in the background and 
ingredients of the conflict in the six counties, John Darby, Conflict in Notthern 
Ireland: The Development of a Polarized Community (New York, 1976), is the 
best place to start. Darby also edited Notthern Ireland: The Background to the 
Conflict (Syracuse, 1983 ), which has ten essays uneven in quality and not 
well integrated, but the editor's "The Historical background" is first-rate, 
as are Paddy Hillyard, "Law and Order"; Dominic Murray, "Schools and 
Conflict"; and Bill Rolston, "Reformism and Sectarianism: The State of the 
Union after Civil Rights." J. Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles (Dublin, 1993), 
demonstrates thorough research and objectivity and contains an encyclope-
dic amount of material on all aspects of the Ulster crisis. Bell is particularly 
good on terrorism, Irish-American involvement, the impact of the hunger 
strike, and the crisis-management policies of the British government. One 
of the early and most interesting scholarly books on Northern Ireland is 
Rosemary Harris, Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster: A Study of Neighbors and 
Strangen in a Border Community (Manchester, 1972). Harris describes the 
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social and economic relationships between Catholics and Protestants, the 
things that unite and divide them. In The Uncivil Wars: Ireland Today (Boston, 
1983 ), and Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair 
(Boston, 1990), Padraig O'Malley offers perceptive and penetrating studies 
of the Northern Ireland conflict that have the quality of great literature. 
Biting at the Grave shows how Pearse's "blood sacrifice" theories, which 
melded Catholic redemptive theology and revolutionary republicanism, 
persist in Northern Ireland and how they influenced the hunger strike 
mentality. O'Malley makes it clear that to some nationalists the permanence 
of the cause is more important than victory. Andrew J. Wilson's forthcoming 
volume Irish America and the Ulster Conflict, 1967-1987 (Washington, D.C., 
and Belfast, 1995), is the most comprehensive examination of the role of the 
American Irish in the Northern Ireland crisis. 
A number of interesting studies have discussed the cultural and 
social dimensions of partition. M.W. Heslinga, The Irish Border as a Cultural 
Divide: A Contribution to the Study of Regionalism in the British Isles (Assen, 
Netherlands, 1962), pioneered this approach. ES.L. Lyons, Culture and 
Anarchy in Ireland, 1890-1939, insists on the divisiveness of an Irish cultural 
pluralism that involved Irish Catholics, Anglo-Irish Protestants, and Ulster 
Presbyterians. Confronting nationalist myths that blame British ambitions 
for a divided Ireland, Conor Cruise O'Brien, in States of Ireland (New York, 
1973 ), convincingly argues that the Protestant majority culture of Northern 
Ireland is quite distinct from the Irish-Catholic culture of the Republic, and 
that the border is cultural as well as geographic. My "Irish Nationalism and 
Irish Catholicism: A Study in Cultural Identity," Church History 42, 4 (De-
cember 1973), 524-34, emphasizes the inseparability oflrish nationalist and 
Catholic identities and the connection between Anglo-Irish Protestant and 
Presbyterian sectarianism in Northern Ireland and British loyalty. Modifying 
Conor Cruise O'Brien's two-nations theory, David W. Miller, in Queen's 
Rebels: Ulster Loyalism in Historical Perspective (New York, 1978), brilliantly 
discusses and analyzes the origins of Ulster Protestant (mainly Presbyterian) 
loyalism, describing it as a pre-modern Scottish "public banding," from the 
covenanting tradition rather than a cultural nationalism. A.T.Q. Stewart, The 
Narrow Ground: Aspects of Ulster, 1609-1969 (London, 1977), is another 
valuable look at the character and ethos of Ulster Unionism. Geoffrey Bell, 
The Protestants of Ulster(London, 1976), is also recommended. For excellent 
studies of Northern Ireland Catholicism see Oliver P. Rafferty, Catholicism 
in Ulster, 1603-1983 (Columbia, S.C., 1994); and Mary Harris, The Catholic 
Church and the Foundation of the Northern Irish State (Cork, 1993). Both 
volumes discuss a conservative Catholicism making pragmatic adjustments 
to a "Protestant state for a Protestant people." Rafferty suggests that these 
adjustments weakened the Church's response to the Catholic community's 
post-1968 anger and frustration. 
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If Ulster unionism does represent a separate cultural nation or 
community that justifies partition, what about the rights of the large Catholic 
minority in the six counties? Liam Kennedy, Two Ulsters: A Case for Reparti-
tion (Belfast, 1986), and Joseph M. Curran, "Ulster Repartition: A Possible 
Answer," America 134 (January 31, 1976), 66-68, advocate a repartition 
(Curran also favors repatriation) of Northern Ireland, placing most Catholics 
in the Republic. In Partition and the Limits oflrish Nationalism (Dublin, 1987), 
Clare O'Halloran maintains that despite all the grumbling from south of the 
border, partition made it easier for nationalists to create the kind of Catholic 
state they desired. 
The IRA is the subject of Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (London, 1970); 
J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Anny: A History of the IRA, 1916-1970 (London, 
1972); and Patrick Bishop and Eamon Mallie, The Provisional IRA (London 
1987). As their tides suggest, Coogan and Bell offer examinations of the IRA 
from its beginnings while Bishop and Mallie focus on more recent times. 
The Irish National Liberation Army is the most vicious and sadistic of the 
nationalist paramilitary organizations. Jack Holland and Henry McDonald 
tell its story in INLA: Deadly Divisions (Tore, 1994 ). In "Making a Killing: 
The High Cost of Peace in Northern Ireland," Harper's Magazine 288 
(February 1994), 45-54, Scott Anderson exposes paramilitary racketeering 
and the cooperation between nationalist and loyalist groups in controlling 
Belfast building-site employment. 
Some revealing books on the responses of Northern lrelanders, 
nationalists and loyalists, are found in three perceptive, exceptionally well-
written books by Chicago, London, and Irish visitors to the six counties: 
John Conroy, Belfast Diary: War as a Way of Life (Boston, 1987); Sally Belfrage, 
Living with War: A Belfast Year (New York, 1987); and Dervla Murphy's A 
Place Apart (London, 1978). 
The development of Irish historiography since I wrote my first 
version of The Irish Question has advanced in both quality and quantity. No 
doubt in this "Recommended Reading" section I have forgotten or over-
looked works that deserve the attention of readers. For those I have missed 
I apologize to both authors and readers. Although I do not agree with the 
theses of some of the books I have mentioned, I am indebted to all for my 
understanding of Irish history since 1800. 
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